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 The Supreme Court has upheld campaign finance disclosure requirements placed on campaigns 
and other political actors. However, recently, governments have considered an alternative: requirements 
that online platforms maintain, and in some cases publicly publish, records about political ads that they 
run. This thesis examines campaign finance disclosure for online political advertising with a primary 
focus on these newer record-keeping obligations for online platforms. In addition to clarifying existing 
sponsorship disclaimer and reporting requirements, policymakers should establish record-keeping and 
publication requirements placed on online platforms, rebut key points in the Fourth Circuit’s decision in 
Washington Post v. McManus to defend them, and build an empirical record that focuses on how these 
requirements might serve traditional disclosure interests articulated by the Supreme Court in Buckley v. 
Valeo. However, policymakers should also work with platforms and each other to explore alternatives, 
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Chapter One: Background and Project Scope 
 
 For decades, the United States Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of campaign 
finance disclosure requirements1––which include both sponsorship disclaimers as well as obligations to 
report expenditures to the Federal Election Commission (“FEC”).2 In Buckley v. Valeo,3 the Court 
explained that disclosure requirements serve key informational, anti-corruption, and enforcement 
interests.4 Accordingly, disclosure requirements have thus far avoided the First Amendment pitfalls that 
plague, for example, limits on independent expenditures,5 which the Court has concluded impermissibly 
limit the amount of political speech in the marketplace of ideas.6 Campaign finance disclosure generally 
includes two broad elements: first, sponsorship disclaimers on political ads stating who paid for the ad 
and, second, campaign finance reports detailing contributions and expenditures filed with government 
agencies.7 Throughout this thesis, the term “sponsorship disclaimer” will refer to “paid for by” statements 
included on political ads, and the term “reporting requirements” will refer to requirements that campaigns 
and political ad purchasers file campaign finance reports. Although this thesis will touch on sponsorship
                                               
1 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 84 (1976); see also Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 366–67 (2010); McConnell v. 
FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 196 (2003). 
 
2 Abby Wood, Campaign Finance Disclosure, 14 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 11, 13 (2018) [hereinafter Wood, Campaign Finance 
Disclosure]. 
 
3 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
 
4 Id. at 66–68. 
 
5 Federal law defines an independent expenditure as “an expenditure by any person for a communication expressly advocating the 
election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate that is not made in cooperation, consultation, or concert with, or at the request 
or suggestion of, a candidate, a candidate’s authorized committee, or their agents or a political party committee or its agents.” 11 
C.F.R. § 100.16 (2021). 
 
6 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 39 (“It is clear that a primary effect of these expenditure limitations is to restrict the quantity of 
campaign speech by individuals, groups, and candidates. The restrictions, while neutral as to the ideas expressed, limit political 
expression ‘at the core of our electoral process of the First Amendment freedoms.’”). 
 
7 Victoria Smith Ekstrand & Ashley Fox, Regulating the Political Wild West: State Efforts to Disclose Sources of Online Political 
Advertising, 47 J. LEGIS. 81, 90 (2021) (citing Wood, Campaign Finance Disclosure, supra note 2, at 13). 
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disclaimers and campaign finance reports as they relate to online political advertising expenditures in 
certain places, the primary focus of this thesis is on a new form of disclosure obligation: requirements that 
online platforms maintain records and, in some cases, publish records on the political ads that they run.  
 Traditionally, regulatory agencies have instituted requirements designed to increase transparency 
surrounding many forms of political advertising.8 For example, the FEC  requires that certain public 
communications9 and all electioneering communications10 contain a “clear and conspicuous”11 disclaimer 
stating who paid for or authorized the communication.12 Additionally, the FEC imposes reporting 
requirements under which political committees and individuals making certain expenditures, including 
advertising expenditures, must file periodic reports with the agency, and these files are publicly available 
on the FEC’s website.13 The Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) also plays a role in political 
advertising transparency by requiring broadcast television and radio stations to upload records pertaining 
to requests for political ad time into the publicly accessible “Political Files.”14  
                                               
8 See infra text accompanying notes 9–14. 
 
9 Federal law defines a public communication as “a communication by means of any broadcast, cable, or satellite communication, 
newspaper, magazine, outdoor advertising facility, mass mailing, or telephone bank to the general public, or any other form of 
general public political advertising,” where “[t]he term general public advertising” includes “communications placed for a fee on 
another person’s [w]eb site.” 11 C.F.R. § 100.26.  
 
10 Federal law defines an electioneering communication as “any broadcast, cable, or satellite communication that: (1) [r]efers to a 
clearly identified candidate for Federal office; (2) [i]s publicly distributed within 60 days before a general election . . . or within 
30 days before a primary or preference election, or a convention or caucus . . . and (3) [i]s targeted to the relevant electorate.” 11 
C.F.R. § 100.29(a). 
 
11 11 C.F.R. § 110.11(c)(1). 
 
12 Id. § 110.11(b). 
 
13 See 52 U.S.C. § 30104; see also Spending, FED. ELECTION COMM’N, https://www.fec.gov/data/browse-data/?tab=spending (last 
visited Oct. 2, 2020). 
 
14 See About Public Inspection Files, FED. COMMC’N COMM’N, https://publicfiles.fcc.gov/about-station-profiles/ (last visited Oct. 
2, 2020); see also 47 U.S.C. § 315(e)(2) (requiring information like whether the request was accepted; the rate charged; the date 
and time the ad aired; the candidate, election, or political issue discussed in the ad; the identity of ad purchasers who are 
candidates or committees; and addresses and contact information of other ad purchasers); 47 C.F.R. § 73.1943 (requiring 
licensees to maintain records “of all requests for broadcast time made by or on behalf of a candidate for public office”). Cable 
television stations are subject to a set of similar filing requirements. 47 C.F.R. § 76.1701. Under those requirements, “[e]very 
cable television system shall keep and permit public inspection of a complete and orderly record (political file) of all requests of 
cablecast time made by or on behalf of a candidate for public office . . . .” Id. § 76.1701(a). 
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 Notably absent from some of the above regulations is political advertising placed online, most 
often through platforms like Facebook and Google.15 Although some regulatory definitions do encompass 
online political advertising,16 scholars explain that the federal government’s approach to online political 
advertising is still relatively “laissez-faire.”17 For example, at the federal level, the definition of 
“electioneering communications,” expressly exempts “communications over the Internet,”18 and Wood 
and Ravel explain that where some political ads placed online legally should have sponsorship 
disclaimers, they often do not because of a series of seemingly inconsistent decisions from the FEC.19 
Similarly, even when online political advertising is reported to the FEC, various loopholes “make[] it 
difficult for analysts to identify and compare advertising spending across thousands of FEC entries.”20 
Finally, outside of platforms’ own efforts at self-regulation through their voluntary ad archives, nothing 
like the FCC’s “Political Files” exists for advertising that occurs online.21   
 Public concern about the current regulatory gaps surrounding online political advertising 
seemingly increased following reports of Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election.22 As 
part of his investigation, Special Counsel Robert Mueller indicted thirteen Russians and three Russian 
                                               
15 See infra Chapter One Section III.A. 
 
16 See Abby K. Wood & Ann M. Ravel, Fool Me Once: Regulating "Fake news" and Other Online Advertising, 91 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 1223, 1249–50 (2018). 
 
17  Brian Beyersdorf, Note, Regulating the "Most Accessible Marketplace of Ideas in History": Disclosure Requirements in 
Online Political Advertisements after the 2016 Election," 107 CALIF. L. REV. 1061, 1073 (2019); See also infra Chapter One 
Section III.A. 
 
18 11 C.F.R. § 100.29(c)(1). 
 
19 Wood & Ravel, supra note 16, at 1250–51 (2018). 
 
20 For instance, J. Scott Babwah Brennan and Matt Perault at the Center on Science and Technology Policy at Duke University 
recently wrote that the FEC does not currently require reporting certain online advertising expenditures made by consultants in 
certain circumstances, political actors may avoid reporting requirements by using shell companies, and political actors may list 
online advertising expenditures using vague terms like “media” or “ads,” making it difficult to know when expenditures are for 
specific types of online ads or for online ads at all. J. SCOTT BABWAH BRENNAN & MATT PERAULT, BREAKING BLACKOUT BLACK 
BOXES: ROADBLOCKS TO ANALYZING PLATFORM POLITICAL AD BANS 9–12 (2021), 
https://scienceandsociety.duke.edu/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/CSTP-Brief_For-Web_1.pdf. 
 
21 Wood & Ravel, supra note 16, at 1257–59 (asserting that the concept of the Political Files should be updated to include online 
political advertising).   
 




organizations in February 2018 for interfering in U.S. elections.23 In the indictment, Mueller explains that 
the Russian-based Internet Research Agency (“IRA”) “creat[ed] false U.S. personas [and] operated social 
media pages and groups designed to attract U.S. audiences” and sow division among voters in the 2016 
U.S. presidential election.24 Mueller also concluded that while much of Russia’s activity here involved 
unpaid social media content, the defendants also “made various expenditures to carry out [their] activities, 
including buying political advertisements on social media in the names of U.S. persons and entities.”25 
More recently, the Campaign Legal Center asserted that the vulnerabilities that allowed secret influence 
are nothing new as “Congress has failed to update campaign finance law for the digital age, omitting 
many online ads from the reporting requirements that apply to political spending on other mediums.”26  
 The Center points to two dark money groups––“A Better Arizona” and “A Stronger Maine”––as 
two examples.27 Collectively, the groups spent an estimated $847,000 on political advertising through 
Facebook opposing Senators McSally and Collins in the 2020 elections.28 Neither set of ads was reported 
to the FEC because “they don’t expressly tell viewers to vote against Senators McSally and Collins,” and, 
thus, they fall outside of the scope of the FEC’s filing requirements.29 The ads also fell outside of the 
FEC’s disclaimer requirements.30 However, some of the ads would have been subject to other disclaimer 
and reporting requirements if they had appeared on television instead of online.31 In short, current 
                                               
23 Exposing Russia’s Effort to Sow Discord Online: The Internet Research Agency and Advertisements, U.S. HOUSE OF 
REPRESENTATIVES PERMANENT SELECT COMM. ON INTEL., https://intelligence.house.gov/social-media-content/ (last visited Oct. 2, 






26 BRENDAN FISCHER, MAGGIE CHRIST & SOPHIA GONSALVES-BROWN, HOW THE 2020 ELECTIONS REMAIN VULNERABLE TO SECRET 
ONLINE INFLUENCE 5 (2020), https://campaignlegal.org/sites/default/files/2020-08/08-18-20%20Post-
Primary%20Digital%20Ad%20Report%20%28330pm%29.pdf. 
 
27 Id. at 5–7. 
 
28 Id.  
 
29 Id. at 6. 
 
30 Id. at 6. 
 
31 Id. at 6. 
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regulatory gaps allow some online advertising to “remain shrouded in secrecy without breaking any 
laws,” making it more difficult for voters to track ad spending from both foreign and domestic sources.32 
 More broadly, scholars have also expressed concern that “echo chambers” within our online 
environments amplify microtargeted, “inflammatory political advertisements” and hinder the 
effectiveness of counterspeech.33 As a result, “[w]hen audiences are small and like-minded, speakers are 
less likely to be held accountable for their speech,” because the people that would typically push back 
against it either do not hear it or the original audience never hears the response.34 While current empirical 
research shows that political campaigns primarily use online political advertising’s microtargeting 
capabilities to more efficiently reach their supporters, rather than to spread negative advertising or 
malicious messages as many members of the public fear,35 other research suggests that “among political 
ads run by outside groups, narrowly-targeted ads on Facebook are more negative than ads targeted more 
broadly, and that online ads from dark money groups are also more negative.”36 Similarly, although 
political scientists are highly skeptical about the effectiveness of microtargeted political ads in influencing 
how individuals vote,37 others contend that microtargeted ads may indirectly contribute to increased 
polarization.38 Tangentially, for microtargeted misinformation, Karpf asserts that the spread of such 
misinformation contributes to the false idea that voters are easily manipulated, allowing “political elites 
[to] behave as though there is no cost to outright lying or procedural hypocrisy . . . .”39 Overall, what this 
                                               
32 Id. at 7. 
 
33 Philip Napoli, What if More Speech is No Longer the Solution? First Amendment Theory Meets Fake News and the Filter 
Bubble, 70 FED. COMM. L.J. 55, 57, 76–77, 90 (2018); see also Dawn Nunziato, The Marketplace of Ideas Online, 94 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1519, 1527 (2019) (“[I]n the online marketplace of ideas, individuals are increasingly siloed in their own echo 
chambers to an unprecedented degree, such that counterspeech may be of limited effect.”). 
 
34 See Abby K. Wood, Facilitating Accountability for Online Political Advertisements, 16 OHIO ST. TECH. L.J. 520, 525 (2020) 
[hereinafter Wood, Facilitating Accountability]. 
 
35 Erika Franklin Fowler et al., Political Advertising Online and Offline, 115 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 130, 131 (2021). 
 
36 Wood, Facilitating Accountability, supra note 34, at 526–27. 
 
37 See, e.g., David Karpf, On Digital Disinformation and Democratic Myths, MEDIAWELL (Dec. 10, 2019),  
https://mediawell.ssrc.org/expert-reflections/on-digital-disinformation-and-democratic-myths/#.XhDQjYRCzGQ.twitter. 
 




mix of early empirical research and scholarly concerns suggests is that scholars are still learning about 
how targeted online political advertising is used and how it may affect the public.40 
 While we are still learning about the effects of online political advertising, what we do know is 
that, for social media platforms like Facebook in particular, part of what makes online political 
advertising unique compared other forms of political advertising, like ads appearing on television, is how 
political ads on social media are distributed through the platform.41 Thus, putting aside concerns about 
misinformation or maliciously negative or inflammatory advertising, “[e]ven when ads posted online are 
identical in content to those posted on broadcast and radio, they are capable of reaching many more 
people than ads run on TV and radio. Online ads can stay online indefinitely, and once posted, they can be 
retweeted and shared.”42 Consequently, launching effective counterspeech to the same audience can be 
challenging, unless platforms voluntarily offer a mechanism for targeting that same audience.43 
 In response to pressure from journalists, the public, and legislators, online platforms have taken 
self-regulatory measures to increase transparency surrounding political advertising on their platforms.44 
For instance, many large platforms have changed microtargeting policies, implemented their own “paid 
for by” disclaimers, and established publicly accessible ad libraries.45 However, major platforms define 
“political advertising” differently, which makes the information available about political advertising 
                                               
39 Karpf, supra note 37. 
 
40 Wood, Facilitating Accountability, supra note 34, at 526–27. 
 




43 Id. at 534. 
 
44 See Bridget Barrett & Daniel Kreiss, Platform Transience: Changes in Facebook’s Policies, Procedures, and Affordances in 
Global Electoral Politics, 8 INTERNET POL’Y REV. 1, 14 (2019); see also Robert Yablon, Political Advertising, Digital Platforms, 
and the Democratic Deficiencies of Self-Regulation, 104 MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES 13, 14 (2020). 
 
45 BRIDGET BARRETT, DANIEL KREISS, ASHLEY FOX & VICTORIA SMITH EKSTRAND, POLITICAL ADVERTISING ON PLATFORMS IN THE 
UNITED STATES: A BRIEF PRIMER 2 (2019), https://citapdigitalpolitics.com/wp-
content/uploads/2020/01/PlatformAdvertisingPrimer_CITAP.pdf (last accessed Mar. 18, 2021) [hereinafter Political Advertising 
on Platforms in the United States]; see also Comparison of Platforms’ Political Advertising, CTR. INFO. TECH. & PUB. LIFE, 
https://citapdigitalpolitics.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/Platform-comparison-tables.001.jpg (last accessed Mar. 18, 2021). 
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inconsistent across platforms.46 Moreover, the Campaign Legal Center explains that information that 
should appear in the platform’s ad libraries simply does not––pointing hundreds of thousands spent on 
independent expenditures that were run on various platforms and were reported to the FEC but failed to 
show up in political advertising archives maintained by Facebook, Google, Snapchat, and Reddit.47 To 
make matters more confusing, the Center notes that online streaming services, who attracted political 
advertisers in 2020, do not engage in the same self-regulatory measures as platforms like Facebook.48  
 Within government, the U.S. Congress has considered the Honest Ads Act to close loopholes and 
increase transparency surrounding online political advertising.49 Although the Honest Ads Act twice 
passed the House as part of the For the People Act, it has yet to pass the Senate.50 Additionally, following 
the 2016 presidential election, five states have established some form of record-keeping requirement for 
online platforms.51 However, In December 2019 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit declared 
in Washington Post v. McManus52 that Maryland’s law––which requires online platforms to publish 
records about the political ads that they run on the platform––was unconstitutional as applied53 to a group 
of media organizations.54 This decision comes despite filing requirements for broadcasters and Supreme 
Court precedent upholding disclosure requirements placed directly on advertisers.55  
                                               
46 Political Advertising on Platforms in the United States, supra note 45, at 5. 
 
47  Fischer, Christ & Gonsalves-Brown, supra note 26, at 3–4. 
 
48  Id. at 4–5 (“[T]he lack of transparency [about microtargeting on these services] makes it a challenge to address 
misinformation, and difficult for candidates who are the subject of the ads to respond. It also makes it harder for watchdogs, 
journalists, and law enforcement to track spending and detect potential campaign finance violations.”). 
 
49 H.R. 1 § 4201–4211, 117th Cong. (2021) (citing the most recent version of the Honest Ads Act). 
 
50  Actions Overview H.R.1 – 117th Congress (2021-2022), CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-
bill/1/actions (last accessed Mar. 6, 2021); Actions Overview H.R.1 117th Congress (2020-2021), CONGRESS.GOV, 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/1/actions (last accessed Mar. 23, 2020). 
 
51 Ekstrand & Fox, supra note 7, at 104–05. 
 
52 944 F.3d 506 (4th Cir. 2019). 
 
53 “An ‘as applied’ challenge is a claim that the operation of a statute is unconstitutional in a particular case while a facial 
challenge indicates that the statute may rarely or never be constitutionally applied.” 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 243 (2020). 
54 McManus, 944 F.3d at 513. 
 
55 See infra Chapter One Part II; see also McManus, 944 F.3d at 517, 519 (distinguishing Maryland’s law from other campaign 
finance disclosure laws and from regulations placed on broadcasters). 
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 In summary, currently political advertising placed online is not subject to many of the 
requirements that are imposed on political advertising in other mediums,56 and this raises concerns about 
online environments’ vulnerability to misinformation57 and general lack of transparency.58 While online 
platforms have taken self-regulatory measures, the overall effectiveness of self-regulation in this area is 
somewhat questionable.59 Moreover, the Fourth Circuit’s decision in McManus, although an as applied 
challenge, raises questions about how far legislators can constitutionally go in regulating online political 
advertising.60 The purpose of this research thesis is to explore current legislative efforts to address online 
political advertising––with a primary focus on laws that require online platforms to keep or publish 
records about the ads that they run––identify legal pressure points that will likely be issues in determining 
the constitutionality of those record-keeping requirements, and make recommendations that policymakers 
should consider in crafting legislation to regulate online political advertising. Ultimately, policymakers 
should, first, expand and clarify sponsorship disclaimer and reporting requirements to expressly apply to 
online ads. Policymakers should also establish record-keeping and publication requirements for online 
platforms to pull out key disclosure information about the distribution of online political advertising, but 
policymakers must be prepared to push back against key points from the McManus decision and build a 
strong record showing how such requirements should be tailored and why such requirements support 
traditional campaign finance disclosure interests. At the same time, policymakers should also discuss 
future efforts to bring online platforms into disclosure schemes with platforms, to determine what is 
technically feasible, and with each other, to develop a more uniform system across the country. 
 In addition to a background discussion of campaign finance disclosure law and the First 
Amendment and a literature review exploring scholars’ work on the legal context of online political 
                                               
56 See infra Chapter One Part III.A.  
 
57 Fischer, Christ & Gonsalves-Brown, supra note 26, at 4–5. 
 
58 See supra text accompanying notes 33–43. 
 
59 See supra text accompanying notes 44–48. 
 
60 See Ekstrand & Fox, supra note 7, at 107–09. 
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advertising found in this Chapter, this thesis is be composed of three parts, culminating in a final set of 
recommendations for policymakers. First, this thesis examines the Honest Ads Act and state legislation 
seeking to regulate online political advertising, with a primary focus on record-keeping and publication 
obligations placed on online platforms. Second, this thesis examines the Fourth Circuit’s decision in 
McManus as well as the legal and theoretical arguments raised in that case to identify the constitutional 
hurdles for laws that seek to place record-keeping and publication requirements on online platforms and 
identify what the key legal issues will likely be in future litigation over such requirements. Third, this 
thesis considers the expertise of two attorneys who filed amicus briefs in the McManus case as well as 
that of four state regulators in Maryland and Washington through a series of interviews as a means of 
exploring how legislation might withstand judicial scrutiny and how disclosure regulations serve state 
regulators’ goals in achieving greater transparency for online political advertising. 
II. Legal Background: Campaign Finance Disclosure and the First Amendment 
 
 The Supreme Court’s decision in Buckley built the framework for campaign finance law that 
persists today, including the reasoning behind campaign finance disclosure.  In Buckley, the Court 
considered the disclosure requirements established by the Federal Election Campaign Act (“FECA”).61 
The requirements challenged in Buckley required candidates and political committees to keep records and 
file quarterly reports with the FEC about contributions and expenditures and required other individuals 
and groups who make contributions or expenditures to file a statement with the FEC.62 The Court 
explained that compelled disclosure requirements are subject to exacting constitutional scrutiny––as 
opposed to a higher level of strict scrutiny63––and ultimately upheld FECA’s disclosure requirements 
                                               
61 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 84 (1976). 
 
62 Id. at 63–64. 
 
63 Id. at 64. Exacting scrutiny requires that the challenged provisions have a “substantial relation between the governmental 
interest and the information required to be disclosed.” Id. at 64 (internal quotations omitted). In contrast, the higher level of strict 
scrutiny requires the government show that the challenged provision is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government 
interest. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010). 
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against a First Amendment challenge.64 At the same time, the Court invalidated FECA’s limits on 
independent expenditures.65  
 In reaching their conclusion, the Court identified three government interests advanced by the 
disclosure requirements.66 First, the requirements serve an informational interest in that they “provide[] 
the electorate with information as to where political campaign money comes from and how it is spent by 
the candidate.”67 According to the Court, such information allows voters to better evaluate candidates for 
public office and “allows voters to place each candidate in the political spectrum more precisely than is 
often possible solely on the basis of party labels and campaign speeches” by “alert[ing] the voter to the 
interests to which a candidate is most likely to be responsive.”68 Information about campaign money “thus 
facilitate[s] predictions of future performance in office.”69 
 Second, FECA’s disclosure requirements “deter actual corruption and avoid the appearance of 
corruption by exposing large contributions and expenditures to the light of publicity.”70 Since 
contributions and expenditures will be made public, individuals involved in making or receiving them 
will be discouraged from using them for an “improper purpose” or handing out “special favors” both 
before and after elections.71 Moreover, the public who has access to information about contributions and 
expenditures can use that information to check public officials through the democratic process.72 The anti-
                                               
64 Buckley, at 84. 
 
65 Id. at 143. 
 
66 Id. at 66–68. 
 
67 Id. at 66 (internal quotations omitted). 
 








72 Id.  
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corruption interest articulated throughout the Court’s opinion in Buckley is limited to rooting out quid pro 
quo arrangements.73 
 Third, FECA’s disclosure requirements allow the government to better detect violations of other 
campaign finance laws.74 Specifically, the “recordkeeping, reporting, and disclosure requirements are an 
essential means of gathering the data necessary to detect violations of [FECA’s] contribution limitations . 
. . .”75 The Court concluded that all three interests were “substantial,” and “that the disclosure 
requirements certainly in most applications appear to be the least restrictive means of curbing the evils of 
campaign ignorance and corruption . . . .”76 
 The government interests articulated in Buckley in favor of campaign finance disclosure–––and in 
the Court’s analysis striking down independent expenditure limits––seem to be consistent with some of 
the theoretical foundations underlying the First Amendment. For example, the Court’s explanation that 
disclosure requirements ensure that voters get key information to make decisions in the democratic 
process and to hold elected officials accountable,77 seemingly has roots in Alexander Meiklejohn’s theory 
of democratic self-governance. According to Meiklejohn, free speech under the First Amendment is 
primarily valuable when working toward the common goal of self-governance.78 Thus, the First 
Amendment should protect free speech about public matters, and free speech about those matters is part 
                                               
73 See id. at 26–27 (explaining that the danger of large campaign contributions is that they may be used to “secure a political quid 
pro quo”). For example, in distinguishing FECA’s contribution limits and independent expenditure limits, the Court explains that 
independent expenditures carry a low risk of corruption because nothing is given directly to the candidate as a quid pro quo 
arrangement. Id. at 46–47. Unlike a contribution to a campaign, an independent expenditure does not involve coordination with 
the campaign and “may well provide little assistance . . . and indeed may prove counterproductive.” Id. at 47. 
 
74 Id. at 67–68. 
 
75 Id.  
 
76 Id. at 68. 
 
77 Id. at 66–68. 
 
78 See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 24–25 (1948), 
http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/UW/UW-idx?type=header&id=UW.MeikFreeSp&isize=M (stating that freedom of speech 




of the social compact put forth in the Constitution.79 To support a system of self-governance, Cass 
Sunstein writes that “[a] well-functioning system of deliberative democracy requires [that citizens have] a 
certain degree of information so that citizens can engage in their monitoring and deliberative tasks.”80  
Applying these ideas to the informational interests for campaign finance disclosure requirements 
articulated in Buckley, a theory of democratic self-governance would seemingly approve of such 
disclosure requirements as a means of giving voters full information and a common set of facts from 
which they could engage in valuable debate about political candidates.81 
 Similarly, the Court’s concern with corruption and the appearance of corruption in Buckley,82 
seemingly relates to what Zephyr Teachout describes as the founders’ concern with corruption at the time 
that they were drafting the constitution.83 According to Teachout, primary documents from the time of the 
founding reveal that the principle of anti-corruption was as inherent in the structure of the U.S. 
government as the principles of federalism or separation of powers.84 Teachout points to numerous 
clauses in the constitution––such as the presidential impeachment process and splitting responsibilities 
between both chambers of Congress––as measures to avoid the potential of corruption among 
politicians.85 However, Teachout also asserts that the founding fathers had a much broader view of what 
constitutes corruption than the quid pro quo articulated by the Court in Buckley and beyond, and, instead, 
the founding fathers thought of political corruption as the “self-serving use of public power, for private 
                                               
79 See id. at 38–39 (asserting that there are two types of freedom of speech, where the Fifth Amendment protects private speech, 
the First Amendment protects speech on public matters necessary for self-governance). 
 
80 CASS SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM 2.0 196 (2007). 
 
81 See Brief for Amici Curiae Campaign Legal Center and Common Cause Maryland in Support of Defendants-Appellants at 35, 
Wash. Post v. McManus, 944 F.3d 506 (4th Cir. 2019) (No. 19-1132) (“To fully participate in the political process, however, 
voters need enough information to determine who supports which positions and why.”). 
 
82 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 67. 
 
83 Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 341, 342 (2009). 
 
84 Id. at 342. 
 




ends . . . .”86 Accordingly, Teachout criticizes the Court’s opinion in Buckley, writing that “[w]hile the 
Framers [of the constitution] were concerned about citizens who wanted to use government to serve their 
own ends, the Buckley justices were most concerned about citizens who had grown cynical about 
government.”87 
 In contrast to the Court’s holding on FECA’s disclosure requirements, the Court in Buckley 
invalidated FECA’s limits on independent expenditures as “substantial restraints on the quantity of 
political speech.”88 By limiting the amount that “individuals, groups, and candidates” could spend on 
campaign speech, “[t]he restrictions . . . limit[ed] political expression ‘at the core of our electoral process 
and of the First Amendment freedoms.’”89 The Court’s reasoning in this portion of the opinion is 
consistent with the idea that the First Amendment is designed to protect a robust marketplace of ideas.90 
Marketplace theory asserts that ideas should be freely expressed rather than censored or restricted in some 
other manner and that the truth will emerge through free debate and counterspeech.91 Ultimately, under 
marketplace theory, individuals should determine the veracity or value of ideas themselves rather than 
having the government dictate to them what speech is worthy of their attention.92 The U.S. Supreme Court 
has a strong history of applying marketplace theory to “virtually every arena of First Amendment law,” 
                                               
86 Id. at 374. 
 
87 Id. at 386. 
 
88 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 39 (1976). 
 
89 Id. (quoting Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 32 (1968)). 
 
90 The “marketplace of ideas” is often traced to Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’s dissent in Abrams v. United States. Rodney A. 
Smolla, The Meaning of the “Marketplace of Ideas in First Amendment Law,” 24 COMMC’N L. & POL’Y 347, 437 (2019). There, 
Holmes wrote, “But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe even more than 
they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas––
that the best test of truth is the power of thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only 
ground upon which their wishes can safely be carried out . . . I think that we should be eternally vigilant against attempts to check 
the expression of opinions that we loath and believe to be fraught with death, unless they so imminently threaten immediate 
interference with the lawful and pressing purposes of the law that an immediate check is required to save the country.” Id. at 438 
(quoting Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)) (emphasis added). 
 
91 See generally JOHN STUART MILL, Of the Liberty of Thought and Discussion, in ON LIBERTY (1859), 
https://www.utilitarianism.com/ol/two.html. 
 
92 See id.; see also Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 356 (2010) (“When Government seeks to use its full power . . . to 
command where a person may get his or her information or what distrusted source he or she may not hear, it uses censorship to 
control thought. This is unlawful. The First Amendment confirms the freedom to think for ourselves.”). 
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and “[o]pinions invoking the marketplace metaphor––literally or conceptually––number over one 
hundred, and opinions that rely on the concept, at least in passing, are double that number.”93 In the 
context of campaign finance specifically, the Court has generally expressed concern regarding provisions 
that will result in less political speech in the marketplace of ideas.94  
 The legacy of the framework articulated in Buckley has carried through to the Court’s later 
campaign finance decisions.95 In particular, the Court has continued to use the logic of Buckley to uphold 
later campaign finance disclosure requirements.96 In McConnell v. FEC,97 the Court upheld the Bipartisan 
Campaign Reform Act’s (“BCRA”) disclosure requirements for electioneering communications.98 
Comparing the requirements to FECA’s requirements considered in Buckley, the Court reasoned that “the 
important state interests that prompted the Buckley Court to uphold FECA’s disclosure requirements––
providing the electorate with information, deterring actual corruption and avoiding any appearance 
thereof, and gathering the data necessary to enforce more substantive electioneering restrictions––apply in 
full to BCRA.”99 Echoing the District Court, the Supreme Court in McConnell was relatively 
unsympathetic to the plaintiffs’ argument that the disclosure requirements burdened their First 
Amendment rights by forcing them to identify themselves, explaining that the plaintiffs’ argument instead 
“ignore[d] the competing First Amendment interests of individual citizens seeking to make informed 
choices in the political marketplace.”100 Additionally, the Court in McConnell also upheld BCRA’s 
                                               
93 Smolla, supra note 90, at, 439. 
 
94 See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 39 (1976) (invalidating limits on independent expenditures as an unconstitutional 
restraint on the quantity of campaign speech in the marketplace); Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 366 (noting that while spending 
limits inevitably limit the quantity of speech in the marketplace, disclosure requirements do not and are therefore less 
constitutionally problematic). 
 
95 See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 196 (2003); see also Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 366–67, 371. 
 
96 See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 196; see also Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 366–67. 
 
97 540 U.S. 93 (2003). 
 
98 Id. at 194–96. 
 
99 Id. at 196. 
 
100 Id. at 197 (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 237 (D.D.C. 2003)). 
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amendment of the Communications Act of 1934.101 That amendment created additional record-keeping 
requirements for broadcasters distributing “politically related broadcasts.”102 While the plaintiffs 
characterized the requirements as “burdensome and invasive,”103 the Court pointed to the broad regulatory 
authority of the FCC and concluded that the requirements did not impose a significant burden compared 
to similar, already-existing requirements.104 
 In 2010, the Court in Citizens United v. FEC105 considered an as applied challenge to BCRA’s 
disclosure requirements, this time brought by Citizens United, a nonprofit corporation who produced the 
documentary Hillary in opposition to Hillary Clinton during her 2008 campaign for the Democratic 
nomination for president.106 BCRA required that the film and related advertisements, as electioneering 
communications, abide by sponsorship disclaimer requirements identifying Citizens United as the party 
responsible for the advertising and disclosure requirements reporting “the person making the expenditure, 
the amount of the expenditure, the election to which the communication was directed, and the names of 
certain contributors.”107 Relying on Buckley, the Court applied exacting scrutiny and upheld the 
requirements’ application to Citizens United.108 The Court explained that “[t]he First Amendment protects 
political speech; and disclosure permits citizens and shareholders to react to the speech of corporate 
entities in a proper way. This transparency enables the electorate to make informed decisions and give 
proper weight to different speakers and messages.”109 Distinguishing disclosure requirements from other 
campaign finance measures, like limitations on the amount parties may spend on political advertising, the 
                                               
101 Id. at 233–34. 
 
102 Id. (citing 47 U.S.C. § 315(e)). 
 
103 Id. at 235. 
 
104 See id. at 234–46. 
 
105 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 
106 Id. at 366. 
 
107 Id.  
 
108 Id. at 366–67, 371.  
 
109 Id. at 371. 
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Court noted that “[d]isclaimer and disclosure may burden the ability to speak, but they impose no ceiling 
on campaign-related activities . . . and do not prevent anyone from speaking.”110 
 While the Court has upheld campaign finance disclosure requirements, it has also recognized that 
there are weighty First Amendment interests against disclosure generally.111 For example, in McIntyre v. 
Ohio Elections Commission,112 the Court struck down an Ohio law requiring that campaign pamphlets 
include a disclaimer identifying the pamphlet’s source.113 There, the Court explained that the desire to 
remain anonymous “may be motivated by fear of economic or official retaliation, by concern about social 
ostracism, or merely by a desire to preserve as much of one’s privacy as possible.”114 Similarly, in 
NAACP v. Alabama,115 the Court concluded that an Alabama law requiring the NAACP to maintain a list 
of names and addresses of members imposed a substantial restraint on members’ associational rights 
under the First Amendment by subjecting them to economic retaliation, physical threats, and public 
hostility.116  
 Even within the traditional campaign finance realm, the Court in Buckley noted that although 
“disclosure requirements impose no ceiling on campaign-related activities[,] . . . we have repeatedly 
found that compelled disclosure, in itself, can seriously infringe on privacy of association and belief 
guaranteed by the First Amendment.”117 Accordingly, disclosure requirements are not automatically 
constitutional by any means, and “[t]here could well be a case . . . where the threat to the exercise of First 
                                               
110 Id. at 366 (internal quotations and citations omitted). Although the Court in Citizens United upheld BCRA’s disclosure 
requirements’ application to Citizens United, the case is best known for its holding that prohibitions on the use of corporate 
treasury funds to make independent expenditures violate the First Amendment. See id. at 365 (“[T]he Government may not 
suppress political speech on the basis of the speaker’s corporate identity. No sufficient governmental interest justifies limits on 
the political speech of nonprofit or for-profit corporations.”). 
 
111 See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 341–42 (1995). 
 
112 514 U.S. 334 (1995).  
 
113 Id. at 357. 
 
114 Id. at 341–42. 
 
115 357 U.S. 449 (1958). 
 
116 Id. at 462. 
 
117 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64 (1976).  
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Amendment rights is so serious and the stated interest furthered by disclosure so insubstantial that 
[disclosure] requirements cannot be constitutionally applied.”118 For example, in Brown v. Socialist 
Workers ’74 Campaign Committee,119 the Supreme Court similarly held that Ohio’s campaign finance law 
requiring political parties “to report the names and addresses of campaign contributors and recipients of 
campaign disbursements” was unconstitutional as applied to the Socialist Workers’ Party (“SWP”) 
because this public disclosure had resulted in threatening incidents against SWP members, including 
“threatening phone calls and hate mail, the burning of SWP literature, the destruction of SWP members’ 
property, police harassment of a party candidate, and the firing of shots at an SWP office.”120 
 Reviewing the Supreme Court’s prior precedent regarding campaign finance disclosure is crucial 
to considering the constitutionality of future measures seeking to increase disclosure of political 
advertising that occurs in online environments. In particular, where those new regulatory measures seek to 
impose disclosure requirements on online platforms that distribute political advertising as opposed to on 
political advertisers themselves as disclosure requirements have done in the past, looking to the legal 
reasoning inherent in the Court’s prior decisions can provide insight into whether new regulatory 
measures fall within the Court’s precedent or outside of its scope.  
III. Literature Review 
 
 This literature review discusses current scholarship about online political advertising by noting 
the loopholes in existing campaign finance law that allow some online political advertising to go 
relatively unregulated,121 exploring platforms’ self-regulatory measures,122 outlining scholars’ proposed 
solutions to regulatory loopholes,123 and examining federal inaction and state action to address online 
                                               
118 Id. at 71. 
 
119 459 U.S. 87 (1982). 
 
120 Id. at 88, 99. 
 
121 See infra Chapter One Part III.A. 
 
122 See infra Chapter One Part III.B. 
 
123 See infra Chapter One Part III.C. 
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political advertising.124 This discussion sets the foundation for understanding this thesis’s further 
examination of federal proposals and state legislation to address online political advertising, in-depth 
examination of the Fourth Circuit’s McManus decision, and proposed recommendations for further 
legislation or litigation in this area. 
(A) The Online Political Advertising Loophole 
 
 Numerous scholars have explained that the current regulatory scheme that governs political 
advertising on traditional media often does not apply to political advertising that occurs online thanks to 
definitional loopholes and ill-fitting regulatory exceptions.125 Beyersdorf describes this as the 
government’s “laissez-faire approach to online political communication.”126 For instance, the federal 
definition of “electioneering communication” does not include online communications.127 Additionally, 
while the federal definition of “public communication” does include some paid advertising distributed 
online,128 this limitation to only paid advertising allows advertisements that are created and independently 
uploaded without a fee by social media users to go unregulated.129 Moreover, television stations that air 
political advertisements must maintain records about political advertising transactions and upload this 
                                               
124 See infra Chapter One Part III.D. 
 
125 See Laura C. Bartelt, Note, Citizens United and Political Advertisements: Corporations' Lucky Loophole to the Unregulated 
Internet, 37 J. CORP. L. 415, 420–21 (2012); see also Beyersdorf, supra note 17, at 1073; Wood & Ravel, supra note 16, at 1248–
50. 
 
126 Beyersdorf, supra note 17, at 1073. 
 
127 Bartelt, supra note 125, at 420–21. Federal law defines an electioneering communication as “any broadcast, cable, or satellite 
communication that: (1) [r]efers to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office; (2) [i]s publicly distributed within 60 days 
before a general election . . . or within 30 days before a primary or preference election, or a convention or caucus . . . and (3) [i]s 
targeted to the relevant electorate.” 11 C.F.R. § 100.29(a) (emphasis added). This definition later expressly exempts 
“communications over the Internet.” Id. § 100.29(c)(1). 
 
128 See Wood & Ravel, supra note 16, at 1249–50. Federal law defines a public communication as “a communication by means of 
any broadcast, cable, or satellite communication, newspaper, magazine, outdoor advertising facility, mass mailing, or telephone 
bank to the general public, or any other form of general public political advertising,” where “[t]he term general public 
advertising” includes “communications placed for a fee on another person’s [w]eb site.”  11 C.F.R. § 100.26 (emphasis added). 
Similarly, federal law notes that an “independent expenditure” is simply an “expenditure for a communication” of express 
advocacy made without coordination with a candidate or political party. Id. § 100.16 (emphasis added). Thus––like public 
communications and unlike electioneering communications––independent expenditures arguably include online political 
advertising. 
 
129 Bartelt, supra note 125, at 421, 428–29; see also Wood & Ravel, supra note 16, at 1249. 
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information to the FCC “Political Files” for public inspection;130 however,  no such requirement exists for 
online platforms that distribute political advertising.131  
 Furthermore, Wood and Ravel contend that many paid online political ads that arguably should 
have sponsorship disclaimers under the law simply do not.132 Instead, ad purchasers or online platforms 
hosting the ads try to fit paid online political ads into regulatory exceptions, like the “small items” 
exception, traditionally used for objects like buttons and bumper stickers, and the “impracticable” 
exception, traditionally used for advertising in places like water towers or forms like skywriting where 
including a disclaimer would be too difficult.133 Although these exceptions were designed for content 
other than online political advertising, platforms like Facebook have asked the FEC to apply them to 
advertisements on their platform.134 Following a 2011 deadlock at the FEC that was interpreted by 
Facebook as an exception to the sponsorship disclaimer requirement, the FEC later determined in 2017 
that character-limited political advertisements on Facebook do require a sponsorship disclaimer, but the 
agency failed to agree on a rationale as to why.135 That same year, the FEC also issued an advisory 
opinion that “failed to decide whether nonconnected political committees136 may use Twitter without 
placing a disclaimer on their Twitter profiles.”137 According to Wood and Ravel, “[t]his opinion gives the 
                                               
130 Christopher Terry, Candidate Appearances, Equal Time, and the FCC's Online Public File Database: Empirical Data on TV 
Station Compliance During the 2016 Presidential Primary, 25 CATH. U.J.L. & TECH. 341, 345 (2017). 
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136 Wood and Ravel define nonconnected political committees as “a class of committees that includes Leadership PACs and 
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green light to groups that want to hide behind Twitter handles and not reveal even the group’s website or 
physical address.”138 
 Opponents of campaign finance disclosure regulations in any context, whether that be online or 
on other traditional mediums, contend that disclosure may result in retaliation for expressing a certain 
political view or impose a heavy compliance burden, where reporting requirements specifically may be 
“too onerous and confusing.”139 As a result, requirements may chill speech and discourage participation in 
the political marketplace of ideas.140 Ortiz contends that campaign finance reformers base their position 
on the idea that the electorate is incapable of sorting through the marketplace of ideas to make democratic 
decisions for themselves and premise their arguments “on a single fear: that, left to themselves, various 
political actors will transform economic power into political power and thereby violate the democratic 
norm of equal empowerment.”141 
 However, scholars also note that a lack of regulation in the specific context of online political 
advertising can have negative consequences for the marketplace of ideas online and the democratic 
process.142 After categorizing fake news as a form of native advertising,143 Wood and Ravel explain that a 
lack of transparency surrounding online political advertising can hinder voters’ ability to detect mis- and 
disinformation caused by foreign election interference.144 Arguing that the source of this mis- and 
disinformation is more difficult to track without disclosures, Wood and Ravel also note that social media 
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users who may not have bad intentions may “unwittingly support the Russian disinformation campaign by 
reacting to, commenting on, and sharing sensational stories with their social media networks.”145  
 However, scholars contend the potential negative consequences of allowing online political 
advertising to go unregulated extend beyond foreign election interference.146 For example, Bartelt notes 
that corporations can influence elections by paying to produce online advertising and then uploading that 
to sites like YouTube as an independent video, thereby avoiding disclosure requirements because the 
video is not technically a “public communication[]” since it was not placed for a fee.147 Thus, “[b]y 
removing the disclosure requirement, the risk of consumer backlash against corporate contributions used 
to fund such advertisements diminishes.”148  
 Additionally, Wood and Ravel have expressed concern about the practice of microtargeting of 
political ads online.149 Barnard and Kreiss explain that political campaigns utilize platforms’ 
microtargeting tools to efficiently target their political base and identify swing voters.150 Although 
microtargeting can be a valuable tool for campaigns, Wood and Ravel explain that the lack of 
transparency and disclosure surrounding microtargeting practices can also have negative effects for the 
public.151 For instance, in the context of election interference, Wood and Ravel note that Russia engaged 
in microtargeting of certain audiences to distribute propaganda during the 2016 election.152 However, 
even outside of intentional election interference from foreign countries, Wood and Ravel contend that 
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microtargeting of disinformation can undermine the democratic process because different groups can be 
presented with different sets of “facts.”153 According to Barrett and Kreiss: 
The fact that not all citizens of any given country likely saw the same social cues to vote means 
that some have powerful prompts to turnout, and therefore some citizens' voices are 
disproportionately heard. With respect to data and targeting, the lack of transparency around key 
changes in things such as the targeting of political ads means that citizens cannot hope to know 
why they are seeing the messages they are––and journalists and regulators cannot answer 
questions regarding who receives political messages driving them to the polls, or keeping them 
home with respect to demobilizing ads.154 
 
 More broadly, scholars note that the structure of contemporary online environments creates “echo 
chambers” that can amplify “inflammatory political advertisements,” undermine the functioning of 
democracy, and hinder the ability of counterspeech to be effective in the marketplace of ideas.155 Wood 
and Ravel contend that the lack of transparency regarding microtargeting of online political 
advertisements may contribute to these problems, leading to increased polarization where “voters will 
come to think of politics as less a common project than an occasion for expressing and affirming their 
narrow identities and interests.” 156  
 In essence, the current world of online political advertising is messy––in some cases, reporting 
requirements are insufficiently detailed to provide value,157 disclaimer requirements are not clearly 
applied,158 some disclosure rules simply do not exist,159 and microtargeting and the structure of our online 
environments, particularly on social media, make it difficult to track who sees what.160 The ultimate result 
                                               
153 Id. at 1236. 
 
154 Barrett & Kreiss, supra note 44, at 16. 
 
155 See Napoli, supra note 33, at 55, 57, 76–77, 90; see also Nunziato, supra note 33, at 1527. 
 
156 Wood & Ravel, supra note 16, at 1236 (quoting Christopher S. Elmendorf & Abby K. Wood, Elite Political Ignorance: Law, 
Data, and the Representation of (Mis)Perceived Electorates, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 571 (Dec. 2018) (manuscript at 35) 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3034685). 
 
157 See Babwah Brennan & Perault, supra note 20, at 12. 
 
158 See Wood & Ravel, supra note 16, at 1250–51. 
 
159 See Bartelt, supra note 125, at 420–21 (explaining that, under federal law, the definition of “electioneering communication” 
does not include online advertising). 
 
160 See Wood, Facilitating Accountability, supra note 34, at 534–36. 
 23 
 
is confusion for researchers and a lack of transparency for the public. To address concerns about the lack 
of transparency surrounding online political advertising, platforms that host these advertisements have 
undertaken self-regulatory measures.161 Alternatively, scholars writing in this area have proposed closing 
current regulatory gaps,162 and federal and state legislators have either proposed or enacted legislation to 
do so. 163 
(B) Platform Self-Regulation 
 
 All social media platforms––like Facebook, Twitter, or YouTube––engage in content 
moderation,164 and, as result, while online “[p]latforms may not shape public discourse by themselves, [] 
they do shape the shape of public discourse.”165 In the context of political content and political 
advertising, platform policies can change often and “dramatically.”166 Barrett and Kreiss describe this 
phenomenon as “platform transience,” which “captures the idea that platform change is fast and continual, 
and as a result they are impermanent and ephemeral in significant ways.”167 As more campaigns rely on 
political advertising distributed on online platforms like Facebook to get their message out, these 
continuous changes have significant implications for campaigns that must reevaluate how they create 
advertisements as well as how they evaluate advertisements’ cost and efficiency.168 Ultimately, “[t]he 
rules [the] platforms adopt––or fail to adopt––thus directly shape the campaigns the public sees.”169 
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 Following reports of foreign election interference in recent electoral contests like the 2016 
presidential election in the United States and Brexit in the United Kingdom, social media platforms have 
faced public pressure from journalists, legislative policymakers, and activists to implement measures to 
protect electoral integrity and promote greater transparency about who purchases advertisements on these 
platforms.170 The platforms themselves have taken note, implementing a number of continuously 
changing measures.171 For example, both Facebook and Google restricted targeting options for political 
advertising;172 Facebook and Google require advertisers to verify their identity;173 most major platforms 
have implemented requirements establishing “paid for by” disclaimers in the absence of clear federal 
regulation;174 and most major platforms continue to refine political advertising libraries where users can 
get information about political advertisements run on the platform.175 However, platforms also define 
“political advertising” differently––and often broadly––making it difficult for the public to draw 
comparisons across platforms and resulting in inconsistent levels of transparency.176 Thus, a user on 
Facebook and a user on Google could potentially both see the same advertisement and receive different 
levels of information about that advertisement.177 
 On a broader scale, platforms have taken varying overall approaches as to whether they will even 
accept political advertising.178 For instance, while Facebook has generally taken what could be described 
as a “counterspeech” approach focusing on giving users more information about political content on the 
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platform rather than restricting it or arbitrating its truthfulness,179 Twitter has banned political advertising 
from its platform altogether.180 However, even Facebook, citing concerns about misinformation, banned 
new political advertising in the week before the 2020 U.S. presidential election.181 Moreover, both 
Facebook and Google have restricted political advertising from specific states in response to new record-
keeping and disclosure requirements for platforms that host political advertising on state candidates and 
ballot measures in those states.182 Thus, not only are political advertising policies inconsistent in scope 
and application across platforms, but outright bans on political advertising have been criticized as posing 
significant challenges for campaigns, and particularly for non-incumbents with fewer resources, trying to 
get their message out before election day.183 
 According to Yablon, while “[p]latforms often use democratic rhetoric to justify their political 
advertising policies[,]” they create those policies in undemocratic ways.184 Specifically, rather than 
include platform users in formulating their policies, “the story of platform self-regulation of political 
advertising is a story of powerful technology industry elites working with powerful political elites to 
produce a veneer of democratic reform.”185 As a result, Yablon critiques platforms’ political advertising 
policies as “band-aid[]” solutions that are a reflection of political professionals’ preferences rather than a 
move toward benefiting the general public.186  
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 Examining the internal decision-making processes of Google and Facebook––who together 
account for fifty-eight percent of online advertising187––Kreiss and McGregor found that political 
advertising policies are the product of internal debates among varying perspectives.188 Thus, according to 
Kreiss and McGregor, “thinking of these firms as one unified actor, as a monolithic platform, is 
misleading; they are composed of individuals and teams with different perspectives and views that come 
to bear during debates over paid and other content.”189 Moreover, the ways that policies surrounding 
political advertising content are enforced are influenced by negotiations between political communication 
practitioners and platform employees.190 However, for practitioners, platforms’ review of political 
advertising content largely remains a “black box” with little transparency.191 At the same time, Facebook 
employees in particular have expressed an unwillingness to police the veracity of political advertising and 
paid promotions on the platform, instead pointing to counterspeech as a means of rectifying misleading 
content.192 Ultimately, Kreiss and McGregor concluded that “there is a fundamental tension at play 
between Facebook’s desire to be an arbiter of political attention and avoid being an arbiter of political 
truth.”193 
  According to Barrett and Kreiss, “[a]t the core of” platforms’ rapid policy changes surrounding 
online political advertising “is the likelihood that platforms can create fundamentally unequal information 
environments.”194 Consequently, the public has little insight into “the ways that political content is being 
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delivered, and political attention structured, by campaigns and the platform itself.”195 Yablon asserts that 
“the realities of platform self-regulation” may make some form of government regulation a more 
attractive option.196  Ultimately, Yablon writes, “we face a choice not between regulated campaigns and 
unregulated ones, but rather a choice about who regulates.”197 Although the self-regulatory efforts of 
individual platforms like Facebook and Google are admirable, differing approaches taken by various 
private parties do not fully address the online political advertising problem as a whole. While a platform 
like Facebook may make individual decisions that increase the transparency of advertising on Facebook 
or within Facebook’s ad network, the ability to increase transparency as a whole is undermined when that 
approach is different than an approach taken by other platforms because it makes it more difficult to track 
advertising across platforms. Thus, legal solutions that would apply across platforms stand in a better 
position to address online political advertising as a whole than individual actions by individual platforms. 
(C) Proposed Scholarly Solutions 
 
 Scholars who have proposed reform efforts to address online political advertising largely seek to 
increase transparency through government regulation.198 For instance, Wood and Ravel propose that 
“groups producing large amounts” of online political ads be “required to register with election 
administrators.”199 However, they do not propose a spending threshold at which such a requirement 
should be triggered.200 Moreover, Wood and Ravel also propose disclosure and sponsorship disclaimer 
requirements––including disclaimers that include an ad purchaser’s top donors for ads bought by political 
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committees201 ––for political ads appearing online.202 Finally, Wood and Ravel propose a publicly 
accessible repository containing copies of all online political advertisements as well as “when the 
communications ran; how much they cost to place and promote; candidates to which the communications 
refer; contested seat/issues mentioned; targeting criteria used; number of people targeted; and a platform-
provided Audience identifier.”203 They describe this as “simply an improved version of the [FCC] 
Political File[s] for television commercials.”204 The FCC Political Files themselves contain a wide range 
of information on political advertisements that run on television stations, including “whether the request 
to purchase broadcast time was accepted, the rate charged, when the message aired, . . . and the name of 
the candidate, description of the election, or in the case of issue advertising, the issue . . . discussed.”205 
The FCC also requires “[a]dditional disclosures . . . including the name of the [campaign organization’s] 
treasurer, the name of the person purchasing the time, and contact information [for the campaign 
organization].”206  
 Similar to Wood and Ravel, Usoro argues for a “medium-specific First Amendment analysis of 
the Internet” in the same way that the federal government currently regulates political advertising in radio 
and television mediums.207 There, she specifically contends that the sponsorship disclaimer requirements 
for political advertising on radio and television statements should simply be extended to include political 
advertising that occurs online.208  
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 Wood and Ravel contend that providing more information about online political advertising, like 
how specific advertising is targeted to certain voters, can encourage counterspeech among groups, who 
might not otherwise know which advertising messages a particular audience sees, and allow 
counterspeech to be more effective.209 Although Wood notes that more research is needed to test whether 
the Supreme Court’s assumption that campaign finance disclosure provides voters with valuable 
information is accurate,210 Wood and Spencer also explain that the public may use disclosure information 
as a heuristic to inform voting behavior.211 Wood also previously found that the public generally values 
campaign finance disclosure.212 In a survey of 2,000 respondents, approximately “75% . . . reported 
seeking out disclosure information ‘at least some of the time,’ and 66% of respondents reported that the 
amount of campaign finance information a candidate discloses is either ‘important or very important.’”213  
 At the same time, Sunstein, in his recent work on the value of disclosure regulations primarily in 
consumer contexts, contends that people have limited time and are already inundated with so much 
information that they simply cannot process all of it.214 Sunstein asserts that instead of blindly relying on 
disclosure regulations as a solution to numerous regulatory problems, public officials should instead 
require disclosure “[w]hen information would significantly improve people’s lives,” such as giving 
people the information that they need to make better choices related to health care, finances, time 
management, or personal happiness.215 Accordingly, regulators should take an empirical approach to 
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weigh the costs and benefits of disclosure requirements.216 Ultimately, Sunstein urges that “[t]ime is the 
most precious commodity that human beings have[,] [and] [p]ublic officials should find ways to give 
them more of it.”217  While Sunstein does not write specifically about campaign finance disclosure, his 
discussion of regulatory disclosure in the consumer context ties back to Wood’s contention that additional 
research is needed to test the Supreme Court’s assumptions in this area and determine how best to 
implement disclosure.218 In short, although implementing disclosure requirements to increase 
transparency surrounding online political advertising may seem like an obvious solution, it is important 
for regulators to remember that assumptions that disclosure will make people into better-informed citizens 
or make platforms into more responsible actors may not be fully accurate, particularly if regulations are 
not implemented in a way that is effective or if citizens simply do not have the time to give it attention.  
(D) Federal Inaction and State Legislative Action 
 
 In response to current loopholes for online political advertising, Senator Amy Klobuchar, Senator 
Mark Warner, and the late-Senator John McCain proposed the Honest Ads Act in 2017.219 The most 
recent version of the bill passed the House in March 2021 as part of the For the People Act.220 The Honest 
Ads Act consists of four main points: (1) expanding key definitions to include online political advertising, 
(2) establishing disclaimer requirements for online political advertising, (3) mandating that platforms 
hosting online political ads maintain publicly accessible records and include sponsorship disclaimers, and 
(4) requiring online platforms and television and radio stations to undertake “reasonable efforts” to ensure 
foreign nationals have not purchased advertisements they run.221 A previous version of the Honest Ads 
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Act sat in the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration since May 2019.222 The For the People Act, 
which incorporates the provisions of the Honest Ads Act and introduces other measures related to voting 
and elections,223 has twice passed the House224 and was first introduced in the Senate in March 2019 and 
again in March 2021.225 This thesis will explore disclosure related to online political advertising, with a 
primary focus on requirements placed on online platforms.  The Honest Ads Act includes such record-
keeping and publication requirements for online platforms,226 and, in general, some scholars agree that the 
Act as a whole is a step in the right direction.227  
 While federal action to address online political advertising remains at a standstill, several states 
have undertaken legislative efforts since the 2016 U.S. presidential election to expressly address 
loopholes in state laws for online political advertising about state candidates and ballot measures.228 
Specifically, from November 2016 to April 2020, eight states established sponsorship disclaimer 
requirements for political advertisements that appear online and five of those eight states also established 
some form of record-keeping disclosure requirement that mandates either the state or the platform hosting 
the advertisement to maintain records containing information about the ads, such as who purchased the 
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advertisement, the cost of the advertisement, and the audience targeted.229 Ekstrand and Fox argue that the 
record-keeping requirements seemingly fit within the goals articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court when 
upholding traditional campaign finance disclosure regulations because they are designed to “increase 
transparency and better allow voters to evaluate the information they receive through these ads.”230 
 In December 2019, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Washington Post v. 
McManus ruled that provisions of Maryland’s law addressing online political advertising were 
unconstitutional as applied to the plaintiffs, who were media organizations.231 There, the Fourth Circuit 
held that Maryland’s requirements that online platforms hosting political advertisements maintain records 
about those advertisements––the “publication requirement”––and provide information about those 
advertisements to the Maryland State Board of Elections upon request––the “inspection requirement”––
violated the plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights.232 The Fourth Circuit concluded that the provisions were 
both overbroad and underinclusive to achieve Maryland’s asserted interest in preventing foreign 
interference in U.S. elections because Maryland failed to demonstrate how the plaintiffs’ platforms 
specifically were involved in those interference efforts, and the provisions did not address unpaid content, 
where most interference efforts took place.233 The Fourth Circuit also distinguished Maryland’s 
requirements from campaign finance disclosure requirements upheld by the Supreme Court, noting that 
while traditional campaign finance disclosure requirements target “direct participants in the political 
process,” Maryland’s requirements were placed on third-party platforms who may simply decide to stop 
selling political advertising space, thereby chilling the marketplace of ideas.234  
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 Parsons critiques the Fourth Circuit’s opinion in McManus and its use of the marketplace of ideas 
model, arguing that online platforms’ decisions to prohibit political advertising on their platforms does 
not chill political speech or silence any political actor because political actors are only prohibited from 
paying for speech, not from speaking.235 Instead, Parsons asserts that courts should use what he describes 
as an “attentional-choice theory of competition,” rather than the Supreme Court’s traditional conception 
of the marketplace metaphor, to evaluate the constitutionality of campaign finance law.236 Parson’s 
attentional-choice model would place constitutional significance on what consumers pay attention to in an 
over-saturated marketplace rather than solely on the amount of speech in the marketplace.237 According to 
Parsons, “[u]nder current doctrine, advertising is just another form of ‘speech’ and advertisers are just 
another group of ‘speakers’ worthy of full constitutional protection.”238 However, under an attentional-
choice model, “advertising agreements and expenditures [are] recognized as being primarily economic 
transactions––ones with a highly distorting effect on the spread of content within the marketplace of 
ideas––[and] the government could have a much larger role to play in regulating the terms of those 
transactions.”239 Therefore, in the McManus case, Parsons explains that an attentional-choice theory may 
(1) place greater weight on an interest in informing the electorate––which was noticeably absent from the 
Fourth Circuit’s analysis despite Maryland raising it briefly––and (2) would not necessarily question the 
constitutionality of Maryland’s legislation simply because platforms restrict political advertising, causing 
the amount of political advertising to decrease.240 Ultimately, although McManus was dealt with as an as 
applied challenge, the decision may have lasting effects on future, similar efforts to place record-keeping 
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and publication requirements on online platforms that distribute political advertising,241 and governments 
that implement these requirements must be prepared to push back on the key points in McManus. 
(E) Roadmap for this Thesis 
 
 Thus far, scholarship published prior to the McManus decision has largely focused on identifying 
loopholes that allow a large portion of online political advertising to go unregulated;242 evaluating self-
regulatory measures taken by major online platforms;243 discussing instances of federal inaction and state 
action;244 and proposing solutions that should be incorporated into future legislation.245 Less scholarship 
has been published on this topic after the Fourth Circuit’s decision in McManus, but post-McManus 
scholarship has identified and addressed preliminary issues raised by the opinion246 and criticized the 
Fourth Circuit’s application of a traditional marketplace of ideas theory to the case.247  
 This thesis seeks to build on previous scholarship by exploring the current range of legislative 
efforts to bring greater transparency to online political advertising, primarily focusing on requirements 
that online platforms keep and publish records of the political ads that they run, with the ultimate goal of 
creating recommendations for policymakers in crafting these record-keeping requirements and defending 
them against First Amendment challenges. To achieve this goal, this thesis is composed of three 
additional parts, culminating in a final Chapter of recommendations. Part One examines the Honest Ads 
Act and state statutes that regulate online political advertising disclosure to identify what has been done 
and what proposals are currently on the table. Part Two examines the Fourth Circuit’s decision in 
McManus and examines the legal and theoretical arguments raised in the case filings by parties and amici 
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curiae to identify what legal points will likely be significant in future litigation over record-keeping and 
publication requirements similar to the provisions challenged in that case. Part Three examines the expert 
opinions of two attorneys who filed amicus briefs in the McManus case and of four regulators in 
Maryland and Washington through a series of interviews to gain additional––albeit non-representative––
insight into how legislation on online political advertising disclosure may be crafted. 
IV. Research Questions 
 
 This research thesis was guided by nine research questions, broken into three parts.   
(A) Part One: Legislative Efforts 
 
RQ1: What legislative actions have state legislatures passed to address online political advertising 
disclosure? 
 
RQ2: What record-keeping requirements do those state legislative actions place on online platforms that 
distribute online political advertising, and what are the scope of those requirements? 
 
RQ3: What penalties do those state legislative actions impose on online platforms who do not comply with 
established record-keeping requirements? 
 
RQ4: How do those state legislative actions compare with the Honest Ads Act? 
 
(B) Part Two: The Fourth Circuit’s Decision in McManus 
 
RQ5: What arguments are raised in the case filings in Washington Post v. McManus? 
RQ6: How does the Fourth Circuit respond, if at all, to the arguments raised in those case filings?  
RQ7: What do the arguments raised in McManus and the Fourth Circuit’s decision suggest about future 
litigation surrounding legislative efforts to address online political advertising disclosure?  
 
(C) Part Three: Expert Opinions of Attorneys and State Regulators 
 
RQ8: How can legislative efforts addressing online political advertising disclosure be crafted to avoid 
constitutional pitfalls?  
 
RQ9: What legislative approaches addressing online political advertising disclosure are effective or 







V. Research Methods 
 
This research thesis was guided by the following research methods, in three parts. 
 
(A) Part One: Legislative Efforts 
 
 Part One, found in Chapter Two, of this research project examines state legislative efforts to 
regulate online political advertising disclosure and compare those efforts to the Honest Ads Act. Chapter 
Two touches briefly on sponsorship disclaimer requirements and reporting requirements for online 
political advertising, but the primary focus is on laws that create record-keeping obligations for online 
platforms, given the novelty of that approach in campaign finance law. Relevant state statutes were 
identified using Thompson Reuter’s Westlaw Edge database. The text of the most recent version of the 
Honest Ads Act was located online at Congress.gov.  
(B) Part Two: The Fourth Circuit’s Decision in McManus 
 
 Part Two, found in Chapter Three, of this research project examines the Fourth Circuit’s decision 
in McManus and the briefs filed by the parties themselves as well as by amici curie throughout the course 
of the case. Relevant briefs were located using Thomson Reuter’s Westlaw Edge database. Ten case 
filings submitted to the District of Maryland and the Fourth Circuit were examined as part of this research 
project. The ten filings included the following: 
 (1) Brief of Appellants (filed by Maryland) 
 (2) Reply Brief of Appellants (filed by Maryland) 
 (3) Brief of Plaintiff-Appellees (filed by Washington Post Co. et al.) 
 (4) Amicus Curiae Brief of the Institute for Free Speech in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellees 
 (filed in support of Washington Post Co. et al.) 
 
(5) Brief of Amici Curiae National Association of Broadcasters and NCTA – The Internet & 
Television Association in Support of Appellees (filed in support of Washington Post Co. et al.) 
 
 (6) Brief of Amici Curiae News Media Alliance and 16 Media Organizations in Support of 
 Plaintiffs-Appellees (filed in support of Washington Post Co. et al.) 
 
 (7) Brief for Amici Curiae Campaign Legal Center and Common Cause Maryland in Support of 




 (8) Brief of the Brennan Center for Justice as Amicus Curiae in Support of Defendants-
 Appellants (filed in support of Maryland) 
 
 (9) Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary 
 Injunction (filed by Washington Post Co. et al.) 
 
 (10) Defendants’ Memorandum in Opposition to the Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction 
(filed by Maryland) 
 
 Analysis of the case filings focused on comparing legal arguments made in the filings as well as 
references made to First Amendment theories, like the marketplace of ideas theory and the theory of 
democratic self-governance. The Fourth Circuit’s opinion and the filings were also compared to 
determine how the court responded, or failed to respond, to the arguments raised in the filings.  
(C) Part Three: Expert Opinions of Attorneys and State Regulators 
 
 Part Three, found in Chapter Four, of this research project examines the expert opinions of two 
attorneys who each filed an amicus brief in McManus as well as the expert opinions of state regulators in 
Maryland and Washington, both of which have established record-keeping obligations for online 
platforms who distribute political advertising on state candidates and ballot measures.248 This thesis 
project sought to add interviews with current or former employees in positions related to political 
advertising policy at Facebook and Google. However, the project failed to garner sufficient interest 
among those parties, and this late addition was dropped. Part Three consists of six interviews. Interview 
subjects were recruited through direct contact via an email. All interviews took place in January and 
February 2021 and lasted approximately forty-five to sixty minutes. The interviews were recorded with 
the consent of interview subjects, and those recordings were later transcribed for analysis. Five of the six 
transcripts can be found in the Appendix to this thesis. One interview subject agreed to be recorded and to 
have the recording transcribed for the purposes of writing, but the subject also requested that the 
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transcript not be included in the Appendix. This request was honored. The university’s Institutional 
Review Board reviewed this study and exempted it from further review. 
 Three sets of interview questions were drafted. Interview questions for attorneys who filed an 
amicus brief in McManus focused on their opinions about the Fourth Circuit’s decision, the decision’s 
potential implications for regulation of online political advertising disclosure, and how future legislative 
efforts might be drafted to avoid similar constitutional pitfalls. Interview questions for campaign finance 
regulators in Maryland and Washington focused on disclosure requirements for online political 
advertising in that state, disclosure obligations placed on online platforms, the benefits gained by 
involving online platforms in the broader disclosure scheme, and what works well or what could be 
improved about the state’s current disclosure obligations for online platforms. Interview questions for 
current and former employees at Facebook and Google would have focused on political advertising 
revenue, the reasoning and process of developing those platforms’ voluntary transparency measures––like 
their ad libraries––the resources involved in maintaining those measures, how those platforms have 
navigated various states’ record-keeping requirements for online platforms, and the types of regulation the 
platforms would welcome. All interviews were guided by interview protocols providing further detail on 
these topics and questions. These protocols, including the protocol that would have been used for 
employees from Facebook and Google, can be found in the Appendix. 
VI. Limitations 
 
 This research project has two main limitations. First, the primary case that this thesis explores, 
Washington Post v. McManus, is an as applied opinion from one federal appellate court.249 Accordingly, it 
is unclear how similar requirements that online platforms publish records of political ads that they run 
might be examined when applied to different parties, analyzed by a court in a different circuit, or 
analyzed by the Supreme Court. Simply put, the issues discussed in McManus are far from settled at this 
point in time. However, closely examining this case is still worthwhile because it is currently the only 
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constitutional challenge to recent legislation attempting to regulate online political advertising disclosure 
in this way, and the provisions of the Maryland law analyzed there are somewhat similar to those in the 
Honest Ads Act.250 Thus, although McManus is not binding law beyond the specific parties involved, the 
arguments raised in the case filings highlight what the key legal issues might be in future litigation, and 
the decision itself may have a significant influence on future regulatory efforts surrounding online 
political advertising.251  
 Second, interviews conducted as part of this research thesis are not representative of all legal 
experts or all regulators looking at the issue of online political advertising simply because this thesis is 
not seeking to interview a representative sample of experts. However, the hope is that the interviews here 
still provide some expert insight from attorneys who have invested significant time working on this issue 
during the McManus litigation and from state regulators who work on disclosure requirements as part of 
their day-to-day jobs. Thus, although these interviews do not uncover all expert opinions on online 
political advertising disclosure, the goal is that they are one element of this larger project that can better 
inform how policymakers might craft rules moving forward. 
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Chapter Two: Legislative Efforts to Address Online Political Advertising 
 
 The purpose of this Chapter is to explore the different types of statutory requirements states have 
established for political advertising placed online. This Chapter is divided into four parts. Part A gives a 
general overview of sponsorship disclaimer and reporting requirements states have applied to online 
political advertising. Although the main focus of this thesis is on record-keeping requirements placed on 
online platforms, implementing or clarifying disclaimer and reporting requirements placed on political 
advertisers is a legitimate legislative option. Therefore, Part A is intended to give a brief but 
representative picture of what expanding disclaimer and reporting requirements to political ads placed on 
online looks like in different states. Part B details the record-keeping responsibilities some states have 
placed on online platforms that distribute political advertising as well as the scope of those 
responsibilities and the penalties for failing to comply. Part C then compares states’ legislative efforts to 
the provisions proposed in the Honest Ads Act. Finally, Part D provides a summary and concluding 
thoughts for this Chapter. 
(A) State Legislative Efforts: Sponsorship Disclaimer and Reporting Requirements 
 
 A majority of states seem to include online political advertising in either sponsorship disclaimer 
requirements stating that political ads must state who paid for the ad, general reporting requirements 
stating that various expenditures made by campaigns, political committees, and individual persons must 
be included in campaign finance reports, or both disclaimer and reporting requirements.252 In eight states, 
sponsorship disclaimer requirements specifically were extended to apply to online political advertising
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 following the 2016 U.S. presidential election.253 Table One, found at the end of this chapter, provides a 
general overview of how each state addresses online political advertising, if at all.  
 First, most states seem to require that political advertising appearing online include a sponsorship 
disclaimer stating who paid for the ad.254 While over half of states expressly refer to online political 
advertising in their statute by using a term like “internet,”255 or “online,”256 others include a catchall term 
in their statute, like “any other electronic medium”257 or “general public political advertising,”258 that 
would likely apply to online ads. Sometimes, it seems incredibly likely if not certain that these generally 
applicable catchall terms would include online ads. For instance, the Internet is an electronic medium of 
communication, and other references only to a “communication”259 would certainly seem to also include 
communications on the Internet. However, when these general, catchall terms are left undefined, it is not 
always clear whether these catchall terms actually apply to online ads, and, in some cases, they may not. 
For example, in Indiana, sponsorship disclaimers apply to specific printed materials and “any other type 
of general public political advertising.”260 While it seems like online ads could fall into that catchall, the 
state’s most-recent campaign finance manual clarifies that the requirement does not apply to “[p]olitial 
                                               
253 Victoria Smith Ekstrand & Ashley Fox, Regulating the Political Wild West: State Efforts to Disclose Sources of Online 
Political Advertising, 47 J. LEGIS. 81, 93 (2021). 
 
254 For an overview of state sponsorship disclaimer requirements for political ads placed online, see the first column of Table 
One, found at the end of this Chapter. 
 
255 See, e.g., ME. STAT. tit. 21-A §§ 1014(1), 1055, 1055-A(1) (West, Westlaw through 2019 Second Regular Legis. Sess.); WYO. 
STAT. ANN. § 22-25-110(a) (West, Westlaw through 2020 Special Legis. Sess.). 
 
256 See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. §§ 24.2-955, 24.2-957(E), 24.2-958(D) (West, Westlaw through cc. 1&2 of 2020 Regular Legis. 
Sess.). 
 
257 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-1-103(a)(7)(B)(i) (West, Westlaw through 2020 Legis. Sess.).  
 
258 See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 67-6614A (West, Westlaw through 2020 Legis. Sess.); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3517.20(A)(3), 
3517.105(A)(1) (West, Westlaw through 2019-2020 Legis. Sess.); 25 PA. STAT. STAT. § 3258(a) (West, Westlaw through 2021 
Regular Legis. Sess. Act 4). 
 
259 Some states’ sponsorship disclaimer requirements refer generally to “communications” or “advertisements,” without listing 
any specific types of media, including ads distributed via traditional media. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 8-13-1354 (West, 
Westlaw through 2020 Legis. Sess.) (applying sponsorship disclaimer requirements to political “communication[s]” about 
candidates and ballot measures); GA. CODE ANN. § 21-5-34(a)(2)(A) (West, Westlaw through laws effective Act 4 2021) 
(applying sponsorship disclaimer requirements to “advertising” about referendums). 
 
260 IND. CODE § 3-9-3-2.5(b)–(d) (West, Westlaw through 2020 Second Reg. Legis. Sess.). 
 42 
 
messages on radio, television, or the Internet” because “[i]n general, state law does not regulate these 
media.”261 
 The information required in these sponsorship disclaimers typically includes some variation of 
the ad sponsor’s identity, potentially the ad sponsor’s address, and, as applicable, statements that the ad is 
not authorized by the candidate for ads that are also independent expenditures, made without coordination 
with a candidate.262 Additionally, in some states, political committees that purchase ads must also list the 
committee’s top donors as part of the sponsorship disclaimer requirement.263 However, some states also 
provide an exemption to these disclaimer requirements, stating that online ads that cannot easily abide by 
sponsorship disclaimer requirements because of their limited size can instead link to a separate page 
including the required information.264 Overall, in states that have sponsorship disclaimer requirements for 
online ads, these requirements are not unique to online ads in that the same sponsorship disclaimer 
requirements that apply to online ads also apply to political ads distributed through another medium.265  
                                               
261 INDIANA CAMPAIGN FINANCE MANUAL at 72 (2020), https://www.in.gov/sos/elections/files/2020-Campaign-Finance-
Manual.FINAL.pdf (last accessed Mar. 6, 2021). 
 
262 See, e.g., MD. ELEC. LAW § 13-401 (West, Westlaw through laws effective Mar. 5, 2021); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2972(a)–
(b) (West, Westlaw through Acts 1-180, M-1-M-12 of 2019-2020 Adjourned Legis. Sess.); WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17A.320 
(West, Westlaw through Ch. 8 of 2021 Reg. Legis. Sess.). 
 
263 See, e.g., ME. STAT. tit. 21-A § 1014(2-B) (West, Westlaw through 2019 Second Reg. Legis. Sess.); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. 
ch. 55 § 18G (West, Westlaw through Ch. 3 of 2021 First Legis. Sess.); WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17A.320(2). 
 
264See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-925(E) (West, Westlaw through Feb. 12, 2021); COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-45-107.5(5)(c) 
(West, Westlaw through Ch. 7 of First 2021 Legis. Sess.); N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 14-106(4) (West, Westlaw through Chs.1 to 49, 61 
to 71 of 2021 Legis. Sess.); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17 § 2972(d); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 22-25-110(a)(iv) (West, Westlaw through 
chapters 1-3 of 2020 Special Legis. Sess.). 
 
265 For an overview of state sponsorship disclaimer requirements for political ads placed online and how those requirements relate 
to disclaimer requirements for ads placed in traditional media, see the first column of Table One, found at the end of this Chapter. 
However, Maryland is unique in that it has established an additional disclaimer requirement for political ads distributed online 
using a bot, defined as “an automated online account where all or substantially all of the actions or posts of that account are not 
the result of a person.” MD ELEC. LAW § 13-401.1. These online political ads must include a statement that they were distributed 
using bot technology. Id. California has also created a new category of online political advertising, “online platform disclosed 
advertisement[s],” for certain political ads distributed on certain platforms. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 84504.6 (West, Westlaw through 
Ch. 9 of 2021 Reg. Legis. Sess.). Although these ads are uniquely defined in California law and trigger additional requirements 
for online platforms, the sponsorship disclaimer requirements for these ads are not unique in that other political ads appearing 
online are also subject to similar sponsorship disclaimer requirements. See id. § 84504.6(a)(2)(A) (defining “online platform 




 Similarly, all states require regular campaign finance reports detailing expenditures made by 
candidates, various types of political committees, and individuals that make independent expenditures 
over a certain amount.266 The items that must be disclosed in these reports are often broadly described as 
an “expenditure”––typically defined as an exchange of money for something of value, including political 
advertising267––or an or an “independent expenditure”––typically defined as an expenditure of express 
advocacy that is made without coordination with a campaign.268 Accordingly, these reports should include 
expenditures for political advertising placed online. Thus, when the public visits state databases detailing 
campaign finance expenditures made by parties required to file reports, they should be able to also view 
expenditures for some online ads.269 This is similar to campaign finance reports at the federal level, where 
the public should be able to view spending for some online political ads on the FEC’s website.270  
 Ultimately, the requirements outlined above are not surprising. They use familiar campaign 
finance disclosure ideas and simply expand them to include ads that appear online.271 For instance, 
because of prior experience with sponsorship disclaimers on political ads that appear in print, on 
                                               
266 For an overview of state campaign finance reporting requirements, see the second column of Table One, found at the end of 
this Chapter. 
 
267 See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 11-302 (West, Westlaw through 2020 Reg. Legis. Sess.) (defining “expenditure” as, in part, 
“[a]ny purchase or transfer of money or anything of value” to influence an election); MD ELEC. LAW § 1-101(aa) (defining 
“expenditure” as, in part, “a gift, transfer, disbursement, or promise of money or thing of value by or on behalf of a campaign 
finance entity to . . . promote or assist in the promotion of the success or defeat of a candidate, political party, question, or 
prospective question at an election . . . .”). 
 
268 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 15 § 8002(13) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 3 of 2020-2021 Legis. Sess.) (defining “independent 
expenditure” as, “any expenditure made by an individual or other person . . . expressly advocating the election or defeat of a 
clearly identified candidate, which is made without cooperation or consultation with any candidate . . . .); MD ELEC. LAW § 1-
101(bb-1) (defining “independent expenditure” as “a gift, transfer, disbursement, or promise of money or a thing of value by a 
person expressly advocating the success or defeat of a clearly identified candidate or ballot issue if the gift, transfer, 
disbursement, or promise of money or a thing of value is not made in coordination, cooperation, consultation, understanding, 
agreement, or concert with, or at the request or suggestion of, a candidate, a campaign finance entity of a candidate, an agent of a 
candidate, or a ballot issue committee”). 
 
269 See, e.g., View Expenditures / Outstanding Obligations Information, MARYLAND CAMPAIGN FINANCE REPORTING INFO. 
SYSTEM, https://campaignfinance.maryland.gov/Public/ViewExpenses (last visited Jan. 28, 2021); Expenditure Search, ALABAMA 
FCPA, https://fcpa.alabamavotes.gov/PublicSite/SearchPages/ExpenditureSearch.aspx?tb=expendituresearch (last visited, Jan. 
28, 2021); Campaign Finance Expenditure Search, NEVADA SECRETARY OF STATE, 
https://www.nvsos.gov/SOSCandidateServices/AnonymousAccess/CEFDSearchUU/Search.aspx#expenditure_search (last 
visited Jan. 28, 2021). 
 
270 Spending, FED. ELECTION COMM’N, https://www.fec.gov/data/browse-data/?tab=spending (last visited Jan. 28, 2021). 
 
271 See Ekstrand & Fox, supra note 253, at 105 (examining disclaimer requirements of eight states and concluding that they 
“largely fit within our traditional conception of what political advertising sponsorship disclaimers look like”). 
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television, or on the radio, requiring a similar sponsorship disclaimer for ads that appear online is not a 
large shift from what has been done with other forms of political advertising. 272 The same could be said 
for including expenditures for online ads in familiar reporting requirements. The Supreme Court has 
upheld these types of disclosure requirements placed directly on political ad purchasers as a means to 
inform the electorate, prevent corruption and the appearance of corruption, and better enforce other 
campaign finance laws.273 Although the remainder of this thesis largely focuses on record-keeping and 
publication requirements placed on online platforms given the novelty of that approach, sponsorship 
disclaimer requirements and expenditure reporting requirements are still important tools for transparency. 
Currently, part of the confusion surrounding online political advertising disclosure stems from the fact 
that, at least at the federal level, online political advertising is either expressly excluded from certain 
disclaimer and reporting requirements274 or it is unclear when sponsorship disclaimer requirements do 
apply to online ads.275 To eliminate this confusion and provide greater standardization across ads in 






                                               
272 For sponsorship disclaimer requirements for political ads distributed via print, television, or radio at the federal level, see 11 
C.F.R. § 110.11 (2021). 
 
273 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 66–68, 84 (1976); McConnell v. FEC 540 U.S. 93, 196 (2003); Citizens United, 558 U.S. 
310, 366–67 (2010). 
 
274 See 11 C.F.R. § 100.29(c)(1) (expressly exempting online ads from the federal definition of “electioneering 
communications”). 
 
275 Specifically, scholars have explained that technology companies like Facebook have used the FEC’s indecision about whether 
small online ads fall with in sponsorship disclaimer exemptions to avoid requiring political advertisers to include those 
disclaimers. See Katherine Haenschen & Jordan Wolf, Disclaiming Responsibility: How Platforms Deadlocked the Federal 
Election Commission’s Efforts to Regulate Digital Political Advertising, TELECOMM. POL’Y 1, 1 (2018); Pichaya P. Winichakul, 
Note, The Missing Structural Debate: Reforming Disclosure of Online Political Communications, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1387, 
1407–12 (2018). 
 
276 See Abby K. Wood, Facilitating Accountability for Online Political Advertisements, 16 OHIO ST. TECH. L.J. 520, 557 (2020) 
(arguing that “online advertisements should be subject to the same regulatory and disclosure requirements as other types of 
advertisements, such as those broadcasted on TV or radio”) [hereinafter, Wood, Facilitating Accountability]. 
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(B) State Legislative Efforts: Record-Keeping Responsibilities for Online Platforms 
 
 Several states have gone beyond expanding sponsorship disclaimer and reporting requirements to 
establish requirements that online platforms keep records about the ads that they run.277 Most states that 
have implemented this requirement for online platforms, whether before or after the 2016 elections, have 
simply expanded or clarified already-existing requirements in place for all publishers of various forms of 
political ads to include online platforms that sell political advertising space.278 For instance, in 
Washington, all “commercial advertiser[s],” which is defined broadly to include multiple types of media 
organizations and advertising service providers, must keep and provide records about the political ads that 
they run to the state and to members of the public upon receiving a specific request.279 Similar record-
keeping requirements for publishers exist in Nevada,280 New Jersey, 281 and, possibly, Alaska.282 In each 
of these states, the information that must be maintained is roughly the same and typically includes some 
variation of the following: copies of the ad, the times the ad was distributed, the amount paid for the ad’s 
                                               
277 For an overview of requirements placed on online platforms, see the third column of Table One, found at the end of this 
Chapter. 
 
278 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:44A-22.3(d) (West, Westlaw through 2020 Legis. Sess.).; NEV. REV. STAT. § 294A.370 (West, 
Westlaw through 31st and 32nd 2020 Special Legis. Sess.); WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17A.345 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 8 of 
2021 Reg. Legis. Sess.). 
 
279 WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.005(10), 42.17A.345. 
 
280 In Nevada, “[a] newspaper, radio broadcasting station, outdoor advertising company, television broadcasting station, direct 
mail advertising company, printer or other person or group of persons which accepts, broadcasts, disseminates, prints or 
publishes: (a) [a]dvertising for or against any candidate or group of such candidates; (b) [p]olitical advertisng for any person 
other than a candidate; or (c) [a]dvertising for the passage or defeat of a question or group of questions on the ballot, shall . . . 
make available for inspection information setting forth the cost of all such advertisements . . . .” NEV. REV. STAT. § 294A.370. 
 
281 In New Jersey, “[a]ny person who accepts compensation from a committee, group or individual . . . for the purpose of 
printing, broadcasting, or otherwise disseminating to the electorate a communication . . . shall maintain a record of the transaction 
which shall include an exact copy of the communication and a statement of the number of copies made or the dates and times that 
the communication was broadcast or otherwise transmitted, and the name and address of the committee, group or individual 
paying for the communication. The record shall be maintained on file at the principal office of the person accepting the 
communication for at least two years and shall be available for public inspection during normal business hours.” N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§ 19:44A-22.3(d). 
 
282 In Alaska, “[d]uring each year in which an election occurs, all businesses, persons, or groups that furnish [advertising] 
services . . . to a candidate or group shall maintain a record of each transaction . . . . Records of provision of services . . . shall be 
available for inspection by the [Alaska Public Offices] [C]ommission.” ALASKA STAT. §15.13.040(f) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 




placement, and the identity of the ad’s sponsor.283 These responsibilities are not unique to publishers of 
online ads; instead they include online platforms that publish such advertising within their scope.284 
 Other states have passed new requirements that are unique to online platforms and specifically 
designed to target only online political advertising.285 While Virginia law vaguely asserts that online 
platforms must “establish reasonable procedures” to ensure that those buying political ads identify 
themselves to the platform as an advertiser,286 both California287 and Maryland288 have established 
specific and detailed requirements for online platforms. In Maryland, online platforms must proactively 
publish records on their website about the ads that they run, and those records must include information 
like the identities and contact information of ad sponsors and the cost of placing the ad.289 Maryland also 
requires online platforms to provide additional information––like a description of the candidate or issue 
discussed in the ad, a copy of the ad, information about when the ad was distributed, how many times the 
ad was viewed, and the audience targeted––to the Maryland State Board of Elections upon request.290  
 Similarly, California requires online platforms to proactively make records with copies of 
political ads run on the platform as well as information about the purchasing committee, when the ads 
                                               
283 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:44A-22.3(d); NEV. REV. STAT. § 294A.370; WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17A.345. In Washington, 
administrative rules also clarify that online platforms must maintain records about “demographic information (e.g., age, gender, 
race, location, etc.) of the audiences reached . . . and the total number of impressions generated by the advertisement.” WASH. 
ADMIN. CODE § 390-18-050(6)(g) (2021).  
 
284 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:44A-22.3(d); NEV. REV. STAT. § 294A.370; WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17A.345. 
 
285 See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 84504.6(c)-(e) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 9 of 2021 Reg. Legis. Sess.); MD ELEC. LAW § 13-
405(b)-(c) (West, Westlaw through laws effective Mar. 5, 2021). 
 
286 VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-960(b) (West, Westlaw through cc. 1&2 of 2021 Legis. Sess.). In Virginia, “[p]rior to purchasing an 
online political advertisement from or promoting an online political advertisement on an online platform, a person shall identify 
himself to the online platform as an online political advertiser and certify to the online platform that he is permitted under state 
and local laws to lawfully purchase or promote for a fee online political advertisements.” Id. § 24.2-960(a). Online platforms are 
required to “establish reasonable procedures” to ensure that political advertisers comply with those requirements and “may rely in 
good faith on the information provided by online political advertisers.” Id. § 24.2-960(b)-(c). 
 
287 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 84504.6(c)-(e). 
 
288 MD ELEC. LAW §13-405(b)-(c). 
 
289 Id. § 13-405(b). 
 
290 Id. §13-405(c). 
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were distributed, how many times those ads were viewed, and the cost of the ads’ placement.291 In 
contrast to Maryland and California, New York established record-keeping requirements for online 
political advertising that qualifies as an independent expenditure but has refrained from placing the 
responsibility of maintaining those records on online platforms, instead requiring the New York State 
Board of Elections to maintain a publicly accessible database with copies of those ads obtained directly 
from political ad purchasers.292  
 Online platforms who fail to abide by the record-keeping requirements established in these states 
can be penalized, in Maryland, by being subject to an injunction that requires them to remove certain 
political ads on the platform,293 or, in other states, by being subject to a civil fine.294 The Fourth Circuit in 
McManus underscored the significance of Maryland’s system of seeking an injunction against online 
platforms, accurately noting that “failure to comply with the injunction is ultimately punishable by 
criminal penalties,”295 including “a fine not exceeding $250 or imprisonment not exceeding 30 days or 
both.”296 Although less harsh than the potential criminal penalties facing noncompliant platforms in 
Maryland, civil penalties imposed in other states can include amounts like “three times the cost of the 
advertisement, including placement costs” in California,297 up to $6,000 for a first offense and $12,000 for 
any additional offense in New Jersey,298 or up to $10,000 per offense in Washington.299 Lawsuits filed 
against Facebook and Twitter by the Attorney General of Washington in 2018 and 2020 highlight what 
                                               
291 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 84504.6(d). 
 
292 N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 14-107(5-a) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 1to 49, 61 to 71 of 2021 Legis. Sess.). 
 
293 MD ELEC. LAW §13-405.1(b). 
 
294 See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 84510(2); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:44A-22(a)(1) (West, Westlaw through 2020 Legis. Sess.); NEV. 
REV. STAT. § 294A.420(2) (West, Westlaw through 31st and 32nd 2020 Special Legis. Sess.); WASH. REV. CODE § 
42.17A.750(1)(c) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 8 of 2021 Reg. Legis. Sess.). 
 
295 Wash. Post v. McManus, 944 F.3d 506, 514 (4th Cir. 2019). 
 
296 MD ELEC. LAW §13-605(b). 
 
297 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 84510(2). 
 
298 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:44A-22(a)(1). 
 
299 WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17A.750(1)(c). 
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these civil penalties can look like in action. In 2018, Facebook paid a $200,000 penalty for failing to 
comply with the state’s record-keeping requirements from 2013 to 2018,300 and Facebook is currently 
entangled in additional litigation about further violations, despite the company’s own policy of not 
accepting political ads on Washington state candidates and ballot measures.301 Similarly, in 2020, Twitter 
paid a $100,000 penalty for a similar failure to maintain records from 2012 to 2019.302 
 The record-keeping requirements that some states have placed on online platforms that distribute 
political advertising and the penalties for failing to comply are noteworthy for three main reasons. First, 
some platforms now refuse to accept political advertising on state candidates and ballot measures in states 
with these requirements.303 For example, Google currently refuses to accept political advertising for state 
candidates and ballot measures in Maryland, New Jersey, Nevada, and Washington, and has in place other 
internal procedures to ensure compliance with requirements in California, New York, and Virginia.304 
Likewise, Facebook refuses to run political ads targeted to Washington about Washington candidates and 
ballot measures.305 Accordingly, these requirements may make hosting certain political ads targeted at 
these states unattractive for online platforms seeking to avoid civil penalties and compliance burdens, and, 
                                               
300 Press Release, Washington State Office of the Attorney General, AG Ferguson Sues Facebook for Repeatedly Violating 
Washington Campaign Finance Law (Apr. 14, 2020), https://www.atg.wa.gov/news/news-releases/ag-ferguson-sues-facebook-
repeatedly-violating-washington-campaign-finance-law [hereinafter AG Ferguson Sues Facebook]; Press Release, Washington 
State Office of the Attorney General, AG Ferguson Files Campaign Finance Lawsuits Against Facebook, Google (Jun. 14, 2018), 
https://www.atg.wa.gov/news/news-releases/ag-ferguson-files-campaign-finance-lawsuits-against-facebook-google [hereinafter 
AG Ferguson Files Campaign Finance Lawsuits]. 
 
301 AG Ferguson Sues Facebook, supra note 300; see also Press Release, AG Ferguson Releases Statement after Defeating 
Facebook’s Attempt to Dismiss Campaign Finance Lawsuit (Aug. 7, 2020), https://www.atg.wa.gov/news/news-releases/ag-
ferguson-releases-statement-after-defeating-facebook-s-attempt-dismiss.  
 
302 Press Release, AG Ferguson: Twitter to Pay $100,000 to Washington State for Multiple Campaign Finance Violations (Oct. 
13, 2020), https://www.atg.wa.gov/news/news-releases/ag-ferguson-twitter-pay-100000-washington-state-multiple-campaign-
finance.   
 
303 See, e.g., Political Content, GOOGLE, https://support.google.com/adspolicy/answer/6014595?hl=en (last visited Mar. 19, 
2021); Ads about Social Issues, Elections or Politics, FACEBOOK, 
https://www.facebook.com/policies/ads/restricted_content/political# (last visited Mar. 19, 2021). 
 
304 Political Content, supra note 303 (listing advertising restrictions for California, Maryland, New Jersey, New York, Nevada, 
Virginia, and Washington, among Google’s advertising policies and restrictions). 
 




as a result, online platforms may simply decide to stop accepting ads from those states.306 Second, this 
response from online platforms can create concern from courts who might evaluate these laws if they are 
challenged. In McManus, for instance, the Fourth Circuit expressed concern that Google now refuses to 
accept political advertising on Maryland candidates and ballot measures and that this refusal decreased 
the amount of political speech in the marketplace of ideas.307 Finally, examining the response to these 
record-keeping requirements is worthwhile because the main federal proposal, the Honest Ads Act, seeks 
to establish similar requirements,308 and examining what has happened at the state level could provide 
insight into what should be done at both the federal and state levels.  
 States with these record-keeping requirements for online platforms vary in how they determine 
which platforms must abide by those requirements.309 Maryland defines what platforms are covered by 
their record-keeping requirements quite broadly, sweeping in “public-facing website[s], web 
application[s], or digital application[s] . . . that: (1) ha[ve] 100,000 or more unique monthly United States 
visitors or users for a majority of months during the immediately preceding 12 months; and (2) receive[] 
payment for qualifying paid digital communications.”310 Nevada, New Jersey, Virginia, and Washington 
all seem to draw their scope even wider, either expressly defining an online platform as simply a website 
or digital application that sells advertising space without setting a user or visitor threshold311 or referring 
more generally to all media or commercial publishers of political ads, including those that host ads 
online.312  
                                               




308 H.R. 1, 117th Cong. § 4208 (2021). 
 
309 Compare MD ELEC. LAW §1-101(dd-1) (West, Westlaw through laws effective Mar. 5, 2021), with CAL. GOV’T CODE § 
84504.6(a)(1) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 9 of 2021 Reg. Legis. Sess.), and NEV. REV. STAT. § ST 294A.370(1) (West, Westlaw 
through 31st and 32nd Special Legis. Sess.), and N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:44A-22.3(d) (West, Westlaw through 2020 Legis. Sess. c. 
146 and J.R. No. 6),  and WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17A.345(1), 14.17A.005(10) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 8 of 2021 Reg. 
Legis. Sess.), and VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-955.1 (West, Westlaw through cc. 1&2 of 2021 Reg. Legis. Sess.).  
 
310 MD ELEC. LAW §1-101(dd-1). 
 
311 VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-955.1. 
 
312 NEV. REV. STAT. § ST 294A.370(1); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:44A-22.3(d); WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17A.345(1), 14.17A.005(10). 
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 However, state laws also vary in how they recognize, or fail to recognize, ad network 
relationships, where one platform may sell online advertising space through another platform, like 
Google.313 For example, California’s requirement sweeps in “website[s], web application[s], [and] digital 
application[s], including [] social network[s], ad network[s], or search engine[s],” but the state makes an 
express exemption for online platforms that only host “advertisements that are sold directly to advertisers 
through another online platform.”314 Thus, in California, an online platform that only hosts political ads 
that are actually sold by Google’s ad network would not be subject to record-keeping requirements.315 In 
Maryland, the state slightly alters the records that are required to be maintained publicly online, stating 
that where an online platform has sold ad space to an ad network, then the platform where the ad has been 
published must only provide either the ad network’s contact information or a hyperlink to the ad 
network’s website,316 but provides no alteration to the longer list of information, like the targeting 
information and the number of impressions received, that must be provided to the state.317  Similarly, 
Washington regulations clarify that: 
Any person that hosts political advertising or electioneering communications on a digital 
communication platform or other media is not required to maintain records on such advertising or 
communications if it has been purchased directly through another commercial advertiser [like an 
ad network], however the commercial advertiser [ad network] that directly sells the advertising or 
communications to the original purchaser must maintain the information as required in this 
section.318 
 
In contrast, in Nevada and New Jersey, where online platforms are also required to maintain records 
alongside other publishers, it is simply unclear whether both the platform where the ad is published and 
                                               
313 Compare CAL. GOV’T CODE § 84504.6(a)(1), with MD ELEC. LAW § 13-405(b)(6)(iii), and WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 390-18-
050(2) (2021), and NEV. REV. STAT. § ST 294A.370(1), and N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:44A-22.3(d). 
 
314 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 84504.6(a)(1). 
 
315 See id. 
 
316 MD ELEC. LAW § 13-405(b)(6)(iii). 
 
317 Id. § 13-405(c). 
 
318 WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 390-18-050(2). 
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the platform operating the ad network would be responsible for record-keeping or, if only one is 
responsible, which one must maintain these records.319  
 In addition to defining what platforms are subject to these requirements in different ways, 
California and Maryland also have other triggering conditions that must be satisfied before record-
keeping requirements take effect.320 For example, in California a committee has to spend at least $500 on 
“online platform disclosed advertisement[s]”321 within one year before a platform has to start keeping 
records of those transactions.322 In Maryland, the ad has to be disseminated to at least 500 people to be a 
“qualifying paid digital communication” covered by the state’s record-keeping requirements,323 and 
online platforms may rely on representations from ad purchasers themselves as to whether their ad is a 
“qualifying paid digital communication.”324  
 Exploring the scope of online platforms covered by these is not only important in determining 
how many platforms might be subject to these regulations, but it is also important in constitutional 
analysis. As the Fourth Circuit did in McManus and as will be discussed in the next Chapter of this thesis, 
analyzing how wide-sweeping these requirements are and whether they are tailored to meet a state’s 
asserted goal in implementing them is a significant part of concluding whether they abide by the First 
                                               
319 In Nevada, the record-keeping law applies to a party who “accepts, broadcasts, disseminates, prints or publishes” political 
advertising. NEV. REV. STAT. § ST 294A.370(1) (West, Westlaw through 31st and 32nd Special Legis. Sess.). In New Jersey, the 
record-keeping law applies to a party who “accepts compensation from a committee, group or individual . . . for the purpose of 
printing, broadcasting, or otherwise disseminating” political advertising. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:44A-22.3(d) (West, Westlaw 
through 2020 Legis. Sess. c. 146 and J.R. No. 6). 
 
320 See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 84504.6(a)(2)(A); MD ELEC. LAW §§ 1-101(ll-1), 13-405(d). 
 
321 In California, an “online platform disclosed advertisement” is defined as either “[a] paid electronic media advertisement on an 
online platform made via a form of electronic media that allows users to engage in discourse and post content, or any other type 
of social media, for which the committee pays the online platform, unless all advertisements on the platform are video 
advertisements that can [comply with different requirements]” or “[a] paid electronic media advertisement that is not . . . a 
graphic, image, animated graphic, or animated image that the online platform hosting the advertisement allows to hyperlink to an 
internet website containing required disclosures . . .  or [a] video, audio, or email.” CAL. GOV’T CODE § 84504.6(a)(2)(A). 
 
322 Id. § 84504.6(d). 
 
323 MD ELEC. LAW § 1-101(ll-1). 
 
324 Id. § 13-405(d). Online platforms in California may also rely on representations made to them by political advertisers. CAL. 
GOV’T CODE § 84504.6(e). 
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Amendment. 325 Thus, which platforms these requirements should include and how policymakers should 
define which online ads are covered also depends on the government interest these requirements are 
trying to meet. As the discussion of McManus in the following Chapter will demonstrate, if policymakers 
are trying to address foreign interference in U.S. elections, then including platforms where there is no 
evidence of interference activities or defining which ads are covered in a way that misses the fraction of 
paid content that was associated with Russian interference will present a serious constitutional hurdle.326 
Even looking beyond the public’s concern with foreign interference activity and misinformation in recent 
years, requirements for online platforms established to meet more traditional campaign finance disclosure 
interests in informing the electorate, preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption, and 
enforcing other campaign finance laws should be drawn based on a strong empirical record demonstrating 
why those specific platforms and ads should be subjected to further disclosure regulations.327 
(C) Comparison to the Honest Ads Act 
 
 At the federal level, the Honest Ads Act proposes to increase transparency surrounding online 
political advertising by expanding key definitions, clarifying sponsorship disclaimer requirements, and 
establishing record-keeping requirements for online platforms.328 The Honest Ads Act also requires 
broadcasters, cable providers, and online platforms to “make reasonable efforts to ensure that 
communications . . . are not purchased by a foreign national, directly or indirectly.”329 The Honest Ads 
Act was introduced in the Senate in 2017330 and reintroduced in 2019, but no further action on the bill was 
                                               
325 See Wash. Post v. McManus, 944 F.3d 506, 520–24 (4th Cir. 2019) (concluding that Maryland’s requirements, as applied to 
plaintiffs’ platforms, “strike[] too narrowly in some respects [and] too broadly in others”). 
 
326 See id. at 521. Previously, speaking specifically about governments’ interest in preventing foreign interference activity, 
Ekstrand and Fox cautioned that legislators must be prepared produce evidence of an electoral harm and evidence about how 
regulations will curb that harm. Ekstrand & Fox, supra note 253, at 108. 
 
327 See Ekstrand & Fox, supra note 253, at 108. 
 
328 H.R. 1, 117th Cong. § 4201–4211 (2021). 
 
329 Id. § 4209. 
 
330 Actions Overview S. 1989 – 115th Congress (2017-2018), CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-
congress/senate-bill/1989/actions (last visited Jan. 27, 2021). 
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taken in that chamber.331 In March 2021, the House of Representatives passed the For the People Act,332 
which incorporates the provisions of the latest version of the Honest Ads Act,333 and includes other 
measures related to voting, elections, and government ethics.334 An earlier version of the For the People 
Act was passed by the House and received in the Senate in March 2019,335 where no action was taken.336 
 First, the Honest Ads Act expands the definitions of different types of political advertising to 
expressly include online political advertising.337 For example, current law defines a “public 
communication” as including a list of enumerated media  types as well as  “any other form of general 
public political advertising.”338 FEC regulations explain that “general public political advertising” 
includes “communications placed for a fee on another person’s [w]eb site,”339 but the statutory definition 
makes no express mention of political ads placed online.340 The Honest Ads Act amends the statutory 
definition of “public communication” to expressly include “paid internet, or paid digital 
communication[s]”341 and amends federal sponsorship disclaimer laws to expressly require that all 
“public communication[s]” include a statement about who paid for the ad.342 This change would clarify 
                                               
331 Actions Overview S. 1356 – 116th Congress (2019-2020), CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-
congress/senate-bill/1356/actions (last visited Jan. 27, 2021). 
 
332 Actions Overview H.R.1 – 117th Congress (2021-2022), CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-
congress/house-bill/1/actions (last visited March 6, 2021). 
 
333 H.R. 1 § 4201–4211. 
 
334 See H.R. 1, 117th Cong. (2021).  
 
335 See Actions Overview H.R.1 – 116th Congress (2019-2020), CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-
congress/house-bill/1/actions (last visited March 6, 2021). 
 
336 Actions Overview S. 949 – 116th Congress (2019-2020), CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-
congress/senate-bill/949/actions (last visited Jan. 27, 2021). 
 
337 H.R. 1 § 4205–4206. 
 
338 52 U.S.C. § 30101(22). 
 
339 11 CFR § 100.26 (2021). 
 
340 52 U.S.C. § 30101(22). 
 
341 H.R. 1 § 4205. 
 
342 Id. § 4205(c). 
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that political ads placed online must follow the same disclosure requirements that are currently in effect 
for public communications distributed through other mediums.343 
 The Honest Ads Act also amends the definition of “electioneering communication[s],” which are 
political ads that clearly identify a federal candidate and run close-in-time to an election,344 to include 
“qualified internet or digital communication[s],”345 which the Act defines as “any communication which 
is placed or promoted for a fee on an online platform.”346 At present, FEC regulations limit 
“electioneering communications” to those distributed by “broadcast, cable, or satellite television or 
radio,” and expressly exclude “communications over the Internet.”347 Accordingly, like the expansion of 
“public communications,” the Honest Ads Act would simply expand the same sponsorship disclaimer and 
reporting requirements that apply to “electioneering communications” on other mediums to expressly 
apply to political ads distributed online.348 
 Second, the Honest Ads Act further clarifies that “qualified internet and digital 
communication[s]” must include a “clear and conspicuous” disclaimer statement with information about 
who financed the ad.349 Here, the Honest Ads Act provides that online ads that cannot include a full 
disclaimer on the ad itself because of space limitations may instead direct viewers to a different location 
where all of the required information, including who paid for the ad, the address of that purchaser, and 
                                               
343 Id. § 4205. 
 
344 11 C.F.R. § 100.29(a) (an “[e]lectioneering communication means any broadcast, cable, or satellite communication that: (1) 
[r]efers to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office; (2) [i]s publicly distributed within 60 days before a general election 
for the office sought by the candidate; or within 30 days before a primary or preference election, or a convention or caucus of a 
political party that has authority to nominate a candidate, for the office sought by the candidate, and the candidate referenced is 
seeking the nomination of that political party; and (3) [i]s targeted to the relevant electorate, in the case of a candidate for Senate 
or the House of Representatives”). 
 
345 H.R. 1 § 4206. 
 
346 Id. § 4206(a)(1)(D). 
 
347 11 C.F.R. § 100.29(c)(1). 
 
348 H.R. 1 § 4206. 
 
349 Id. § 4207. 
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whether the ad was authorized by a candidate or committee, may be found.350 This section of the Honest 
Ads Act also provides specific guidance about what qualifies as a “clear and conspicuous” disclaimer 
statement and alters statutory language referring to sponsorship disclaimers on television and radio to 
include online ads in video or audio formats.351 These first three sections of the Act are similar to many of 
the provisions adopted by states to address online political advertising in that, like over half of states, they 
seek to expand existing definitions and existing disclaimer requirements to expressly include online 
political advertising and, like many states, provide clear instructions for when online ads are too small to 
provide sponsorship disclaimers.352 
 Beyond clarifying requirements and closing definitional loopholes, the Honest Ads Act also 
establishes new record-keeping requirements for online platforms that distribute political ads.353 Under 
the Honest Ads Act, online platforms are required to maintain, for four years, online, publicly accessible 
records about requests to purchase “qualified political advertisement[s] . . . made by a person whose 
aggregate requests to purchase qualified political advertisements on [that] platform during the calendar 
year exceeds $500.”354 The Act also directs the FEC to establish “common data formats for the record[s] . 
. . so that all online platforms submit and maintain data online in a common, machine-readable and 
publicly accessible format.”355 These records must contain a lengthy list of information, including a copy 
of the ad, the number of views the ad received, the dates the ad was first and last displayed, the cost of the 
ad, the audience targeted, the candidate or issue discussed in the ad, and the identity of the person 
                                               
350 Id. § 4207(b)(1)(e)(1). Allowing disclaimer requirement exceptions for small ads that can link to a separate location where this 
disclaimer information is provided is also similar to the sponsorship disclaimer laws for online ads in some states. See, e.g., ARIZ. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-925(E) (West, Westlaw through Feb. 12, 2021); COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-45-107.5(5)(c) (West, Westlaw 
through Ch. 7 of 2021 First Regular Legis. Sess.). 
 
351 H.R. 1 § 4207(c). 
 
352 For an overview of state sponsorship disclaimer and campaign finance reporting requirements, see Table One, found at the 
end of this Chapter.  
 
353 H.R. 1 § 4208. 
 
354 Id. § 4208(a)(k). 
 
355 Id. § 4208(b). 
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purchasing the ad.356 The latest version of the Honest Ads Act also requires that “online platform[s] 
displaying a qualified political advertisement . . . display with the advertisement a visible notice 
identifying the sponsor . . . [and] ensure that the notice will continue to be displayed if a viewer of the 
advertisement shares the advertisement with others on that platform.”357 Although the vast majority of 
states have not adopted unique record-keeping requirements for platforms that distribute online political 
advertising,358 the Honest Ads Act is similar to Maryland and California in that it does create this 
responsibility specifically for online platforms.359 However, unlike Maryland, the Act appears to create a 
common database where online platforms are compelled to publish information, rather than compelling 
platforms to publish some of this same information on their own websites.360 Overall, the information 
required to be maintain under the Honest Ads Act is similar to what is required in Maryland and 
California in that it mandates that these records include not only information about the party who 
purchased the ad but also information about the ad’s online distribution, like how many times it was 
viewed and which audience was targeted.361 
 However, the scope of the Honest Ads Act is different from Maryland and California in terms of 
which ads it includes in the record-keeping requirement.362 Under the Honest Ads Act, ads subject to this 
requirement, are “qualified political advertisement[s]” which are defined differently than the Act’s prior 
                                               
356 Id. § 4208(a)(k)(2). 
 
357 Id. § 4211. 
 
358 For an overview whether states place record-keeping on online platforms that host political advertising, see the third column 
of Table One, found at the end of this Chapter. 
 
359 Compare H.R. 1 § 4208, with CAL. GOV’T CODE § 84504.6(d) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 9 of 2021 Reg. Legis. Sess.), and 
MD ELEC. LAW § 13-405(b)-(c) (West, Westlaw through laws effective Mar. 5, 2021). This is a different approach than that taken 
in New York, where the state maintains records about political ads distributed online. N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 14-107(5-a) (West, 
Westlaw through Chs. 1 to 49, 61 to 71 of 2021 Legis. Sess.). 
 
360 Compare H.R. 1 § 4208(b), with MD ELEC. LAW § 13-405(b). 
 
361 Compare H.R. 1 § 4208(a)(k)(2), with CAL. GOV’T CODE § 84504.6(d), and MD ELEC. LAW § 13-405(b)-(c). Similarly, within 
Washington state’s record-keeping requirement for commercial advertisers, Washington regulations require online platforms to 
maintain records with information about the demographic audiences who saw the advertisement as well as the number of 
impressions the ad received. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 390-18-050(6)(g) (2021). 
 
362 Compare H.R. 1 § 4208(a)(k)(4), with MD ELEC. LAW § 1-101(ll-1), and CAL. GOV’T CODE § 84504.6(a)(2). 
 57 
 
reference to “qualified internet and digital communication[s].”363 “Qualified political advertisement” is 
defined as “any advertisement . . . that (i) is made by or on behalf of a candidate[,] or (ii) communicates a 
message relating to any political matter of national importance, including (I) a candidate[,] (II) any 
election to Federal office[,] or (III) a national legislative issue of public importance.”364 In contrast, 
Maryland defines “qualifying paid digital communication[s]” subject to its record-keeping law as “any 
electronic communication that (1) is campaign material[,] (2) is placed or promoted for a fee on an online 
platform[,] (3) is disseminated to 500 or more individuals[,] and (4) does not propose a commercial 
transaction.”365 In Maryland, “campaign material,” includes political ads referencing “a candidate, a 
prospective candidate, or the approval or rejection of a question or prospective question.”366 While both 
the Honest Ads Act and Maryland define the ads subject to these requirements fairly broadly, Maryland’s 
definition is narrower in that it only includes ads on current or prospective candidates and ballot questions 
while the Honest Ads Act also includes ads discussing national legislative issues.367 
 In California, political ads subject to the state’s record-keeping requirements are even narrower 
and apply to “online platform disclosed advertisement[s],” the definition of which includes a slew of 
confusing terms and limitations.368 There, an “online platform disclosed advertisement” are ads that fall 
into one of two categories: (1) “[a] paid electronic media advertisement” that is posted on social media or 
similarly interactive websites, “unless all advertisements on the platform are video advertisements that 
can comply with” separate disclaimer requirements, or (2) “[a] paid electronic media advertisement on an 
online platform that is not” a graphic that can link to a separate page and comply with separate disclaimer 
                                               
363 H.R. 1 § 4206(a)(1)(B), 4208(a)(k)(4). 
 
364 Id. § 42088(a)(k)(4). 
 
365 MD ELEC. LAW § 1-101(ll-1). 
 
366 Id. § 1-101(k)(1). 
 
367 Compare H.R. 1 § 4208(a)(k)(4), with MD ELEC. LAW § 1-101(k)(1), (ll-1). 
 




requirements, a video file, an audio file, or an email file.369 The state defines an “[a]dvertisement” as “any 
general or public communication that is authorized and paid for by a committee for the purpose of 
supporting or opposing a candidate or candidates for elective office or a ballot measure or ballot 
measures.”370 Thus, California’s record-keeping requirement also does not include ads about political 
issues that do not relate to candidates or ballot measures.371 California’s record-keeping requirement sits 
within a broader campaign finance disclosure scheme that includes completely separate sponsorship 
disclaimer requirements for online ads that are not “online platform disclosed advertisement[s].”372 Here, 
California’s description of which ads are covered by record-keeping requirements is narrower but far 
more confusing than the definitions in the Honest Ads Act or in Maryland. California has tried to limit 
record-keeping requirements only to political ads on websites like social media platforms or to ads that 
cannot follow the state’s other disclaimer requirements.373 But, in doing so, the state has also created a 
web of requirements that is difficult to follow and untangle. 
 The Honest Ads act also differs from state laws in how it defines which platforms are subject to 
the Act’s record-keeping requirements.374 The Honest Ads Act applies its requirement to  “any public-
facing website, web application, or digital application (including a social network, ad network, or search 
engine) which (A) sells qualified political advertisements[,] and (B) has 50,000,000 or more unique 
monthly United States visitors for a majority of months during the preceding 12 months.”375 Online 
platforms that fail to abide by the record-keeping requirement may be subject to an injunction or civil 
                                               
369 Id. § 84504.6(a)(2). 
 
370 Id. § 84501(a)(1)). 
 
371 See id.  
 
372 See Campaign Advertising – Requirements & Restrictions, CAL. POL. PRAC. COMM’N, 
https://www.fppc.ca.gov/learn/campaign-rules/campaign-advertising-requirements-restrictions.html (last accessed Mar. 2, 2021). 
 
373 See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 84504.6(a)(2). 
 
374 Compare H.R. 1, 117th Cong. § 4208(a)(k)(3) (2021), with CAL. GOV’T CODE § 84504.6(a)(1), and MD ELEC. LAW § 1-
101(dd-1) (West Westlaw through laws effective Mar. 5, 2021). 
 
375 H.R. 1 § 4208(a)(k)(3). 
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fines ranging $5,000 to $10,000, or more depending on the amount of the advertising expenditure 
involved.376 Notably, the Honest Ads Act limits online platforms subject to this requirement by imposing 
a monthly user threshold that is much higher than those found in California and Maryland, or even those 
other states that apply record-keeping requirements to other mediums of communication beyond online 
platforms.377 For instance, California defines an online platform as a website or application that sells ads 
directly to advertisers, without setting a user threshold.378 Maryland similarly defines an online platform 
as a website or web application that sells space for “qualifying paid digital communication[s],” but does 
not sweep in online platforms that have had fewer than 100,000 unique monthly users in the preceding 12 
months.379 In contrast, the Honest Ads Act raises that user threshold significantly to 50 million unique 
monthly users.380 At the same time, the Honest Ads Act lacks one significant limitation that California has 
implemented. In California, the law clarifies that it does not include websites or web applications that 
“display[] advertisements that are sold directly to advertisers through another online platform.”381 
Therefore, websites that only run political ads directly sold by a separate ad network, would not be 
subject to record-keeping requirements in California.382 The Honest Ads Act makes no reference to this 
type of relationship among different online platforms in its definition of online platforms.383  
                                               
376 Id. § 4208(a)(k)(7); see also 52 U.S.C. § 30109(5)–(6). 
 
377 Compare H.R. 1 § 4208(a)(k)(3), with CAL. GOV’T CODE § 84504.6(a)(1), and MD ELEC. LAW § 1-101(dd-1). Other states that 
have record-keeping requirements for online platforms apply them broadly to persons and businesses that sell political 
advertising space. See WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17A.345 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 8 of 2021 Reg. Legis. Sess.); N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 19:44A-22.3(d) (West, Westlaw through 2020 Legis. Sess.); NEV. REV. STAT. § 294A.370 (West, Westlaw through 31st 
and 32nd 2020 Special Legis. Sess.). 
 
378 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 84504.6(a)(1). 
 
379 MD ELEC. LAW § 1-101(dd-1). 
 
380 H.R. 1 § 4208(a)(k)(3). 
 
381 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 84504.6(a)(1). 
 
382 See id.  
 
383 See H.R. 1 § 4208. However, Maryland’s record-keeping requirement does state that where an online platform has sold 
advertising space to an ad network, who in turn sells it directly to an ad purchaser, the online platform where the ad has been 
published must only maintain “the contact information for the ad network [or] a hyperlink to the ad network’s website where 
contact information is located.” MD ELEC. LAW § 13-405(b)(6)(iii). 
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 As mentioned above,384 these policy choices about who and what is covered by these record-
keeping requirements are particularly important because of how those choices are treated in constitutional 
analysis. When analyzing the constitutionality of particular law, under exacting scrutiny, which is 
typically used for traditional campaign finance disclosure requirements placed on political ad purchasers, 
the court will look at whether there is a “‘substantial relation’ between an ‘important’ government interest 
and ‘the information required to be disclosed.’”385 Under strict scrutiny, the court will look at whether the 
law is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling government interest.386 There may be multiple ways to 
ensure that a record-keeping law is properly tailored to achieve the asserted interest, depending on the 
government interest at hand. For instance, a law with the purpose of preventing foreign election 
interference that narrowly targets only large platforms where interference efforts took place, like 
Facebook, by using a high user threshold may have a better chance of being upheld than a law that also 
targets small platforms without evidence of interference efforts, like the plaintiffs in McManus.387 In 
contrast, a law that focuses on traditional campaign finance interests may be able to draw a wider scope.  
 That being said, looking both at the Honest Ads Act and back to state laws with similar record-
keeping requirements, although some of the information required to be maintained by platforms under 
these laws is similar,388 the variation in these laws beyond that in terms of which platforms and ads are 
covered becomes messy. This presents a challenge for online platforms, like Facebook or Google, who 
operate in multiple states. While platforms can track changes in federal law, they may not have the ability 
to easily track those changes in addition to different requirements across different states. Complying with 
multiple, slightly different requirements, each with slightly different penalties, creates additional 
                                               
384 See supra notes 325–327 and accompanying text. 
 
385 Wash. Post v. McManus, 944 F.3d 506, 520 (4th Cir. 2019) (Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64-66 (1976)). 
 
386 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010). 
 
387 See McManus, 944 F.3d at 521–22 (explaining that while “the clear bulk of foreign meddling took place on websites like 
Facebook, Instagram, or other social media platforms that each garner millions of visitors per month,” Maryland did not produce 
sufficient evidence showing that interference efforts took place on plaintiffs’ smaller media platforms). 
 
388 See supra notes 283–291, 356–361 and accompanying text. 
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compliance burdens for platforms who may then decide to leave the political advertising marketplace as 
Google has done in multiple states with these requirements.389 Consequently, any requirements for online 
platforms should be standardized, rather than implemented as a patchwork of different requirements. 
 
(D) Summary and Conclusion 
 
 This Chapter sought to outline the various approaches states have taken to address online political 
advertising and compare those approaches to the provisions of the Honest Ads Act. Exploring these 
statutes establishes an important foundation for the rest of this thesis, which ultimately seeks to make 
recommendations for policymakers seeking to increase transparency surrounding online political 
advertising and, in particular, for potential regulations of online platforms in this context. The information 
conveyed in this Chapter highlights the various approaches that could be taken, ranging from very simple 
tweaks to existing legislation to entirely new, record-keeping requirements for online platforms. The 
paragraphs that follow provide a brief summary of the information presented in this chapter.  
 First, legislators seeking to regulate online political advertising could simply expand existing 
definitions and disclosure requirements to apply to political advertising placed online. Governments 
should do this to eliminate current confusion about what disclosure rules apply to online ads and bring 
more consistent standardization to political ads across different mediums.390 Currently, all states require 
that certain expenditures, including advertising expenditures, be reported to the government. 391 Moreover, 
over half of states expressly include online advertising among the list of advertising mediums covered by 
their sponsorship disclaimer requirements or expressly state that online ads can meet the sponsorship 
                                               
389 Political Content, supra note 303. 
 
390 See Wood, Facilitating Accountability, supra note 276, at 557 (“At minimum, online advertisements should be subject to the 
same regulatory and disclosure requirements as other types of advertisements, such as those broadcasted on TV or radio.”). 
 
391 For a general overview of state requirements for reporting expenditures, see the second column of Table One, found at the end 
of this Chapter. To view expenditure data at the federal level, the public can view reports for various types of expenditures, some 




disclaimer requirements by linking to a separate webpage.392 This is also the approach taken by the 
Honest Ads Act, which seeks to (1) amend the federal definitions of “public communication” and 
“electioneering communication” to expressly apply to online ads, and, thus, apply existing sponsorship 
disclaimer and campaign finance reporting requirements to online ads,393 and (2) apply existing 
sponsorship disclaimer requirements specifically for ads in “television” and “radio” formats to online ads 
by amending the statutory language to apply to “video” and “audio” format ads.394  
 Among the other states that do not expressly include online ads in their sponsorship requirements 
for political ads, the vast majority merely refer generally to “communications” or “advertisements,” or 
they include a general, catchall term, like “general public political advertising” or “electronic media 
advertising,” among a list of enumerated media types, that would likely include online advertising.395 
However, whether online advertising falls within these terms is largely unclear, and, as the example from 
Indiana shows, these terms may not encompass online ads.396 Tweaking statutory language to include 
online ads by expressly mentioning them––as opposed to including a vague catchall term––is the simplest 
way to increase transparency and establish the clarity that disclosure requirements currently lack in the 
area of online political advertising. Making these simple changes to both federal and state laws would 
more clearly sweep political ads placed online into many of the sponsorship disclaimer and reporting 
requirements that already apply to political ads placed on other communication mediums.  
 Additionally, legislators could establish record-keeping requirements related to political ads 
distributed online. This is the main focus of this thesis given its novel approach to campaign finance 
disclosure. Although this approach is best analogized to the record-keeping requirements for political ads 
                                               
392 For an overview of state sponsorship disclaimer requirements and how many states expressly include online political 
advertising in those requirements, see the first column of Table One, found at the end of this chapter. 
 
393 H.R. 1, 117th Cong. § 4205–4206 (2021). 
 
394 Id. § 4207(c). 
 
395 For an overview of state sponsorship disclaimer requirements and how many include a catchall term that could incorporate 
online political advertising, see the first column of Table One, found at the end of this chapter. 
 
396 INDIANA CAMPAIGN FINANCE MANUAL, supra note 261, at 72. 
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distributed through cable and broadcasting stations,397 the Fourth Circuit in McManus rejected this 
argument and concluded that Maryland’s record-keeping requirements for online platforms were unlike 
both traditional campaign finance laws that place disclosure obligations directly on ad purchasers and 
record-keeping requirements for broadcasters given the distinction between the broadcast industry and the 
Internet in First Amendment jurisprudence.398 The Fourth Circuit’s decision in McManus will be 
discussed in greater depth in the following Chapter. Under these record-keeping requirements for online 
political advertising, states that have these laws, particularly those that have created their requirements 
specifically for online platforms, require that either the government or online platforms maintain publicly-
accessible records with information about online political ads.399 This information typically includes items 
like the identity and address of the ad purchaser, the cost of the ad, when the ad was distributed, the issue 
or candidate discussed, and the targeted audience.400 While some states have established these record-
keeping requirements for all types of media that distribute political ads,401 others have specifically created 
unique record-keeping requirements for certain political ads distributed on certain online platforms.402 
The Honest Ads Act proposes the latter.403  
 Legislators enacting record-keeping regimes for online political advertising have two significant 
points to consider. First, legislators must decide whether to place the responsibility for maintaining these 
records available to the public on the government, which would get the required information directly from 
ad purchasers, or on online platforms. As the McManus case, which discussed in depth in the following 
                                               
397 See 47 U.S.C. § 315(e); see also 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.1943, 76.1701 (2021). 
 
398 Wash. Post v. McManus, 944 F.3d 506, 515, 519 (4th Cir. 2019). 
 
399 See supra Chapter Two Part B. 
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401 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:44A-22.3(d) (West, Westlaw through 2020 Legis. Sess.); NEV. REV. STAT. § 294A.370 (West, 
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2021 Reg. Legis. Sess.). 
 
402 See, CAL. GOV’T CODE § 84504.6; MD ELEC. LAW § 13-405(b)-(c). 
 
403 H.R. 1, 117th Cong. § 4208 (2021). 
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Chapter, demonstrates, placing this responsibility on online platforms can raise constitutional concerns.404 
Requirements that mandate online platforms to publish records of the political ads that they run open the 
law up to arguments that these laws compel speech in violation of the First Amendment.405 Thus, as one 
attorney interviewed for a later portion of this thesis suggests, placing the responsibility for maintaining 
these records on the government, rather than the platform, would eliminate that concern.406  
 At the same time, what makes online political advertising, especially on social media, unique 
compared to political advertising in other mediums is how those ads are distributed through the 
platform.407 For social media platforms like Facebook, “[e]ven when ads posted online are identical in 
content to those posted on broadcast and radio, they are capable of reaching many more people . . . 
[o]nline ads can stay online indefinitely, and once posted, they can be retweeted and shared.”408 Part of 
what society cares about is how online ads are distributed––how many impressions they received, who 
saw them, and who they were targeted to––in addition to who paid for it or how much it cost.409 Record-
keeping requirements specifically made for online platforms include this information,410 and the platforms 
themselves are more likely to have consistently up-to-date information on these points than ad 
purchasers.411 Furthermore, as will be discussed in greater depth in Chapter Four, state regulators in at 
least one state with record-keeping requirements for online platforms, among other businesses, feel that 
                                               
404 See Wash. Post v. McManus, 944 F.3d 506, 520–24 (4th Cir. 2019) (concluding that Maryland’s requirements for online 
platforms were not sufficiently tailored, as applied to the plaintiffs, to meet the state’s asserted interest in combatting foreign 
interference in state elections). 
 
405 See id. at 513. 
 
406 Transcript: Research Thesis Interview Six, at 206–07. 
 
407 See, Wood, Facilitating Accountability, supra note 276, at 533–36. 
 
408 Id. at 536. 
 
409 See id. at 533–36. 
 
410 See supra notes 285–291, 356 and accompanying text. 
 
411 See G. Michael Parsons, Platforms, Political Advertising, and Attentional Choice, 12 DREXEL L. REV. 765, 796–97 (2020) 
([O]nline platforms––unlike government agencies––are in a unique position to provide dynamic contextual information to 




removing that obligation would eliminate benefits that they currently get from including them in the 
disclosure scheme, like a means to double-check that campaign finance reports filed by political actors 
themselves are complete and accurate.412 Thus, there are key benefits that would be lost if governments 
obtained disclosure information directly from ad purchasers, instead of involving online platforms. 
 Second, policymakers must determine the scope of these record-keeping requirements by clearly 
defining what types of online ads and online platforms are subject to these requirements. Some 
approaches to drawing these lines may place a real limit on what platforms and what ads are covered, 
while others do not. For instance, the Honest Ads Act’s 50 million monthly user threshold limits the 
requirements’ applicability to large platforms,413 while the Maryland’s 100,000 monthly user threshold 
sweeps in even media organizations operating smaller platforms, like a local newspaper.414 At the same 
time, while the Honest Ads Act would apply to a broad range of ads on those large platforms, including 
ads discussing national legislative issues415 in Maryland the types of ads included in record-keeping 
requirements for large and small platforms is limited to those discussing prospective or current candidates 
and public questions on the ballot.416 Ultimately, determining how far a record-keeping requirement 
should reach is significant to constitutional analysis because that consideration speaks to whether the 
requirement is sufficiently tailored to meet the government’s interest in establishing it.  
 There may be various ways to draw these lines––and they should be drawn based on a strong 
empirical record that has yet to be established, rather than assumptions––and strike the proper 
constitutional balance. Policymakers across the country should strive for uniformity to ease compliance 
burdens on online platforms that operate on a national scale. Similarly, J. Scott Babwah Brennen and Matt 
Perault similarly recommended that federal law “should standardize variable names and formats to 
                                               
412 Transcript: Research Thesis Interview Two, at 179; Transcript: Research Thesis Interview Three, at 187–88. 
 
413 H.R. 1, 117th Cong. § 4208(a)(k)(3) (2021). 
 
414 MD ELEC. LAW §1-101(dd-1) (West, Westlaw through laws effective Mar. 5, 2021). 
 
415 H.R. 1 § 4208(a)(k)(4). 
 
416 MD ELEC. LAW § 1-101(k)(1), (ll-1). 
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facilitate cross-platform analysis” of political ad archives.417 Providing some level of standardization is 
important beyond the public’s ability to make comparisons across platforms and beyond legislation at the 
federal level. As McManus, discussed in detail in the following Chapter, suggests, record-keeping 
requirements may encourage platforms to leave the political advertising marketplace and 
disproportionally disadvantage down-ballot, state level candidates.418 By providing some level of 
uniformity in what platforms and what ads are covered by these record-keeping requirements, 
policymakers would be at least be minimizing the compliance burden that platforms would otherwise face 
if they had to navigate multiple, different laws. 
 







ads to include  
sponsorship disclaimers 
Imposes campaign 
reporting requirements  
for expenditures for  
online ads 
Imposes requirements  
on online platforms that  
host online ads 
Alabama 
Yes (Expressly referring to 
online ads). ALA. CODE § 
17-5-12 (West, Westlaw 
through Act 2021-19) 
(applying requirements to 
paid political ads, including 
those distributed via “any 
electronic media” and 
providing an exception for 
limited-character online ads 
that can link to a webpage 
with required information). 
Yes. ALA. CODE § 17-5-8 
(West, Westlaw through Act 
2021-19) (requiring periodic 
reports from campaigns, 
committees, and other 
persons making certain 
political ad expenditures). 
No. 
Alaska 
Yes (Expressly applying to 
online ads) ALASKA STAT. 
§§ 15.13.090(a), 
15.13.400(3) (West, 
Westlaw through Ch. 32 of 
2020 Second Reg. Legis. 
Sess.) (applying 
requirements to political 
“communications” and 
Yes. ALASKA STAT. § 
15.13.040 (West, Westlaw 
through Ch. 32 of 2020 
Second Reg. Legis. Sess.) 
(requiring periodic reports of 
all expenditures by 
campaigns, political groups, 
and other persons). 
Maybe. ALASKA STAT. § 
15.13.040(f) (West, 
Westlaw through Ch. 32 
of 2020 Second Reg. 
Legis. Sess.) (requiring 
“all businesses, persons, 
or groups” supplying 
political advertising 
services to maintain 
                                               
417 J. SCOTT BABWAH BRENNAN & MATT PERAULT, BREAKING BLACKOUT BLACK BOXES: ROADBLOCKS TO ANALYZING PLATFORM 
POLITICAL AD BANS 15 (2021) https://scienceandsociety.duke.edu/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/CSTP-Brief_For-Web_1.pdf. 
 





to expressly include those 
over the Internet). 
records of the transaction 
for inspection by the 
state). 
Arizona 
Yes (Expressly referring to 
online ads). ARIZ. REV. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 16-901(1), 
16-925 (West, Westlaw 
through laws effective Feb. 
12, 2021) (applying 
requirements to 
“advertisement[s],” 
exempting online ads that 
can link to a webpage with 
required information, and 
defining “advertisement” 
broadly as information 
distributed via a 
“communication medium”). 
Yes. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 16-926 (West, Westlaw 
through laws effective Feb. 
12, 2021) (requiring periodic 
reports of all disbursements 
over $250 made by 
candidate committees and 
political committees and 
independent advertising 
expenditures over $1,000 
made by other persons). 
No. 
Arkansas 
Likely (via a catchall). 
ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-1-
103(a)(7)(B)(i) (West, 
Westlaw through acts 18, 
20, 56, 60 87, 94, and 151 
of 2021 Reg. Legis. Sess.) 
(applying requirements to 
paid political ads, including 
those distributed via an 
“electronic medium”). 
Yes. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 7-
6-207–209, 7-6-220 (West, 
Westlaw through acts 18, 20, 
56, 60 87, 94, and 151 of 
2021 Reg. Legis. Sess.) 
(requiring periodic reports 
for all candidate 
expenditures and from those 
making more than a total of 
$500 in independent 
expenditures in one year). 
Maybe. ARK. CODE ANN. 
§ 7-1-103(a)(7)(B)(ii) 
(West, Westlaw through 
acts 18, 20, 56, 60 87, 94, 
and 151 of 2021 Reg. 
Legis. Sess.) (placing 
partial responsibility for 
including sponsorship 
disclaimers on ad 
publishers). 
California 
Yes (Expressly applying to 
online ads). CAL. GOV’T 
CODE § 84504.6 (West, 
Westlaw through Ch. 9 of 
2021 Reg. Legis. Sess.) 
(expressly applying 
requirements to certain paid 
political ads placed on 
online platforms).; See also 
Campaign Advertising - 
Requirements & 





restrictions.html (last visited 
Mar. 8, 2021) (describing 
disclaimer requirements for 
paid political ads placed 
Yes. See CAL. GOV’T CODE 
§§ 84200, 84200.5, 84204.5, 
84211, 85500 (West, 
Westlaw through Ch. 9 of 
2021 Reg. Legis. Sess.) 
(requiring campaign finance 
reports detailing 
expenditures by candidates 
and committees). 
Yes. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 
84504.6 (West, Westlaw 
through Ch. 9 of 2021 
Reg. Legis. Sess.) (first, 
requiring online platforms 
to include sponsorship 
disclaimers on “online 
platform disclosed 
advertisement[s],” one 
form of online political 
advertising, or link those 
ads to the webpages of 
political committees and, 
second, requiring online 
platforms to maintain 
records about political ads 
bought by committees 
spending more than $500 




online, among other 
mediums). 
advertisement[s]” on that 
platform).  
Colorado 
Yes (Expressly applying to 
online ads) COLO. REV. 
STAT. §§ 1-45-107.5(5), 1-
45-108.3 (West, Westlaw 
through Ch. 7 of First 2021 
Reg. Legis. Sess.) (expressly 
applying requirements to 
political ads “placed on a 
website, streaming media 
service, or online forum,” 
among other mediums and 
providing an exception for 
limited-character online ads 
that can link to a webpage 
with required information). 
Yes. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 
1-45-107.5(4), 1-45-
108(1)(a), 1-45-108.5 (West, 
Westlaw through Ch. 7 of 
First 2021 Reg. Legis. Sess.) 
(requiring periodic reports 
from those making more 
than a total of $1,000 in 
independent expenditures in 
one year and candidates and 




Yes (Expressly applying to 
online ads). CONN. GEN. 
STAT. § 9-621 (West, 
Westlaw through 2020 Reg. 
Legis. Sess., 2020 July 
Special Legis. Sess, 2020 
Sept. Special Legis. Sess.) 
(expressly applying 
requirements to paid 
political ads placed online, 
among other mediums, and 
providing an exception for 
limited-character online ads 
that can link to a webpage 
with required information). 
Yes. CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 
9-601(d), 9-603, 9-607, 9-
608 (West, Westlaw through 
2020 Reg. Legis. Sess., 2020 
July Special Legis. Sess, 
2020 Sept. Special Legis. 
Sess.) (requiring periodic 
reports from those making 
more than $1,000 in 
independent expenditures 






Yes (Expressly applying to 
online ads). DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 15, §§ 8021, 
8002(7) (West, Westlaw 
through Ch. 3 of 2021-2022 
Legis. Sess.) (expressly 
applying requirements to 
paid political ads placed 
online, among other 
mediums). 
Yes. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 
15, §§ 8030–8031 (West, 
Westlaw through Ch. 3 of 
2021-2022 Legis. Sess.) 
(requiring campaign finance 
reports of all expenditures 
by candidates, political 
parties, and third-parties 
making more than an 






Yes (Expressly applying to 
online ads). FLA. STAT. §§ 
106.011(4), (15), 106.143, 
106.071 (West, Westlaw 
through 2020 Second Reg. 
Legis. Sess.) (expressly 
applying requirements to 
paid political ads placed 
online, among other 
mediums, and providing an 
exception for limited-
character online ads that can 
link to a webpage with 
required information). 
Yes. FLA. STAT. §§ 106.07, 
106.071 (West, Westlaw 
through 2020 Second Reg. 
Legis. Sess.) (requiring 
campaign finance reports of 
all expenditures by 
candidates, political 
committees, and those 
making more than $5,000 in 
independent expenditures).  
No. 
Georgia 
Likely (Applying generally 
to “advertising”). GA. 
CODE ANN. § 21-5-
34(a)(2)(A), (f)(3) (West, 
Westlaw through laws 
effective Act 4 2021) 
(requiring that “advertising” 
about referendums paid for 
by a campaign committee 
identify the committee’s 
principal officer and 
requiring that 
“communication[s]” paid for 
by an independent 
committee identify that 
committee). 
Yes. GA. COMP. R. & REG. 
189-3-.01(3) (2021) 
(requiring campaign finance 
reports detailing 




Likely (via a catchall). 
HAW. REV. STAT. § 11-391 
(West, Westlaw through 
2020 Reg. Legis. Sess.) 
(applying requirements to 
paid political ads, including 
those distributed by 
“electronic means”). 
Yes. HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 
11-333, 11-335, 11-341 
(West, Westlaw through 
2020 Reg. Legis. Sess.) 
(requiring campaign finance 
reports detailing all 
expenditures made by 
candidate committees, 
noncandidate committees, 
and those spending more 
than $2,000 on 
electioneering 






Likely (via a catchall). 
IDAHO CODE § 67-6614A 
(West, Westlaw through Ch. 
13 of First Reg. Legis. Sess.) 
(applying requirements to 
political ads in traditional 
media and those distributed 
via “any other type of 
general public political 
advertising.”).  
Yes. IDAHO CODE §§ 67-
6607, 67-6611, 67-6628 
(West, Westlaw through Ch. 
13 of First Reg. Legis. Sess.) 
(requiring campaign finance 
reports detailing all 
expenditures made by 
candidates and political 
committees, those making 
more than $100 in 
independent expenditures, 





Yes (Expressly applying to 
online ads). 10 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. 5/9-9.5 (West, 
Westlaw through P.A. 101-
653) (expressly applying 
requirements to paid 
political ads placed online, 
among other mediums). 
Yes. 10 ILL. COMP. STAT 
5/9-8.6, 5/9-10 (West, 
Westlaw through P.A. 101-
653) (requiring campaign 
finance reports detailing all 
expenditures by campaigns, 
political committees, and 
those making more than 
$3,000 in independent 
expenditures in one year).  
No. 
Indiana 
No. Disclaimers in 2020 
INDIANA CAMPAIGN 





(last visited March 8, 2021) 
(expressly excluding ads 
placed on the Internet). 
Yes. IND. CODE §§ 3-9-5-5, 
3-9-5-15 (West, Westlaw 
through 2020 Second Reg. 
Legis. Sess.) (requiring 
campaign finance reports 
detailing all expenditures 
made by committees). 
No. 
Iowa 
Likely (via a catchall). 
IOWA CODE § 68A.405 
(West, Westlaw through 
laws effective Feb. 23, 2021) 
(applying requirements to 
political ads in traditional 
media and those distributed 
via “electronic general 
public political advertising). 
Yes. IOWA CODE §§ 
68A.401, 68A.401A, 68A-
402A, 68A.404(3) (West, 
Westlaw through laws 
effective Feb. 23, 2021) 
(requiring campaign finance 
reports detailing 
expenditures by candidate 
and political committees, 
organizations making 
expenditures for issue 
advocacy ads, and those 
making more than $1,000 in 





Yes (Expressly applying to 
online ads). KAN. STAT. 
ANN. § 25-4156(b)(1)(E) 
(West, Westlaw through 
2021 Reg. Legis. Sess. laws 
effective Jan. 25, 2021) 
(expressly applying 
requirements to paid 
political ads placed online, 
among other mediums, and 
providing an exception for 
limited-character ads placed 
on social media). 
Yes. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 
25-4148, 25-4148c, 25-4150 
(West, Westlaw through 
2021 Reg. Legis. Sess. laws 
effective Jan. 25, 2021) 
(requiring campaign finance 
reports detailing all 
expenditures over $50 made 
by candidate committees, all 
independent expenditures 
over $300 made by party 
and other political 
committees, and all 
expenditures over an 
aggregate of $100 in one 
year made by other persons). 
No. 
Kentucky 
No. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
121.190 (West, Westlaw 
through Ch. 8 of 2021 Reg. 
Legis. Sess.). 
Yes. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
121.180 (West, Westlaw 
through Ch. 8 of 2021 Reg. 
Legis. Sess.) (requiring 
campaign finance reports 
detailing expenditures by 
candidate committees and 
political issue committees 
spending more than $3,000 
total in one election).  
No. 
Louisiana 
No. LA. STAT. ANN. § 
18:1463(C)(2), (5) (West, 
Westlaw through 2020 
Second Extraordinary Legis. 
Sess.).  
Yes. LA. STAT. ANN. § 
18:1484 (West, Westlaw 
through 2020 Second 
Extraordinary Legis. Sess.) 
(requiring campaign finance 
reports detailing 
expenditures by candidates, 
political committees, and 
other persons who make 
expenditures over $2,500). 
No. 
Maine 
Yes (Expressly applying to 
online ads). ME. STAT. tit. 
21-A §§ 1014(1), 1055, 
1055-A (West, Westlaw 
through 2019 Second Reg. 
Legis. Sess.) (expressly 
applying requirements to 
paid political ads placed 
online, among other 
mediums). 
Yes. ME. STAT. tit. 21-A §§ 
1016, 1017, 1017-A, 1019-B 
(West, Westlaw through 
2019 Second Reg. Legis. 
Sess.) (requiring campaign 
finance reports detailing 
expenditures by campaigns 
and political committees and 
those making independent 
expenditures over $250 
during one election). 
Yes. ME. STAT. tit. 21-A 
§ 1014(3-B) (West, 
Westlaw through 2019 
Second Reg. Legis. Sess.) 
(requiring online 
newspapers to refrain 
from publishing ads 





Yes (Expressly applying to 
online ads). MD. CODE 
ANN. ELEC. LAW §§ 1-
101(k)(1), 13-401 (West, 
Westlaw through laws 
effective Mar. 5, 2021) 
(expressly applying 
requirements to paid 
political ads placed online, 
among other mediums). 
Yes. MD. CODE ANN. ELEC. 
LAW §§ 13-304(b), 13-306, 
13-307 (West, Westlaw 
through laws effective Mar. 
5, 2021) (requiring 
campaign finance reports for 
expenditures made by 
political committees, those 
making independent 
expenditures for political 
ads, and those making 
electioneering 
communications for political 
ads). 
Yes. MD. CODE ANN. 
ELEC. LAW § 13-405(b)-
(c) (West, Westlaw 
through laws effective 
Mar. 5, 2021) (requiring 
online platforms to 
maintain records about 
online ads and provide 
additional records about 




Yes (Expressly applying to 
online ads). MASS. GEN. 
LAWS Ch. 55, § 18G (West, 
Westlaw through Ch. 3 of 
2021 First Legis. Sess.) 
(expressly applying 
requirements to paid 
political ads placed online, 
among other mediums). 
Yes. MASS. GEN. LAWS Ch. 
55, §§ 18, 18A, 18F (West, 
Westlaw through Ch. 3 of 
2021 First Legis. Sess.) 
(requiring campaign finance 
reports for expenditures 
made by candidates and 
political committees and 
those making more than 
$250 in electioneering 
communications and 
independent expenditures).   
No. 
Michigan 
Likely (via a catchall). 
MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 
169.36 (2021) (applying 
requirements to printed 
campaign materials and 
“[a]ny other medium used 
for campaign purposes”).  
Yes. MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 
169.226, 169.229, 169.251 
(West, Westlaw through 
P.A. 2020, No. 402 of 2020 
Reg. Legis. Sess.) (requiring 
campaign finance reports for 
expenditures made by 
campaign committees, 
political committees, 
political party committees, 
and those making more than 
$100 in independent 





Yes (Expressly referring to 
online ads). MINN. STAT. §§ 
211B.04, 211B.01(2) (West, 
Westlaw through laws 
effective Feb. 13, 2021) 
(requiring “campaign 
material” to include a 
sponsorship disclaimer, 
defining “campaign 
material” to include material 
“disseminated for the 
purpose of influencing 
voting,” and providing an 
exception for limited-
character online ads that can 
link to a webpage with 
required information). 
Yes. MINN. STAT. § 
211A.02 (West, Westlaw 
through laws effective Feb. 
13, 2021) (requiring 
campaign finance reports 
from candidates and 
committees making more 
than $750 total in 
expenditures in one year). 
No. 
Mississippi 
Yes (Expressly applying to 
online ads). MISS. CODE 
ANN. § 23-15-897 (West, 
Westlaw through 2021 Reg. 
Legis. Sess. laws effective 
Feb. 8, 2021) (expressly 
applying requirements to 
paid political ads placed 
online, among other 
mediums). 
Yes. MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 
23-15-807, 23-15-809 
(West, Westlaw through 
2021 Reg. Legis. Sess. laws 
effective Feb. 8, 2021) 
(requiring campaign finance 
reports detailing 
expenditures made by 
candidates and political 
committees and those 
making more than $200 in 
independent expenditures in 
one year).  
No. 
Missouri 
No. MO. REV. STAT. § 
130.031(8) (West, Westlaw 
through 2020 Second Reg. 
Legis. Sess. and First and 
Second Extraordinary Legis. 
Sess.). 
Yes. MO. REV. STAT. §§ 
130.041, 130.047, 130.050 
(West, Westlaw through 
2020 Second Reg. Legis. 
Sess. and First and Second 
Extraordinary Legis. Sess.) 
(requiring campaign finance 
reports detailing 
expenditures made by 
candidates, political 
committees, out of state 
committees, and other 
persons making $500 or 
more in support of or 
opposition to a candidate or 





Yes (Expressly applying to 
online ads). MONT. CODE 
ANN. §§ 13-35-225, 13-35-
237, 13-1-101(14)(a), 
(16)(a) (West, Westlaw 
through Chapters effective 
Feb. 18. 2021) (expressly 
applying requirements to 
paid political ads placed 
online, among other 
mediums). 
Yes. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 
13-37-225, 13-37-229(2)(a) 
(West, Westlaw through 
Chapters effective Feb. 18. 
2021) (requiring campaign 
finance reports detailing 
expenditures by candidates, 
political party committees, 





Yes (Expressly applying to 
online ads). NEB. REV. 
STAT. § 49-1474.02(3) 
(West, Westlaw through 
2020 Second Reg. Legis. 
Sess.) (expressly applying 
requirements to paid 
political ads placed online, 
among other mediums). 
Yes. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 
49-1459, 49-1467 (West, 
Westlaw through 2020 
Second Reg. Legis. Sess.) 
(requiring campaign finance 
reports detailing 
expenditures from political 
committees making more 
than $1,000 in expenditures 
in an election year and any 
person making more than 




Yes (Applying generally to 
express advocacy). NEV. 
REV. STAT. §§ 294A.347, 
294A.348 (West, Westlaw 
through 31st and 32nd 
Special 2020 Legis. Sess.) 
(applying requirements to all 
political ads containing 
express advocacy published 
within 60 days of a general 
election or 30 days of a 
primary election and to 
political ads in traditional 
media, as well as those 
distributed via “general 
public political advertising). 
Yes. NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 
294A.200, 294A.210 (West, 
Westlaw through 31st and 
32nd Special 2020 Legis. 
Sess.) (requiring campaign 
finance reports detailing 
expenditures made by 
candidates, political 
committees and political 
parties, and from other 
persons making more than 
$1,000 in independent 
expenditures). 
Yes. NEV. REV. STAT. § 
294A.370 (West, 
Westlaw through 31st and 
32nd Special 2020 Legis. 
Sess.) (requiring parties, 
including online 
platforms, that 
disseminate political ads 






Yes (Expressly applying to 
online ads). N.H. REV. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 664.14, 
664.2(VI)-(VII) (West, 
Westlaw through 2020 Reg. 
Legis. Sess.) (expressly 
applying requirements to 
paid political ads placed 
online, among other 
mediums). 
Yes. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 664:6, 664:6-a, 664:7 
(West, Westlaw through 
2020 Reg. Legis. Sess.) 
(requiring campaign finance 
reports detailing 
expenditures by political 
committees making more 





candidates making more 
than $500 in expenditures). 
No. 
New Jersey 
Yes (Expressly applying to 
online ads). N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 19:44A-22.3 (West, 
Westlaw through L.2020, c. 
156 and J.R. No. 6) 
(expressly applying 
requirements to paid 
political ads placed online, 
among other mediums). 
Yes. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 
19:44A-8, 19:44A-11 (West, 
Westlaw through L.2020, c. 
156 and J.R. No. 6) 
(requiring campaign finance 
reports detailing 
expenditures made by 
political committees, 
political party committees, 
expenditures over $3,000 
made by independent 
expenditure committees, and 
other expenditures over $500 
by other persons unaffiliated 
with a committee). 
Yes. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 
19:44A-22.3(d) (West, 
Westlaw through L.2020, 
c. 156 and J.R. No. 6) 
(requiring parties, 
including online 
platforms, that sell 
political ad space, to 
maintain records about 
those ads) 
New Mexico 
Likely (via a catchall). 
N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-19-
26.4, 1-19-26(A) (West, 
Westlaw through Ch. 3 of 
2021 First Reg. Legis. Sess.) 
(applying requirements to 
political ads in traditional 
media and those distributed 
via “electronic media”). 
Yes. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-
19-27, 1-19-27.3 (West, 
Westlaw through Ch. 3 of 
2021 First Reg. Legis. Sess.) 
(requiring campaign finance 
reports detailing 
expenditures made by 
campaigns, political 







Yes (Expressly applying to 
online ads). N.Y. ELEC. 
LAW §§ 14-106(2)-(4), 14-
107(2) (West, Westlaw 
through 2021 Legis. Sess. 
Ch. 1 to 49, 61 to 71) 
(expressly applying 
requirements to paid 
political ads placed online, 
among other mediums, and 
providing an exception for 
limited-character online ads 
that can link to a webpage 
with required information). 
Yes. N.Y. ELEC. LAW §§ 14-
102, 14-104, 14-107(4) 
(West, Westlaw through 
2021 Legis. Sess. Ch. 1 to 
49, 61 to 71) (requiring 
campaign finance reports 
detailing expenditures made 
by political committees, 
candidates, and those 
making more than $500 in 
independent expenditures for 
online ads). 
No. N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 
14-107(5-a) (West, 
Westlaw through 2021 
Legis. Sess. Ch. 1 to 49, 
61 to 71) (requiring the 
state of New York to 
maintain records about 
independent expenditure 




No. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 
163-278.39, 163-278.38z(1) 
(West, Westlaw through 
2020 Reg. Legis. Sess.) 
(applying requirements to 
print media, television, and 
radio).  
Yes. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 
163.278.9, 163.278.12 
(West, Westlaw through 
2020 Reg. Legis. Sess.) 
(requiring campaign finance 
reports detailing 
expenditures made by 
candidates and political 
committees and those 




Yes (Expressly applying to 
online ads). N.D. CENT. 
CODE § 16.1-10-04.1 (West, 
Westlaw through 2019 Reg. 
Legis. Sess.) (expressly 
applying requirements to 
paid political ads placed 
online, among other 
mediums). 
Yes. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 
16.1-08.1-02.3, 16.1-08.1-
02.4, 16.1-08.1-3.5 (West, 
Westlaw through 2019 Reg. 
Legis. Sess.) (requiring 
campaign finance reports 
detailing expenditures made 
by candidate committees, 
political party committees, 
other political committees, 
as well as reports detailing 




Likely (via a catchall). 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 
3517.20, 3517.105(B) 
(West, Westlaw through 
2019-2020 Legis. Sess.) 
(applying requirements to 
political ads in traditional 
media and those distributed 
via other means of “general 
publication” or “general 
public political 
advertising”). 
Yes. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§§ 3517.10(A), 
3517.105(C)(2) (West, 
Westlaw through 2019-2020 
Legis. Sess.) (requiring 
campaign finance reports 
detailing expenditures by 
campaign committees, 
political party committees, 
other political committees, 






Yes. Rules 2.54–2.58 in 
ANNOTATED ETHICS RULES 







requirements to paid 
political ads placed online, 
among other mediums). 
Yes. Rules 2.100–2.101, 
2.104–2.109 in ANNOTATED 








reports from political 
committees, political party 
committees, and candidate 







Yes (Expressly applying to 
online ads). OR. REV. STAT. 
§ 260.266 (West, Westlaw 
through 2020 Reg. Legis. 
Sess.) (expressly applying 
requirements to paid 
political ads placed online, 
among other mediums, and 
providing an exception for 
limited-character online ads 
that can link to a webpage 
with required information). 
Yes. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 
260.044(1), 260.057(1), 
260.083(1)(b), 260.118 
(West, Westlaw through 
2020 Reg. Legis. Sess.) 
(requiring campaign finance 
reports detailing 
expenditures made by  
candidate committees, 
political committees, petition 
committees, and all persons 
making more than $250 in 




Likely (via a catchall). 25 
PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. 
§ 3258(a) (West, Westlaw 
through 2021 Reg. Sess. Act 
4) (applying requirements to 
political ads in traditional 
media and those distributed 
via “any other type of 
general public political 
advertising”). 
Yes. 25 PA. STAT. AND 
CONS. STAT. § 3246 (West, 
Westlaw through 2021 Reg. 
Sess. Act 4) (requiring 
campaign finance reports 
detailing expenditures made 
by candidates and political 
committees that have 
expended more than $250 
and from those making more 






Yes (Expressly applying to 
online ads). 17 R.I. GEN. 
LAWS §§ 17-25-3(16)–(17), 
17-25-3.3 (West, Westlaw 
through Ch. 79 of 2020 
Second Reg. Legis. Sess.) 
(applying requirements to 
“electioneering 
communication[s],” which 
includes online ads, and 
“independent 
expenditure[s],” which 
includes communications of 
express advocacy).  
Yes. 17 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 
17-25.3-1 (West, Westlaw 
through Ch. 79 of 2020 
Second Reg. Legis. Sess.) 










Likely (Applying generally 
to “communication[s]”). 
S.C. CODE ANN. § 8-13-
1354 (West, Westlaw 
through 2020 Legis. Sess.) 
(applying requirements to 
expenditures for political 
“communication[s]” 
supporting or opposing 
candidates and ballot 
measures).   
Yes. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 8-
1304, 8-13-1308(A), 8-13-
1309(A) (West, Westlaw 
through 2020 Legis. Sess.) 
(requiring campaign finance 
reports detailing 
expenditures from 
campaigns and political 
committees making more 
than $500 total in 
expenditures and ballot 
measure committees making 




Likely (Applying generally 
to “communication[s]”). 
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 12-
27-15, 12-27-16, 12-27-16.1 
(West, Westlaw through 




Yes. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS 
§§ 12-27-16(2), 12-27-16.1, 
12-27-22, 12-27-24 (West, 
Westlaw through laws 
effective Mar. 3, 2021) 
(requiring campaign finance 
reports detailing 
expenditures made by 
candidates, political party 
committees, political action 
committees, ballot question 
committees, and those 




Likely (via a catchall). 
TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-19-
120 (West, Westlaw through 
2021 First Extraordinary 
Legis. Sess.) (applying 
requirements to political ads 
in traditional media and 
those distributed via “any 
Yes. TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-
10-105 (West, Westlaw 
through 2021 First 
Extraordinary Legis. Sess.) 
(requiring campaign finance 
reports detailing all 





other form of general public 
political advertising”). 
Texas 
Yes (Expressly applying to 
online ads). TEX. ELEC. 
CODE ANN. §§ 255.001, 
251.001(16) (West, Westlaw 
through 2019 Reg. Legis. 
Sess.) (expressly applying 
requirements to paid 
political ads placed online, 
among other mediums). 
Yes. TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. 
§§ 254.031, 254.061, 
254.121, 254.151, 154.161 
(West, Westlaw through 
2019 Reg. Legis. Sess.) 
(requiring campaign finance 
reports detailing 
expenditures over $100 in 
the aggregate made by 
candidates, officeholders, 
specific purpose committees, 
general purpose committees, 





Likely (via a catchall). 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-
11-901 (West, Westlaw 
through 2020 Sixth Special 
Legis. Sess.) (applying 
requirements to political ads 
in traditional media and 
those distributed via “any 
other type of general public 
political advertising”). 





Westlaw through 2020 Sixth 
Special Legis. Sess.) 
(requiring campaign finance 
reports detailing 
expenditures made by 
candidates and political 
parties; political action 
committees, corporations, 
and political issue 
committees making more 
than $750 in expenditures in 
one year; and other persons 
making more than $1,000 in 
independent expenditures in 
one election cycle). 
No. 
Vermont 
Yes (Expressly applying to 
online ads). VT. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 17 §§ 2901(6), 2972, 
2973 (West, Westlaw 
through Acts 1 and 2 of 
2021-2022 Reg. Legis. 
Sess.) (expressly applying 
requirements to paid 
political ads placed online, 
among other mediums, and 
providing an exception for 
limited-character online ads 
Yes. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17 
§§ 2964, 2968, 2970, 2971 
(West, Westlaw through 
Acts 1 and 2 of 2021-2022 
Reg. Legis. Sess.) (requiring 
campaign finance reports 
detailing expenditures made 
by candidates making more 
than $500 in expenditures in 
one election cycle, political 
committees and political 
parties making more than 




that can link to a webpage 
with required information). 
one election cycle, other 
entities making more than 
$1,000 in expenditures in 
one election cycle, and any 
person spending more than 
$500 or any independent-
expenditure only committee 
spending more than $5,000 




Yes (Expressly applying to 
online ads). VA. CODE ANN. 
§§ 24.2-955–24.2-958.3 
(West, Westlaw through cc. 
1&2 of 2021 Reg. Legis. 
Sess.) (expressly applying 
requirements to paid 
political ads placed online, 
among other mediums). 
Yes. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 
24.2-947.4, 24.2-949.5, 
24.2-949.9:2, 24.2-950.4, 
24.2-951.3 (West, Westlaw 
through cc. 1&2 of 2021 
Reg. Legis. Sess.) (requiring 
campaign finance reports 
detailing expenditures made 
by campaign committees, 
political action committees, 
out of state political 
committees, political party 
committees, and referendum 
committees)  
Yes. VA. CODE ANN. § 
24.2-960 (West, Westlaw 
through cc. 1&2 of 2021 
Reg. Legis. Sess.) 
(requiring online 
platforms to “establish 
reasonable procedures” to 
ensure that political ad 
purchasers identify 
themselves and are 
legally able to buy ads). 
Washington 
Yes (Expressly applying to 
online ads). WASH. REV. 
CODE §§ 42.17A.320(1), 
42.17A.005(21)(a), (40) 
(West, Westlaw through Ch. 
8 of 2021 Reg. Legis. Sess.) 
(expressly applying 
requirements to paid 
political ads placed online, 
among other mediums). 
Yes. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 
42.17A.235, 42.17A.255, 
42.17A.260 (West, Westlaw 
through Ch. 8 of 2021 Reg. 
Legis. Sess.) (requiring 
campaign finance reports 
detailing expenditures made 
by candidates and political 
committees, those making 
more than $100 in 
independent expenditures in 
one election campaign, those 
purchasing advertising worth 
more than $1,000).  
Yes. WASH. REV. CODE § 
42.17A.345 (West, 
Westlaw through Ch. 8 of 
2021 Reg. Legis. Sess.) 
(requiring “commercial 
advertiser[s],” including 
persons who sell online 
ad space, to maintain 
records on those ads). 
West Virginia 
Likely (Applying generally 
to certain statements of 
express advocacy). W. VA. 
CODE §§ 3-8-2(f), 3-8-
1a(22) (West, Westlaw 
through 2020 Reg. Legis. 
Sess. laws effective Feb. 18, 
2021) (applying 
requirements to ads that are 
independent expenditures, 
Yes. W. VA. CODE §§ 3-8-2, 
3-8-5, 3-8.5a (West, 
Westlaw through 2020 Reg. 
Legis. Sess.) (requiring 
campaign finance reports 
detailing expenditures by 
those making more than 
$1,000 in independent 




which is defined broadly as 
express advocacy made 
without coordination with a 
candidate or political party).  
expenditures by candidates 
and political committees). 
Wisconsin 
Likely (via a catchall). WIS. 
STAT. § 11.1303 (West, 
Westlaw through Apr. 18, 
2020) (applying 
requirements to political ads 
in traditional media and 
“other communication[s]”). 
Yes. WIS. STAT. §§ 11.0204, 
11.0304, 11.0404, 11.0504, 
11.0505, 11.0604, 11.0605, 
11.0804, 11.0904, 11.1001 
(West, Westlaw through 
Apr. 18, 2020) (requiring 
campaign finance reports 
detailing expenditures by 
candidate committees, 
political parties, legislative 
campaign committees, 




committees, and other 




Yes (Expressly applying to 
online ads). WYO. STAT. 
ANN. § 22-25-110 (West, 
Westlaw through 2020 
Budget Sess. and Ch. 1-3 of 
the 2020 Special Legis. 
Sess.) (expressly applying 
requirements to paid 
political ads placed online, 
among other mediums, and 
providing an exception for 
limited-character online ads 
that can link to a webpage 
with required information). 
Yes. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 
22-25-106 (West, Westlaw 
through 2020 Budget Sess. 
and Ch. 1-3 of the 2020 
Special Legis. Sess.) 
(requiring campaign finance 
reports detailing 
expenditures made by 
candidates, political action 
committees, and other 
organizations spending more 
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Chapter Three: In-Depth Examination of Washington Post v. McManus 
 
 The purpose of this Chapter is to examine in-depth the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Washington 
Post v. McManus,419 the arguments raised in the briefs filed with the Fourth Circuit in that case, and how 
the Fourth Circuit responded to those arguments. This Chapter is divided into four parts. Part A describes 
in-depth the Fourth Circuit’s decision in McManus. Part B identifies the legal arguments raised in the case 
filings. Part C identifies arguments rooted in First Amendment theory raised in the case filings, and Part 
D explores key takeaways from the McManus decision. Although McManus is only one federal appellate 
case that was ultimately dealt with as an as applied challenge,420 examining the Fourth Circuit’s decision, 
as well as the arguments raised in the case filings, is important because it reveals potential First 
Amendment concerns with record-keeping requirements placed on online platforms and provides insight 
to identify legal points that will be important in evaluating their constitutionality in the future. 
(A) The Fourth Circuit’s Decision in McManus 
 
 Maryland passed the state’s disclosure requirements for online platforms as part of the Online 
Electioneering Transparency and Accountability Act in May 2018 in response to “a growing consensus [] 
that Russian nationals had attempted to interfere in the presidential election through a sustained 
disinformation campaign carried out on social media and other online platforms.”421 The state passed two, 
closely-related requirements for online platforms distributing political advertising on Maryland candidates 
and ballot measures.422 First, the “publication requirement” requires online platforms to publish records 
                                               
419 944 F.3d 506 (4th Cir. 2019). 
 
420 Id. at 513. 
 
421 Id. at 510. 
 
422 Id. at 511. 
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about political ads that they host.423 Second, the “inspection requirement” requires online platforms to 
provide records about those ads to the Maryland State Board of Elections upon receiving a request from 
that agency.424 These two provisions were challenged by a group of media plaintiffs, including The 
Washington Post and local media organizations, who asserted that these requirements violated their First 
Amendment rights by compelling them to engage in political speech.425 In response, Maryland asserted 
that the requirements fit within existing campaign finance disclosure law and argued that the requirements 
were sufficiently tailored to serve government interests in preventing foreign interference in state 
elections, informing the electorate, preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption, and enforcing 
campaign finance laws.426 Ultimately, however, the Fourth Circuit held that the requirements were 
unconstitutional as applied to the plaintiffs.427 
 At the district court level, a federal district court in the District of Maryland granted a preliminary 
injunction to prevent the provisions’ application to the plaintiffs, finding that Maryland’s responsibilities 
for online platforms were subject to strict constitutional scrutiny428––the highest level of constitutional 
scrutiny––and concluding that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their claim that the provisions 
violated the First Amendment.429 Strict constitutional scrutiny requires that the government show the law 
is narrowly tailored to meet a compelling government interest.430 Strict scrutiny is typically used to 
                                               
423 Id. at 511–12. 
 
424 Id. at 512. 
 
425 Id. The Online Electioneering Transparency and Accountability Act also applied sponsorship disclaimer requirements to 
online political advertising, and this provision was not challenged. Id. at 511. 
 
426 Brief of Appellants at 21–23, Wash. Post v. McManus, 944 F.3d 506 (4th Cir. 2019) (No. 19-1132); Defendants’ 
Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 10–11, Wash. Post v. McManus, 944 F.3d 506 
(4th Cir. 2019) (No. 1:18-cv-02527-PWG). 
 
427 McManus, 944 F.3d at 523–24. 
 
428 To pass strict scrutiny, a law must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest. Citizens United v. FEC, 
558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010). 
 
429 Wash. Post v. McManus, 355 F. Supp. 3d 272, 278 (S.D. Ma. 2019). 
 
430 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 340. 
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evaluate content-based restrictions on speech, including laws that single out political speech.431 In 
contrast, the slightly lower standard of exacting scrutiny requires a “‘substantial relation’ between [an 
important] government interest and the information required to be disclosed.”432 In campaign finance law, 
exacting scrutiny is typically used to evaluate disclosure requirements placed on campaigns or other 
political actors.433  
 When deciding to apply strict scrutiny as opposed to the lower standard of exacting scrutiny,434 
the district court explained that the provisions compelled plaintiffs to engage in political speech and, thus, 
were content-based restrictions.435 Accordingly, the district court rejected Maryland’s argument that the 
exacting scrutiny applied in Buckley should apply here, explaining instead that the provisions were 
“indisputably unlike” the statutes analyzed by the Supreme Court under exacting scrutiny in prior 
campaign finance disclosure cases because “[i]n each of those cases, the challenged regulations imposed 
burdens on individuals or groups seeking to influence an election or ballot question––the direct 
participants in the electoral process. They did not burden ostensibly neutral third parties such as 
publishers of political advertisements, as the Maryland statute does.”436 
 The district court noted that the Maryland law highlighted “tension between two competing 
interests in Free Speech jurisprudence.”437 While plaintiffs had an “interest in free expression” and the 
ability to speak, the public had an interest in “minimizing the societal harms that would be all but certain 
to flow from an absolute, unchecked right to say anything at any time, in any place, and in any manner the 
                                               
431 McManus, 944 F.3d at 513 (“When the government seeks to favor or disfavor certain subject-matter because of the topic at 
issue, it compromises the integrity of our national discourse and risks bringing about a form of soft censorship. For this reason, 
content-based laws are ‘presumptively unconstitutional.’”).  
 
432 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64 (1976). 
 
433 See McManus, 944 F.3d at 512. 
 
434 To pass exacting scrutiny, a law must have a “substantial relation between the governmental interested [asserted] and the 
information required to be disclosed.” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 64. 
 
435 Wash. Post v. McManus, 355 F. Supp. 3d 272, 286–87, 299 (S.D. Ma. 2019). 
 
436 Id. at 293. 
 
437 Id. at 285.  
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speaker so desires.”438 However, the district court concluded that the law’s provisions would likely fail 
strict scrutiny because they were both overbroad and underinclusive and, thus, the provisions were not 
narrowly tailored to meet Maryland’s asserted interest in preventing foreign election interference.439 First, 
the provisions were overbroad because they regulated more online platforms than was necessary to 
address foreign election interference that primarily occurred on large social media platforms, not 
plaintiffs’ platforms.440 Second, the provisions were underinclusive because they failed to address unpaid 
content that was largely the target of foreign interference in the 2016 elections.441 These are two points 
that the Fourth Circuit would later use in holding that the provisions were unconstitutional as applied to 
the plaintiffs.442 
 Maryland appealed the district court’s decision, and the case came before the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in 2019.443 The Fourth Circuit ultimately agreed with the district 
court.444 However, the Fourth Circuit declined to determine whether strict or exacting scrutiny applied to 
the provisions, instead concluding that the provisions failed even the “more forgiving” standard of 
exacting scrutiny.445 The Fourth Circuit also carefully limited its holding to the plaintiffs in this case, 
noting that “[they] do not expound upon the wide world of social media and all the issues that may be 
pertinent thereto.”446 According to the Fourth Circuit, both the publication and inspection requirements 
were problematic.447 After noting that both provisions “concern[] [political] content that is ordinarily 
                                               
438 Id. 
 






442 Wash. Post v. McManus, 944 F.3d 506, 521–24 (4th Cir. 2019). 
 
443 Id. at 510. 
 
444 Id.  
 
445 Id. at 520. 
 
446 Id. at 513. 
 
447 Id. at 514–15. 
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shielded within ‘the heart of the First Amendment’s protection,’” the Fourth Circuit explained that both 
provisions were content-based and compelled political speech by requiring the plaintiffs to publicly 
publish information and present similar information to the state.448 Taken together, the Fourth Circuit 
concluded that “the fact that [the law] is content-based, targets political expression, and compels certain 
speech––poses a real risk of either chilling speech or manipulating the marketplace of ideas.”449 
 Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the provisions threatened the traditional freedom 
of the press by requiring these media plaintiffs to publish political information and present information 
for inspection to the government.450 Relying on Supreme Court precedent outside of the Court’s cases on 
campaign finance disclosure––like Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo,451 Hurley v. Irish-American 
Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston,452 Wooley v. Maynard,453 and Janus v. American Federation 
of State, City & Municipal Employees Council454––the Fourth Circuit emphasized that the fact that the 
compelled speech required by the provisions was factual information in an advertisement, as opposed to 
opinion, made no difference in concluding that the provisions “intru[ded] into the function of editors”455 
and “force[d] elements of civil society to speak when they otherwise would have refrained.”456 Moreover, 
the Fourth Circuit distinguished the media plaintiffs here from broadcasters, who have traditionally been 
subject to more government regulation under the rationale of spectrum scarcity.457 Here, the Fourth 
Circuit explained that while broadcast media have traditionally been subject to government regulation 
                                               
448 Id. at 514. 
 
449 Id. at 515. 
 
450 Id. at 518–19. 
 
451 418 U.S. 241 (1974). 
 
452 515 U.S. 557 (1995). 
 
453 430 U.S. 705 (1977). 
 
454 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018). 
 
455 McManus, 944 F.3d at 518 (quoting Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 258). 
 
456 Id. at 514. 
 
457 Id. at 519. 
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because “[b]roadcast frequencies are a scare resource,” that logic does not apply to the Internet, which has 
not been subject to the same government regulation.458 Thus, “compelling broadcasters to speak is not the 
same as altering the content of a news product,” as the Fourth Circuit concluded that Maryland’s 
provisions did here.459 
 Although Maryland argued that the provisions were similar to campaign finance disclosure 
regulations that had previously been upheld by the Supreme Court, the Fourth Circuit disagreed, finding 
that the logic of the Supreme Court’s precedent on disclosure was inapplicable here, where Maryland’s 
requirements targeted third party platforms rather than “direct participants in the political process.”460 
According to the Fourth Circuit, political ad purchasers and online platforms have different motivations: 
while direct participants, like candidates, subject to disclosure requirements are motivated to continue 
speaking by their desire to reach the electorate, Maryland’s requirements for online platforms are 
especially problematic because third party platforms have no such motivation.461 Instead, third party 
platforms would be more inclined to leave the online political advertising marketplace to avoid legal 
liability, which threatens to reduce the overall amount of political expression in the marketplace.462  
 After outlining the many ways in which it found that the provisions implicated the First 
Amendment, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the provisions were not sufficiently related to Maryland’s 
asserted interests to pass even the lower standard of exacting scrutiny.463 To justify the provisions, 
Maryland asserted an interest in preventing foreign election interference and, what the Fourth Circuit 
characterized as, a “set of secondary interests that are traditionally associated with disclosure-based laws: 









462 Id. at 517. 
 




informing the electorate, deterring corruption, and enforcing the state’s campaign finance laws.”464 
Although the Fourth Circuit recognized that these “secondary interests” can be “’sufficiently important’ 
to justify certain campaign finance regulations”465 the court’s subsequent analysis focused almost 
exclusively on Maryland’s interest in preventing foreign interference.466 
 The Fourth Circuit concluded that while the law “strikes too narrowly in some respects, it also 
strikes too broadly in others.”467 First, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the provisions were too narrow 
because they failed to address unpaid content, which was the primary mechanism used in foreign 
interference in the 2016 elections.468 The Fourth Circuit also explained that the provisions “fail[ed] to 
regulate even the narrow band of paid content used by foreign nationals,” which typically addressed 
political issues like gun rights and fell outside of Maryland’s definition of online ads subject to these 
provisions.469 Second, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the provisions were too broad because 
Maryland’s law applied to both large and small platforms equally, with only speculative assertions that 
platforms like those operated by the plaintiffs were subject to foreign interference through ad networks.470 
Similar to the district court, the Fourth Circuit recognized the tension between an uninhibited marketplace 
of ideas and the need “to promote transparency, facilitate an educated populace, and deter corruption.”471 
However, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the Maryland provisions create “a legislative scheme with 
                                               
464 Id.  
 
465 Id.  
 
466 Id. at 521–23; see also G. Michael Parsons, Platforms, Political Advertising, and Attentional Choice, 12 DREXEL L. REV. 765, 
795 (2020). 
 
467 McManus, 944 F.3d at 521. 
 
468 Id.  
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470 Id. at 522. The Fourth Circuit also noted that, while the plaintiffs’ contention that existing state regulations accomplished 
Maryland’s interests was largely irrelevant to the inquiry of whether the specific provisions at issue were constitutional, 
Maryland’s other campaign finance laws did “illustrate that much of what Maryland wishes to accomplish through the Act can be 
done through better fitting means.” Id. at 522–23. 
 
471 Id. at 523. 
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layer upon layer of expressive burdens, ultimately bereft of any coherent connection to an offsetting state 
interest of sufficient import.”472 
 Despite the Fourth Circuit’s contention that “it did not mean to ‘expound upon the wide world of 
social media and all the issues that may be pertinent thereto,’ . . . the court’s First Amendment arguments 
(if credited) sweep broadly enough to implicate and potentially condemn a wide range of transparency 
and disclosure focused policy responses––perhaps even the Honest Ads Act.”473 In particular, the Fourth 
Circuit’s opinion, the arguments raised in the case filings, and the Fourth Circuit’s response to those 
arguments suggest three broad points that policymakers should consider in the future. First, there will 
likely be an overarching and continuing debate about where these laws fit within First Amendment 
jurisprudence. Within this, policymakers should be prepared to push back on the Fourth Circuit’s 
reasoning that these record-keeping laws compel platforms to alter their own expression and that the 
broadcast industry is still distinct from the Internet for the purposes of regulation. Second, the McManus 
decision shows that policymakers must build a strong record to justify how these requirements are 
tailored and cautions against asserting a primary interest in preventing foreign-election interference.474 
Finally, the case filings demonstrate a continuing tension between an unfettered marketplace of ideas and 
laws that seek to provide voters with more information in today’s political environment.  
(B) Legal Arguments Raised in McManus Case Filings 
 
 Overall, the case filings are predominantly concerned with where Maryland’s provisions fall 
within First Amendment jurisprudence and whether strict or exacting scrutiny should apply in analyzing 
the provisions’ constitutionality.475 This disagreement is rooted in whether Maryland’s requirements fit 
                                               
472 Id. 
 
473 Parsons, supra note 466, at 783. 
 
474 See Victoria Smith Ekstrand & Ashley Fox, Regulating the Political Wild West: State Efforts to Disclose Sources of Online 
Political Advertising, 47 J. LEGIS. 81, 108 (2021) (explaining that when governments assert an interest in preventing foreign 
election interference, they must demonstrate evidence of an electoral harm happening on the regulated platforms). 
 
475 See infra notes 477–486 and accompanying text. 
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within traditional campaign finance disclosure law, which would suggest that exacting scrutiny may be 
the more appropriate standard, or whether the requirements fall outside of that umbrella.476 In their 
memorandum to the United States Court for the District of Maryland, the plaintiffs argued that, while 
there is precedent for placing disclosure requirements on political advertisers, placing those requirements 
on third party publishers is simply different, especially because the requirements here are content-based 
and imposed on media organizations where “editorial independence is at stake.”477 Because “the Act 
directly regulates speech based on its content,” the plaintiffs contended that strict scrutiny was 
applicable.478 The amicus briefs filed in support of the plaintiffs largely used this same logic in arguing 
that strict constitutional scrutiny applied to the challenged provisions.479 Similar to the plaintiffs, the 
amicus brief filed by the National Association of Broadcasters and NCTA relied on key precedent, like 
Reed v. Town of Gilbert480 and Tornillo, to argue that strict scrutiny was applicable because the provisions 
are content-based and compel “online publishers to speak words mandated by the State.”481  
 In contrast, Maryland argued that “the district court erred by applying strict scrutiny,” and, 
instead, exacting scrutiny should apply because Maryland’s requirements for online publishers are similar 
to the disclosure requirements previously upheld by the Supreme Court.482 Specifically, Maryland 
asserted that the exacting scrutiny test rooted in the Supreme Court’s decision in Buckley “now applies to 
                                               
476 See infra notes 477–486 and accompanying text.   
 
477 Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction at *10–11, Wash. Post v. 
McManus, 355 F. Supp. 3d 272 (S.D. Ma. 2019) (No. 1:18-cv-02527-DKC). The plaintiffs continued this line of reasoning in 
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481 Brief of Amici Curiae National Association of Broadcasters, supra note 479, at 6–7. 
 
482 Brief of Appellants, supra note 426, at 21; Reply Brief of Appellants at 3, Wash. Post v. McManus, 944 F.3d 506 (4th Cir. 
2019) (No. 19-1132); see also Defendants’ Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction, supra 
note 419, at 9–10 (making this same argument before the district court). 
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all campaign-finance disclosure requirements.”483 Maryland further argued that “[n]othing in the Supreme 
Court’s recent decisions applying strict scrutiny to content-based speech restrictions purports to pull back 
the applicability of exacting scrutiny to campaign-disclosure cases.”484 The amicus briefs filed in support 
of Maryland made similar arguments.485 In particular, the Brennan Center for Justice argued that the 
plaintiffs had “over-read recent First Amendment decisions in non-electoral cases, improperly construing 
them as if they had overturned settled campaign finance doctrine.”486  
 Ultimately, the Fourth Circuit declined to decide whether strict or exacting scrutiny applied, but 
the court did agree with the argument put forth by the plaintiffs that Maryland’s provisions were different 
than traditional campaign finance disclosure requirements because they placed a burden on the third party 
plaintiffs instead of on political advertising purchasers.487 In reaching this conclusion, the Fourth Circuit 
relied on precedent outside of the electoral context, like Janus and Hurley to conclude that Maryland’s 
provisions were constitutionally problematic because they compelled plaintiffs’ platforms to speak488 and 
Tornillo to find that the provisions were especially pernicious in that they applied to plaintiffs' media 
organizations.489 The Fourth Circuit also rejected Maryland’s assertion that the state’s provisions are 
similar to existing disclosure requirements for broadcasters, relying on the Supreme Court’s 1997 
decision in Reno v. ACLU490 distinguishing the Internet from the broadcast industry.491 However, 
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Maryland and their amici are correct in that reliance on these non-electoral precedents is this case is 
misguided. Thus, the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning in using these points to conclude that placing 
requirements on platforms is constitutionally problematic, above and beyond traditional disclosure 
requirements placed on campaigns and political ad purchasers, is flawed for two reasons, both of which 
will be discussed in greater depth in the final Chapter of this thesis. First, the Fourth Circuit treats the 
platforms’ interest here as a direct interest in speech––and Maryland’s requirements compelling them to 
publish records on political ads as an affront to that direct interest––while the platforms’ interest in 
political advertising is primarily a business interest, not an expressive interest in advertising messages.492 
Second, the legal distinction between the broadcast industry and the Internet is based on an outdated 
understanding of the Internet and is no longer tenable.493 
 After arguing that Maryland’s requirements were subject to strict scrutiny, the plaintiffs asserted 
that the provisions could pass neither strict scrutiny or the lower level of exacting scrutiny.494 Under both 
tests, the plaintiffs’ focused primarily on Maryland’s asserted interests in preventing foreign interference 
in Maryland elections and argued that the provisions were not sufficiently tailored to meet that interest.495 
Specifically, the plaintiffs argued that the provisions were overbroad because they applied to third-party 
platforms that were not conclusively targeted by foreign interference efforts.496 The plaintiffs also argued 
that the provisions were underinclusive because they failed to address unpaid content, which constituted 
                                               
492 See Parsons, supra note 466, at 793 (explaining that even a platform’s decision to stop hosting political ads would not affect 
the content of the platform because “[t]he content relayed in an advertisement is principally the advertiser’s not the platform’s”); 
see also Brief of the Brennan Center for Justice, supra note 485, at 15 (“[E]ven if plaintiffs exercise some control over political 
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495 Id. at 47–52. Plaintiffs addressed Maryland’s asserted interest in informing the electorate, deterring corruption, and aiding in 
the enforcement of other campaign finance laws only briefly in their brief to the Fourth Circuit, arguing that those interests are 
already served by existing campaign finance laws in the state and asserting that the requirements for platforms were merely 
“duplicative,” without providing additional benefits. Id. at 52–54. 
 
496 Id. at 40–41; see also Memorandum of Points, supra note 477, at *13. 
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most of the foreign interference efforts in the 2016 elections.497 The amici supporting plaintiffs put forth 
these same arguments.498 The National Association of Broadcasters and NCTA also argued for 
broadening the injunction granted by the district court beyond the plaintiffs in this case, writing that the 
“constitutional analysis here is independent of Plaintiffs’ status as members of the traditional press.”499 
 Maryland, however, asserted that the provisions are neither overbroad nor underinclusive.500 
Maryland noted that, although foreign interference efforts were predominantly carried out through unpaid 
content, these efforts also “infiltrated ad networks that served plaintiffs’ websites.”501 Accordingly, it was 
logical for the provisions to target paid content and to target platforms like those operated by plaintiffs as 
one measure to address some portion of foreign interference in Maryland elections.502 Similarly, the 
Brennan Center for Justice stated that other media platforms had run ads bought by Russians and placed 
through Facebook’s ad network.503 The Brennan Center continued, arguing that while the public had 
focused on interference efforts on large platforms, that did not mean that interference had not also taken 
place on smaller platforms, like those operated by the plaintiffs.504 
 Although the filings largely focused on Maryland’s interest in preventing foreign interference in 
its state elections, Maryland further argued that the provisions also support the three government interests 
in campaign finance disclosure articulated in Buckley: promoting an informed electorate, preventing 
corruption and the appearance of corruption, and improving enforcement of other campaign finance 
                                               
497 Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees, supra note 477, at 41. 
 
498 Brief of Amici Curiae National Association of Broadcasters, supra note 479, at 15–18; Amicus Curiae Brief of the Institute 
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503 Brief of the Brennan Center for Justice, supra note 485, at 22. 
 
504 Id. at 22–23. (“[A]s plaintiffs themselves have reported, Google and Facebook both denied that they had hosted illegal foreign 
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laws.505 To this point, Campaign Legal Center and Common Cause Maryland contended that the law not 
only helped detect violations of existing campaign finance laws, but the provisions also “advanced the 
state’s important interest in ensuring that Maryland citizens have prompt, direct, and easy access to 
information about the sources and financing of digital political ads.”506 While the plaintiffs touched on 
this second set of interests only briefly, the plaintiffs argued that the provisions were also insufficiently 
tailored to meet these interests because the provisions were duplicative of existing state campaign finance 
laws that required regular reporting of campaign expenditures while providing little additional benefit.507 
According to the plaintiffs this “duplication is, by definition, not narrow tailoring” because “those 
secondary goals are not meaningfully promoted by the obligations the Act imposes.”508 
 The Fourth Circuit largely ignored Maryland’s assertion that their provisions furthered the 
traditional campaign finance disclosure interests articulated in Buckley, instead focusing its analysis on 
Maryland’s asserted interest in preventing foreign interference activities.509 This focus aligns with the 
large amount of space spent discussing Maryland’s interest in preventing foreign interference in the case 
filings as a whole compared to the lesser amount of space allotted to discussing government interests 
traditionally associated with campaign finance disclosure.510 In the end, the Fourth Circuit agreed with the 
plaintiffs’ in this case, concluding that, although preventing foreign interference in Maryland elections 
was an important government interest, the provisions were both overbroad and underinclusive as applied 
to the plaintiffs.511 Namely, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the provisions (1) missed the bulk of 
                                               
505 Brief of Appellants, supra note 426, at 40. 
 
506 Brief for Amici Curiae Campaign Legal Center, supra note 485, at 9.  
 
507 Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees, supra note 477, at 52–54; see also Brief of Amici Curiae National Association of Broadcasters, 
supra note 479, at 23 (“Because the State could attain essentially the same result by collecting and publishing the information 
itself, without burdening the speech rights of private online platforms, the Act does not survive exacting scrutiny.”). 
 
508 Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees, supra note 477, at 52. 
 
509 Wash. Post v. McManus, 944 F.3d 506, 521–23 (4th Cir. 2019); see also Parsons, supra note 466, at 795. 
 
510 See supra Chapter Two Part B. 
 
511 McManus, at 520–21. 
 95 
 
interference efforts, which took the form of unpaid content, (2) missed the interference efforts that were in 
the form of paid content about divisive issues, and (3) swept in plaintiffs’ small platforms with only 
speculative evidence that interference had taken place on those platforms.512 For policymakers, this 
portion of the Fourth Circuit’s opinion highlights the importance of strategically articulating the 
government interest these laws are intended to serve and then building a record with evidence of how the 
law is tailored to that interest.513 For instance, a strong focus on how these laws can further government 
interests in informing the electorate, preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption, and 
enforcing other campaign finance laws would likely fare better in constitutional analysis than a strong 
focus on foreign interference activity, which will always be more difficult to target through regulation 
given that most interference activity took the form of unpaid content.514 
(C) Arguments Rooted in First Amendment Theory Raised in McManus Case Filings 
 
 Running parallel to the legal arguments throughout the McManus case filings was a more 
philosophical debate highlighting the tension between an uninhibited marketplace of ideas and the need 
for information about who is purchasing political ads to further the goal of self-government.515 Examining 
these references to First Amendment theory throughout these filings and how the Fourth Circuit 
responded to those references is worthwhile because references to these theories of free speech are found 
throughout the Supreme Court’s campaign finance jurisprudence.516 Moreover, when these two theories 
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are at odds, that clash can provoke valuable discussion about what the purpose of regulations involving 
speech should be in this context and what guideposts policymakers and courts should follow in crafting 
and evaluating those regulations. 
 Plaintiffs’ initial memorandum to the United States District Court for the District of Maryland 
explained that the provisions threaten to decrease the amount of political speech in the online marketplace 
of ideas.517 Specifically, the plaintiffs drew a comparison between Google, who decided to stop accepting 
political advertising on Maryland candidates and ballot measures, and the plaintiffs, stating “if [p]ublisher 
[p]laintiffs are forced to make a similar choice, this will work both a financial injury on the [p]ublisher 
[p]laintiffs and will also substantially curtail the speech available to the citizens of Maryland, as is already 
the case in the wake of the choice Google has made.”518 This line of reasoning in support of the plaintiffs 
continued in the case filings once the case reached the Fourth Circuit,519 and the amici in support of the 
plaintiffs made these same points.520 For instance, the amicus brief filed by the National Association of 
Broadcasters and NCTA argued that the provisions will not promote an informed electorate, stating that 
“[i]f anything, the Act will produce the opposite effect because online media may stop accepting political 
advertising in Maryland to avoid the onerous burdens.”521 The amici also noted that vague definitions 
within the provisions had already discouraged some of their members from continuing to accept online 
political advertising on Maryland candidates and ballot measures.522  
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 On the other side of this debate, Maryland  referenced the provisions’ intended role in preserving 
democratic self-governance.523 Maryland’s brief to the Fourth Circuit argued that the marketplace of ideas 
online has fundamentally changed in recent years and has become more difficult for the average person to 
navigate.524 According to Maryland, we are currently “‘[i]n an age characterized by the rapid 
multiplication of media outlets and the rise of [I]nternet reporting,’ where ‘the “marketplace of ideas” has 
become flooded with a profusion of information and political messages.’”525 Therefore, when navigating 
this modern marketplace of ideas online, citizens had come to “rely ever more on a message’s source as 
proxy” for making political decisions in our self-governing democracy.526 Similarly, Campaign Legal 
Center and Common Cause Maryland asserted that Maryland’s requirements for online platforms 
“advance[] the First Amendment rights of Maryland citizens by 'increasing, not limiting, the flow of 
information.’”527 Referencing the Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United, the amici explained that 
citizens need information, including “enough information to determine who supports which positions and 
why,” to effectively participate in politics and achieve a goal of self-government.528  
 Throughout the Fourth Circuit’s opinion, the court predominantly relied on the marketplace of 
ideas theory, while making only passing reference to the assertions of Maryland and amici that the 
provisions play an important role in providing voters with information to make informed decisions.529 
According to the Fourth Circuit, the plaintiffs here may simply leave the political advertising marketplace 
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as a way to avoid potential legal liability or financial burdens associated with creating new systems to 
comply with the provisions.530 Like the plaintiffs, the Fourth Circuit pointed to Google as an example.531 
However, toward the end of the opinion, the Fourth Circuit did briefly note the tension between the 
marketplace of ideas and the need for transparency in a functioning democracy: 
Within our federal system, states are tasked with striking a difficult balance in administering 
elections. On the one hand, the marketplace of ideas resists governmental regulation. The First 
Amendment guarantees that all citizens shall be free to speak their piece on the issues of the day, 
and that government cannot meddle in the debate that takes place among the governed. On the 
other hand, for a democracy to reach its full potential, intervention is occasionally necessary to 
promote transparency, facilitate an educated populace, and deter corruption.532  
 
(D) Conclusion & the Takeaways from McManus 
 
 In their decision, the Fourth Circuit concluded that Maryland’s publication and inspection 
requirements for online platforms were unconstitutional as applied to the media plaintiffs in this case.533 
Declining to decide whether strict scrutiny or exacting scrutiny applied to the publication and inspection 
requirements for online platforms,534 the Fourth Circuit determined that the provisions were not 
sufficiently tailored to pass even the slightly-lower standard of exacting scrutiny and would, thus, fail 
either constitutional standard.535 Ultimately, the Fourth Circuit did limit its decision to the plaintiffs in this 
case, thereby leaving some uncertainty about the constitutionality of Maryland’s publication and 
inspection requirements in other situations involving other parties, like large online platforms such as 
Facebook or Google. 536  As discussed in the preceding Chapter, Maryland is far from the only state actor 
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attempting to enact similar record-keeping requirements for online platforms.537 Indeed, the Honest Ads 
Act seeks to establish a system requiring online platforms to maintain similar records at the federal 
level,538 and California has also established requirements mandating that online platforms “make available 
for online public inspection” records with information about the political ads that they host.539 
Accordingly, these too may face constitutional struggles if the Fourth Circuit’s decision in McManus is 
carried forward beyond the specific plaintiffs at issue here.540 Overall, while the Fourth Circuit’s decision 
in McManus may leave some uncertainty about the constitutionality of these laws, the filings submitted to 
both the District of Maryland and the Fourth Circuit by the parties and amici, as well as what the Fourth 
Circuit decided to pay attention to or largely ignore from those filings, gives some insight into what the 
key legal and theoretical questions might be in potential future litigation surrounding these laws as well as 
how future policymakers may push back on some of the Fourth Circuit’s key points. 
 First, the most significant legal issue presented by these record-keeping laws requiring platforms 
to publish records on the political ads that they host is where they fall within First Amendment doctrine. 
This point is crucial for the purposes of constitutional analysis because it helps determine whether the law 
will be subject to strict constitutional scrutiny, which is possible but typically very difficult to 
overcome,541 or the slightly lower standard of exacting scrutiny, which is often applied to other campaign 
finance disclosure requirements placed on political advertisers.542 This issue dominated the case filings in 
McManus.543 Although the Fourth Circuit refused to decide the applicable level of scrutiny,544 it did 
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explain that “Maryland’s law is different in kind from customary campaign finance regulations because 
the Act burdens platforms rather than political actors.”545 In recognizing this difference, the Fourth Circuit 
also suggested that the provisions were more constitutionally problematic because they placed disclosure 
obligations on third-party platforms––as opposed to political ad purchasers––who may decide to leave the 
political advertising marketplace.546 Here, however, the critical flaw in the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning is 
that the court uses compelled speech cases to analogize hosting records on political ads and being 
compelled to alter one’s expression.547 
 In its analysis, the Fourth Circuit relied on Supreme Court cases like Hurley, Janus, and Tornillo 
to conclude that Maryland’s requirements for the plaintiffs in McManus compel them “to speak when 
they otherwise would have refrained.”548 However, these cases are distinguishable from the provisions at 
issue in McManus specifically and record-keeping requirements for online platforms generally. Each of 
the cases relied upon by the Fourth Circuit dealt with circumstances where an individual or an 
organization was required to alter their own speech, subsidize speech, or host someone else’s speech.549 
But, record-keeping requirements for online platforms do not require platforms to alter their own message 
or host someone else’s message.550 In the context of political advertising, the message is entirely that of 
the political ad purchaser, not that of the platform, which is still free to make its own decision of whether 
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to host political advertising.551 This point is particularly significant when considering how courts may 
evaluate record-keeping requirements in a case involving large platforms like Facebook, which has been 
clear in saying that the company sees its role as providing a space for civic discussion, not as an editor 
that alters users’ speech to fit Facebook’s idea of what political expression should be.552 Thus, the Fourth 
Circuit’s misguided use of the compelled speech doctrine presents a lasting legal issue, particularly in 
future cases that may involve different types of platforms, and presents one point where policymakers 
seeking to establish requirements for online platforms can push back on the reasoning in McManus. 
 Additionally, also within this idea of where these record-keeping laws fall in First Amendment 
law sits the decades-long distinction between the Internet and the broadcast industry.553 In McManus, the 
Fourth Circuit expressly rejected Maryland’s contention that these provisions are similar to the federal 
disclosure requirements that currently exist for broadcasters,554 explaining that “the vast democratic 
forums of the Internet [have never] been subject to the type of government supervision and regulation that 
has attended the broadcast industry.”555 However, as will be discussed in greater depth in the final 
Chapter of this thesis, society’s relationship with the Internet has changed since the Supreme Court in 
Reno articulated this same distinction between the broadcast industry and the Internet in 1997.556 Not only 
has the Internet become far more pervasive––a characteristic once attributed to broadcast media as a 
means of justifying broadcast regulation557––in everyday life than the broadcast industry, but the idea that 
broadcast waves are a scarce resource––which is typically used as another justification for treating the 
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broadcast industry different in First Amendment law558––is ultimately rooted in a concern about 
monopolizing a communication resource in the marketplace of ideas, and similar concerns have arose in 
recent years regarding the market power of large Internet platforms.559 Thus, the legal basis for the 
distinction between broadcast and the Internet in First Amendment law will be another important legal 
issue for these laws targeting online platforms in the future.  
 Second, in addition to this discussion of where reporting-requirements for online platforms fit 
within First Amendment law and, consequently, how rigorously courts should evaluate these laws, there 
also exists a significant issue of how to craft the scope of these laws such that they are sufficiently 
tailored to meet the asserted government interest and pass whichever level of constitutional scrutiny is 
applied. There are two components within this larger issue: the government’s asserted interest in 
establishing the law and whether the law is sufficiently tailored to meet that interest. Taking the 
government interest prong first, the government interest primarily focused on in McManus was 
Maryland’s interest in preventing foreign interference in the state’s elections.560 Although Maryland did 
briefly assert other interests––specifically, promoting an informed electorate, deterring corruption and the 
appearance of corruption, and aiding in the enforcement of other campaign finance laws––more 
traditionally associated with campaign finance disclosure laws, the Fourth Circuit largely ignored those 
interests in its analysis.561 Instead, the Fourth Circuit mentioned them only briefly as a set of “secondary 
interests”562 and did not carry them through the full constitutional analysis in the way that it did for the 
foreign election interference interest.563 This was also the primary focus of the case filings.564 
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 The consequences of this focus on foreign interference activity becomes clear under the tailoring 
prong of constitutional analysis. Here, this is where the scope of these requirements and the range of 
political ads and online platforms that are subject to them becomes important. In McManus, the Fourth 
Circuit explained that the provisions’ application to the plaintiffs was not sufficiently tailored to meet a 
government interest in preventing foreign election interference for three reasons.565 First, the law was 
underinclusive because it did not address unpaid content, which was the primary tool of Russian actors in 
2016.566 Second, the law was also underinclusive because it “fail[ed] to regulate even the narrow band of 
paid content used by foreign nationals . . . the vast majority [of which] did not urge people to choose a 
certain candidate or support a specific ballot initiative,”567 which is what Maryland includes in its 
definition of ads covered by the challenged provisions,568 but instead sought to “rouse passions on 
divisive questions such as those surrounding race or gun rights.”569 Thirdly, the provisions were 
overbroad in that they applied to plaintiffs’ platforms when Maryland had failed to show that plaintiffs’ 
smaller news platforms had been the targets of interference efforts.570 
 Although other states have similar record-keeping requirements and the Honest Ads Act has 
proposed a statutory scheme similar to Maryland’s, the scope of how far these laws reach vary, as was 
outlined in the previous Chapter.571 For example, Maryland set the threshold for online platforms coming 
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568 Maryland law defines a “qualifying paid digital communication” covered by the state’s record-keeping requirement for online 
platforms as “any electronic communication that: (1) is campaign material; (2) is placed or promoted for a fee on an online 
platform; (3) is disseminated to 500 or more individuals; and (4) does not propose a commercial transaction.” MD. CODE ANN., 
ELEC. LAW § 1-101(ll-1) (West, Westlaw through laws effective Mar. 5, 2021). A “campaign material” is “any material that: (i) 
contains text, graphics, or other images; (ii) relates to a candidate, a prospective candidate, or the approval or rejection of a 
question or prospective question; and (iii) is published, distributed, or disseminated.” Id. § 1-101(k)(1). A “campaign material” 
does not include political ads about issues that are not about a “candidate, a prospective candidate, or the approval or rejection of 
a question or prospective question.” See id. Therefore, such political ads also fall outside of the scope of “qualifying paid digital 
communication[s]” subject to the state’s record-keeping requirement. See id. § 1-101(ll-1). 
 
569 McManus, 944 F.3d at 521. 
 
570 Id. 521–22. 
 
571 For a full discussion of record-keeping requirements imposed on online platforms in various states and in the Honest Ads Act, 
see Chapter Two Parts B & C. 
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under the act’s requirements at 100,000 unique monthly users for most of the previous 12 months,572 
while the Honest Ads Act sets a much higher threshold of 50 million unique monthly users in that same 
time period.573 Consequently, to the extent that the Fourth Circuit in McManus was partially concerned 
with Maryland’s failure to differentiate between large and small platforms,574 the Honest Ads Act may not 
have that same problem. At the same time, depending on the online platforms that fall within the scope 
drawn by the Honest Ads Act, the federal proposal may not be able to sidestep the Fourth Circuit’s 
concern in McManus that foreign interference in the 2016 presidential election occurred on only some 
platforms, which could potentially make laws using that rationale to target online platforms that did not 
host content related to interference activity overbroad.575 Similarly, the Honest Ads Act also focuses on 
paid content,576 and the Fourth Circuit in McManus explained that Maryland’s provisions were too narrow 
to serve an interest in preventing foreign election interference because they too did not address unpaid 
content, which constituted the majority of election interference efforts.577  
 Overall, McManus should serve as a warning bell to other policymakers that they must produce 
actual evidence making a strong argument for why it makes sense to target both the political ads and the 
online platforms under the law’s scope.578 Moreover, the Fourth Circuit’s analysis highlights the 
challenges of trying to craft a law that addresses foreign interference activity. Ultimately, despite intense 
public concern, policymakers should relegate this interest to a secondary role because laws will likely 
                                               
572 MD. CODE ANN., ELEC. LAW § 1-101(dd-1). 
 
573 H.R. 1 § 4208(a)(k)(3)(B). 
 
574 McManus, 944 F.3d at 522. 
 
575 Id. at 521–22; see also Fox & Ekstrand, supra note 474, at 108 (“[T]he Fourth Circuit’s opinion suggests that in order to 
impose record-keeping requirements broadly on a wide range of platforms that host online political advertising, states should 
have some concrete evidence, more than speculation, of an electoral harm present in political advertising on that specific 
platform, and that regulating that platform would address that harm.”). 
 
576 H.R. 1 § 4208. 
 
577 McManus, 944 F.3d at 521. 
 
578 See Ekstrand & Fox, supra note 474, at 108. 
 105 
 
never adequately address unpaid content,579 where the bulk of foreign interference activity took place in 
2016,580 and, yet, they will likely always sweep up other political ads and numerous platforms that have 
not been associated with interference activity. Instead, policymakers should focus on building a record 
that demonstrates why these laws further the traditional campaign finance interests articulated in Buckley.  
 Finally, when analyzing these types of requirements for online platforms, there will likely be 
tension surrounding what First Amendment values our legal system wants to further.  Here, that 
consistently manifested as a tension between the marketplace of ideas on one hand and the need for 
informed citizens in a self-governing society on the other.581 For instance, while plaintiffs argued that the 
challenged provisions would chill political speech in the marketplace,582 Maryland and the Campaign 
Legal Center and Common Cause Maryland argued that citizens need this information to navigate an 
increasingly complex marketplace of ideas online and to fully participate in the political process.583 
Although the Fourth Circuit recognized the tension between an unfettered marketplace of ideas and the 
need for regulation to ensure transparency in a self-governing society,584 the Fourth Circuit expressed a 
particular concern about how the challenged provisions may reduce the amount of political speech in the 
marketplace of ideas online.585 According to the Court, because the provisions applied to third-party 
platforms and not political actors, third parties may decide to stop accepting political advertising, as 
Google has already done in Maryland, to avoid compliance burdens.586 Therefore, in addition to thorny 
legal questions, laws like Maryland’s present our legal system with a more philosophical question about 
                                               
579 Numerous scholars have expressed that regulating unpaid content or even outright lies is difficult given the First 
Amendment’s strong protections for political speech. See Kreiss & Barrett, supra note 514, at 511; see also Marshall, supra note 
514, at 673–74.  
 
580 McManus, 944 F.3d at 521. 
 
581 See supra Chapter Three Part C. 
 
582 Memorandum of Points, supra note 477, at *9; see also Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees, supra note 477, at 21. 
 
583 Brief of Appellants, supra note 426, at 41; see also Brief for Amici Curiae Campaign Legal Center, supra note 485, at 35–36. 
 
584 McManus, 944 F.3d at 523. 
 





whether it is acceptable to further some values, like transparency to support a system of self-government, 
to the potential detriment of others, like maintaining an unfettered marketplace for political ads.  
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Chapter Four: Interviews with Attorneys and State Regulators 
 
 The final portion of this thesis included interviews with two attorneys who filed amicus briefs in 
Washington Post v. McManus587 and four state regulators from Maryland and Washington.588 Both states 
have different forms of record-keeping requirements for online platforms.589 Attorneys were asked about 
the effect that the McManus decision is likely to have on future efforts to regulate online political 
advertising and their thoughts on how to craft disclosure regulations for online political advertising to 
avoid the First Amendment concerns that arose in McManus. State regulators were asked about their 
current record-keeping scheme for online political advertising, the benefits involved in incorporating 
online platforms into that scheme, and the possibility of switching to an alternative scheme.590 This 
Chapter pulls out key themes from interviewees’ to further identify lessons from McManus. It also seeks 
to reflect on how legislation can be crafted to avoid similar issues in the future, think about the goals of 
additional disclosure regulations for political ads placed online, and consider what types of regulations, 
according to regulators, will be effective in achieving those goals. 
(A) Attorneys Filing Amicus Briefs in the McManus Litigation 
 
 Two attorneys who filed amicus briefs in the McManus litigation were interviewed to gain a 
deeper understanding of what the effect of the Fourth Circuit’s decision is likely to be on efforts to
                                               
587 944 F.3d 506 (4th Cir. 2019). 
 
588 The university’s institutional review board approved these interviews. 
 
589 MD ELEC. LAW § 13-405(b)-(c) (West, Westlaw through legislation effective Mar. 5, 2021); WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17A.345 
(West, Westlaw through Ch. 8 of 2021 Reg. Legis. Sess.). 
 
590 Both sets of questions can be found in the Appendix to this thesis. Additionally, transcripts from five of the six interviews can 
also be found in the Appendix. One state regulator from Maryland, however, agreed to be interviewed and to have the recording 
transcribed for the purposes of writing, but the regulator requested that the transcript not be included in the Appendix. This 
request was honored. Interview subjects’ identities have also been kept confidential.  
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 regulate online political advertising and how they think legislation should be crafted to avoid First 
Amendment concerns. The first attorney filed an amicus brief in support of the plaintiffs while the second 
attorney filed an amicus brief in support of Maryland. Throughout the responses from these two attorneys, 
three themes emerged: (1) the possibility of shifting record-keeping requirements to the government to 
avoid First Amendment challenges from online platforms, (2) the need to build a clear record to show the 
harm requiring regulation and ensure that any proposed law serves the purpose of addressing that harm, 
and (3) the use of the marketplace of ideas and democratic self-governance theories as guideposts when 
crafting legislation in this area. 
 First, the attorney who filed an amicus brief in support of Maryland explained that the Fourth 
Circuit’s opinion leaves open other legislative possibilities.591 According to this attorney, two positive 
aspects of the Fourth Circuit’s decision were that the Fourth Circuit refused to apply strict scrutiny, the 
highest level of constitutional scrutiny, to Maryland’s provisions, and the decision was narrowly focused 
on unique features found in Maryland’s provisions, like the specific user threshold at which the 
requirements were triggered.592 In this attorney’s view, these choices showed that the Fourth Circuit 
recognized that Maryland was attempting to address a novel issue, and the decision “left room for other 
jurisdictions, and even Maryland, to try to address the same problem through even, perhaps, similar ways 
. . . .”593  
 When thinking about how to amend Maryland’s law in light of McManus, this attorney suggested 
placing record-keeping requirements on the government instead of online platforms and eliminating the 
current threshold requirement.594 Placing record-keeping requirements on the government would avoid 
First Amendment concerns from online platforms because the government could get similar disclosure 
information directly from campaigns and political ad purchasers, rather than mandating that platforms 
                                               
591 Transcript: Research Thesis Interview Six, at 205–06. 
 
592 Transcript: Research Thesis Interview Six, at 205–06. 
 
593 Transcript: Research Thesis Interview Six, at 205. 
 
594 Transcript: Research Thesis Interview Six, at 206–07. 
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publish records themselves.595 This attorney explained that if ad purchasers do not already have the 
information required to be disclosed, the law could include a requirement that platforms provide that 
information to the ad purchaser, who then provides it to the government.596 This attorney also suggested 
that Maryland’s current threshold for placing requirements on platforms could be eliminated entirely 
because, with a publication burden on platforms removed, these disclosure responsibilities could be 
placed on ad purchasers buying ad space on any platform.597 According to this attorney, placing the 
record-keeping responsibility with the government rather than online platforms may have additional 
benefits––besides avoiding First Amendment concerns––including having all disclosure information 
accessible in one location, ensuring that records of platforms who may go out of business are retained, 
and creating cost efficiencies by having one database, if governments can find the resources to build it.598  
 At the same time, while this attorney thought that shifting record-keeping requirements to the 
government would resolve First Amendment concerns, this attorney did not think that the shift was 
constitutionally required.599 Thus, this attorney did not think that the Fourth Circuit’s decision in 
McManus “imperils the Honest Ads Act.”600 Ultimately, this attorney expressed that the ideal scenario 
would be to establish a federal disclosure standard for online political ads that states could then adopt; 
doing so would resolve the current patchwork of “ad hoc approaches that vary by platform and by 
state.”601 While shifting record-keeping responsibilities to governments would eliminate First Amendment 
concerns from platforms, state regulators expressed that changing the disclosure scheme in that way 
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would defeat the key benefits that are there when platforms are involved.602 Therefore, while shifting 
responsibility would be the safest option constitutionally, it may not be the most effective option in 
providing transparency to the public as a matter of policy.  
 Second, putting aside specific thoughts on how to amend Maryland’s law, a key lesson legislators 
and regulators should take from McManus is a basic one as a matter of constitution law: any law that is 
passed must be sufficiently tailored to meet the government interest asserted.603 The exact level of 
tailoring required varies slightly depending on whether exact or strict scrutiny is applied,604 but the 
general principle stands. According to both attorneys, Maryland’s law simply fell short, even under 
exacting scrutiny, and the decision highlights the importance of building a strong record to prove why the 
law is needed.605 Speaking on Maryland’s interest in preventing foreign election interference, the attorney 
that filed a brief in support of the plaintiffs explained that, not only would inference efforts be better 
addressed by national security and intelligence agencies than by campaign finance law, but: 
When the state wants to regulate speech, it needs to give a specific reason why, and the more 
novel it is, the more evidence they need. So, for example, when the idea of electioneering 
communications, which is speech that is near in time to an election, was invented in Congress in 
2002, the challenge after that was McConnell v. FEC. In McConnell, they had a 100,000-page 
record that involved expert testimony and studies and testimony from various political people on 
how they approach ad writing and creation and that kind of thing. All of that to prove why ads 
right close in time to an election matter. No state, not Maryland [or] the federal government, has 
amassed a similar record to say why small Internet ads need to be regulated at this point.606 
 
 The attorney who filed a brief in support of Maryland also expressed that the decision “counsels 
in favor of making sure there’s a record documenting the need to update political disclosure laws for 
                                               
602 See infra notes 633–640 and accompanying text.  
 
603 Transcript: Research Thesis Interview Six, at 206. 
 
604 Wash. Post v. McManus, 944 F.3d 506, 520–21 (4th Cir. 2019) (explaining that “[u]nder exacting scrutiny, there must be a 
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digital media.”607 However, this attorney also reached beyond the government’s interest in preventing 
foreign interference, explaining that these laws should make clear that the goal is to update campaign 
finance laws that are currently outdated and promote an informed electorate by bringing more 
transparency to political advertising distributed online.608 In this attorney’s view, focusing on other 
interests aside from preventing foreign election interference is one positive attribute of the Honest Ads 
Act and something that distinguishes the federal proposal from Maryland’s provisions.609 While Maryland 
focused heavily on their interest in preventing foreign election interference, it is “clear that the Honest 
Ads Act is not just a response to foreign interference, but is precisely about this concern about 
transparency in political advertising.”610 This attorney’s view that the interests articulated in support of 
additional disclosures for online political advertising stretch beyond the interest in preventing foreign 
election interference discussed heavily in McManus also fits with the benefits state regulators explain that 
their requirements for platforms bring to transparency, which are discussed in more detail below.611  
 Third, as articulated in the McManus case filings, the two attorneys disagreed on the guiding 
principles of the First Amendment that legislators should look to when crafting these laws.612 The 
attorney who filed an amicus brief in support of the plaintiffs explained that disclosure requirements 
should only be established if they prevent the quid pro quo corruption articulated in Buckley.613 In this 
attorney’s view, laws like the Honest Ads Act, which seek to establish disclosure requirements for online 
platforms, present “too much burden on speech for not a lot of gain.”614 Thus, not only do such laws 
                                               
607 Transcript: Research Thesis Interview Six, at 206. 
 
608 Transcript: Research Thesis Interview Six, at 206–07. 
 
609 Transcript: Research Thesis Interview Six, at 207. 
 
610 Transcript: Research Thesis Interview Six, at 207. 
 
611 See infra notes 661–663 and accompanying text. 
 
612 For a discussion of references to fundamental First Amendment theories in the McManus case filings, see Chapter 3 Part C of 
this thesis.  
 
613 Transcript: Research Thesis Interview One, at 177. 
 
614 Transcript: Research Thesis Interview One, at 174. 
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create costly requirements for platforms, but the larger issue is that campaign finance disclosures in 
general can chill the speech of donors and political ad purchasers, including grassroots activists, in the 
marketplace of ideas, without providing strong benefits to justify those burdens.615 Instead, citizens can 
find information about ad sponsors and the cost of political advertising, including ads placed online, 
through other means, like campaign finance reports filed with state and federal governments, that do not 
involve additional databases with information about online ads.616 Therefore, the key question when 
considering any type of disclosure should be “is it essential to stop quid pro quo corruption? And if it's 
not essential to stop that, then we shouldn't be having that kind of disclosure.”617 
 In contrast, the attorney who filed an amicus brief in support of Maryland emphasized that “[t]he 
idea about a marketplace of ideas . . . is part and parcel, integral to the notion of an informed electorate 
because in order for people to be able to express their ideas and have competing ideas, [they] . . . need 
information about the source of the messages you’re receiving.”618 Therefore, while the briefs in 
McManus and the Fourth Circuit’s decision itself presented a strong tension between promoting the free 
flow of information in the online marketplace of ideas and regulations that may chill speech to inform the 
electorate,619 the two principles, in some minds, are instead two necessary elements of a self-governing 
society, with measures to promote an informed citizenry feeding an effective marketplace. 
(B) State Regulators 
 
 In addition to attorneys who filed an amicus brief in McManus, state regulators in high-level 
positions in Maryland and Washington State were interviewed to gain a deeper understanding of how the 
record-keeping requirements established for online platforms in those two states work, why those record-
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616 Transcript: Research Thesis Interview One, at 175. 
 
617 Transcript: Research Thesis Interview One, at 177. 
 
618 Transcript: Research Thesis Interview Six, at 209. 
 
619 For a discussion of references to fundamental First Amendment theories in the McManus case filings and the Fourth Circuit’s 
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keeping requirements were established, and how regulators should think about regulation in the future. 
Maryland was selected because the state passed a record-keeping requirement specifically for online 
platforms that requires platforms to publish publicly accessible records about the political ads that they 
distribute and provide information to the Maryland State Board of Elections upon request.620 Washington 
State was selected because, in recent years, the state clarified that an existing requirement that 
“commercial advertiser[s]” maintain records about the political ads that they distribute does apply to 
online platforms.621 One notable difference between Maryland’s law and Washington’s law is that while 
Maryland’s law requires publication of these records, Washington’s law only requires that commercial 
advertisers maintain these records and make them available upon receiving a request from a member of 
the public or from the Washington Public Disclosure Commission.622 Three regulators were interviewed 
from Washington State and one regulator was interviewed from Maryland. This section examines four 
themes that emerged from these four interviews: (1) a desire for a disclosure system with duality, (2) an 
aspiration to work with online platforms and other states, (3) a focus on modernizing disclosure laws 
across both large and small platforms, and (4) a continuing search for the most effective means of 
increasing transparency for the public. 
 First, regulators expressed numerous benefits from what one Washington regulator described as 
the “duality” of the state’s record-keeping scheme,623 beyond what is achieved with traditional campaign 
finance disclosure laws.624 For example, in Washington, regulators described how the record-keeping 
requirement for commercial advertisers, which includes online platforms, is intended as a method of 
“double-proofing” to ensure that information reported by campaigns is accurate and full.625 Thus, 
                                               
620 MD. CODE ANN. ELEC. LAW § 13-405(b)-(c) (West, Westlaw through legislation effective Mar. 5, 2021). 
 
621 Transcript: Research Thesis Interview Two, at 178–80. 
 
622 Compare MD. CODE ANN. ELEC. LAW § 13-405(b)-(c), with Transcript: Research Thesis Interview Two, at 180. 
 
623 Transcript: Research Thesis Interview Three, at 187. 
 
624 Transcript: Research Thesis Interview Two, at 179; Transcript: Research Thesis Interview Three, at 187–88. 
 
625 Transcript: Research Thesis Interview Two, at 179; Transcript: Research Thesis Interview Three, at 187–88. 
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mandating that commercial advertisers maintain these records provides an important investigatory tool for 
regulators seeking to ensure that campaigns follow disclosure requirements.626 This is particularly true for 
anonymous advertising that does not include required sponsorship disclaimers, where the record-keeping 
requirements allow regulators to identify the ad sponsor using records from the commercial advertiser and 
contact that ad sponsor about their reporting obligations.627 Therefore, one Washington regulator 
characterized the record-keeping scheme as “a key part of the statutory scheme” because it helps the state 
enforce disclosure requirements on campaigns, who are the “prime regulated community.”628 
 In Maryland, the state regulator also explained the benefits gained by their dual system of 
disclosure––which requires expenditure reporting by campaigns and also requires online platforms to 
publish, on their own websites, records of political ads that they host.629 Here, the regulator tied the 
benefits of Maryland’s record-keeping and publication requirement to how people consume media in 
today’s online environments.630 According to this regulator, voters scrolling through their social media 
feed are not likely to visit another website to do additional research and sift through campaign finance 
reports filed by campaigns.631 Instead, through the state’s requirements for online platforms, Maryland’s 
goal is to provide important disclosure information for online ads in one location, the location where 
people consume the ad.632 
 When asked how feasible it would be for their state to switch to the approach adopted in New 
York, where the state government is responsible for maintaining a database with information directly 
                                               
626 Transcript: Research Thesis Interview Two, at 185; Transcript: Research Thesis Interview Three, at 187–88. 
 
627 Transcript: Research Thesis Interview Three, at 188. 
 
628 Transcript: Research Thesis Interview Two, at 179. 
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from ad purchasers about independent expenditures distributed online,633 regulators were mixed on 
whether their state could take on that project.634 While one regulator in Washington expressed that it 
would be “technically feasible” to get information on online ads directly from campaigns and compile 
that information in a state-owned database,635 another indicated it is unclear the resources a project like 
that would involve.636 In Maryland, the regulator distinguished the technical capabilities of his office and 
online platforms, explaining that while his office was small and did not have the technical abilities to 
build a functional database, platforms like Facebook and Google have access to professional software 
developers.637 However, particularly in Washington, these regulators believed that moving to a system 
where the state itself hosted a database containing information gathered from campaigns could limit their 
ability to meet their goals inherent in their current record-keeping requirement.638 According to one 
regulator, the state would lose the “checks and balances” it seeks to achieve under the current scheme 
because “[i]f you’re getting all your reporting from one source [in this context, campaigns], then you have 
nothing to check it against.”639 At the same time, another Washington regulator also recognized that the 
state’s current scheme––which provides a right of access to the public but does not require platforms to 
publish records, only to maintain them and provide them upon request from a member of the public––
could be improved because, unlike approaching a local newspaper or broadcast station, members of the 
public do not know who to contact at Google or Facebook to exercise their right of access.640 
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 This response from state regulators stands in contrast to the attorneys’ suggestion that record-
keeping requirements should not be placed on online platforms.641 Although one attorney suggested 
adopting an approach similar to New York, where record-keeping responsibilities would be placed with 
the government, as a means of avoiding constitutional concerns from platforms,642 the responses from 
regulators highlight that doing so would sacrifice the benefits they feel are gained by involving parties 
that distribute political ads.643 Similarly, while the other attorney explained that the public can already get 
information about online political ads through campaign finance reports under existing disclosure 
requirements,644 this approach would also defeat regulators’ goal of establishing a campaign finance 
disclosure system that incorporates some intentional redundancy as a check on the reporting received 
from campaigns and ad sponsors. 
 Second, regulators expressed a desire to work with online platforms like Facebook and Google in 
developing regulations.645 This is particularly true when platforms have withdrawn from the marketplace 
and stopped accepting political advertising in the state, which at least one regulator from Washington 
explained as not being the “best solution,” noting that encouraging platforms to leave the marketplace is 
not the intent of Washington’s record-keeping requirements.646 According to this regulator, digital 
advertising can be an important tool for campaigns, and Washington wants to work with Facebook and 
Google to “get them back into compliance.”647 However, “[w]hat we don’t want is for it to be used as 
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leverage to somehow give them a break in what is the most effective way of getting transparency to the 
public.”648  
 Within this desire to work with online platforms, Washington regulators pointed to tension that 
exists because of current enforcement proceedings and unequal technical knowledge as barriers to that 
goal.649 One Washington regulator explained that the state is currently involved in litigation over the 
record-keeping requirements with both Facebook and Google, creating an adversarial relationship.650 
Another Washington regulator explained that regulators often do not have the technical knowledge to 
properly evaluate the feedback that they do receive from platforms.651 For example, he explains:  
If we say, “how about just giving us all your targeting information?” And they say “no, we can’t 
do that.” Well, we don’t know whether they can or not. I can’t evaluate their own internal 
assessments or how their systems are engineered. That’s where we sort of get stuck or find the 
limits of what we’re doing. [] [I]ndustry will say that this doesn’t work, and we’re like “it doesn’t 
work because you don’t want it to work or it doesn’t work because it’s literally like extremely 
difficult for you to do that or the information just isn’t obtainable that way,” whatever it is.652 
 
 While these regulators do not want to sacrifice transparency to benefit online platforms’ business 
models, they do want to understand what is technologically feasible for platforms. As a late addition to 
this project, this research thesis sought to incorporate interviews with current or former employees at 
Facebook and Google to gain a deeper insight into the resources involved in creating the platforms’ 
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current transparency measures––specifically the platforms’ verification processes for political advertisers 
and the platforms’ ad transparency libraries––as well as the resources that would be involved in 
complying with government record-keeping requirements, their reasoning behind the decision to stop 
accepting political ads in some states with similar requirements but not others, and the types of laws that 
they would welcome.653 Unfortunately, the project failed to garner interest among those individuals who 
were contacted, and this late addition was dropped from the project. However, the responses from 
regulators outlined here highlight the importance of having those conversations with representatives from 
large platforms.  
 At the same time that these regulators expressed a desire to work with platforms, they also 
expressed a desire to work with other policymakers on a system that could be replicated in multiple 
states.654 Although regulators from Washington were hoping to discuss solutions to bring more 
transparency to online advertising at an annual conference of state regulators in similar agencies across 
the country, those plans were sidelined due to the COVID-19 pandemic.655 According to a state regulator 
in Maryland, adopting some sort of uniformity across states may be a solution to bringing platforms like 
Facebook and Google back into the marketplace in states that have these record-keeping requirements.656 
This regulator explained, in deciding to withdraw from Maryland, Google likely weighed the costs of 
complying with Maryland’s law against the revenue from political advertising in the state and decided 
compliance was not worth the cost.657 However, if a large number of states start passing similar laws, that 
calculus may change, and Google may decide that it is better to comply with such laws than to pull out of 
                                               
653 Indeed, Mark Zuckerberg has stated that he supports regulation for large platforms like Facebook, and he supports the Honest 
Ads Act. Mark Zuckerberg, Big Tech Needs More Regulation, FACEBOOK (Feb. 18, 2020), 
https://about.fb.com/news/2020/02/big-tech-needs-more-regulation/.  
 
654 Transcript: Research Thesis Interview Two, at 183; Transcript: Research Thesis Interview Five, at 195. 
 
655 Transcript: Research Thesis Interview Two, at 183; Transcript: Research Thesis Interview Five, at 195. 
 
656 See supra note 629. 
 




multiple markets.658 Thus, policymakers should view creating a uniform disclosure scheme as a collective 
project and work together across states.659 As expressed by one attorney, adopting a standard system for 
the federal government and across multiple states would also bring additional benefits for online 
platforms, who would no longer have to navigate multiple laws.660   
 Third, although interest among the public in online political advertising often centers around the 
spread of misinformation and fears of foreign interference in U.S. elections, two regulators directly 
addressed that concern and described their focus as something beyond eliminating those two issues from 
our online environments.661 In particular, the state regulator from Maryland explained how reports of 
foreign interference following the 2016 Presidential election served as the original impetus for 
Maryland’s record-keeping requirements for online platforms, and, while that is still a concern for the 
state, as the legislative process progressed it became clear that the main goal was to modernize a 
campaign finance disclosure scheme that had not kept up with online advertising.662 Similarly, one 
Washington regulator explained that although misinformation is not regulators’ primary focus, their focus 
on increasing transparency and the public’s access to information about online political ads “does serve 
the purpose of identifying misinformation because . . . the presumption is as long as the public knows 
who you [the sponsor] are, they can evaluate the information for themselves.”663 
 In McManus, although Maryland did assert an interest in informing the electorate, preventing 
corruption, and enforcing other campaign finance laws, the Fourth Circuit focused on Maryland’s interest 
in preventing foreign election interference.664 This focus presented a serious hurdle for Maryland, in part, 
                                               
658 See supra note 629. 
 
659 See supra note 629. 
 
660 Transcript: Research Thesis Interview Six, at 208. 
 
661 Transcript: Research Thesis Interview Two, at 186; see also supra note 629. 
 
662 See supra note 629. 
 
663 Transcript: Research Thesis Interview Two, at 186. 
 
664 Wash. Post v. McManus, 944 F.3d 506, 520–23 (4th Cir. 2019). 
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because the requirements for online platforms did not address all foreign interference activity,665 and, as 
the regulator from Maryland expressed, it was not intended to.666 If states establish these record-keeping 
requirements, they should resist focusing on the public’s fascination with foreign election interference and 
misinformation and instead focus on the broader goals more closely associated with traditional campaign 
finance disclosure laws.  
 As part of their goal in updating their campaign finance disclosure schemes for modern times, 
these regulators also explained the importance of including smaller online platforms within record-
keeping requirements, as opposed to only including larger platforms like Facebook and Google.667 
According to one Washington regulator, including larger platforms while excluding smaller platforms 
risks driving political advertising to unregulated platforms if those platforms can provide advertising 
services at a cheaper cost or if political ad purchasers are simply looking to avoid disclosure.668 Thus, 
distinguishing between platforms would not meet the goal of updating campaign finance disclosure and 
bringing more transparency to the public. The state regulator from Maryland shared similar concerns.669 
In the context of constitutional analysis, this question of which platforms should be brought under these 
record-keeping requirements goes back to whether these laws are sufficiently tailored to meet the asserted 
government interest. In McManus, the Fourth Circuit concluded that Maryland had not presented 
sufficient evidence of election interference on plaintiffs’ platforms to justify placing additional 
requirements on those platforms.670 However, the Fourth Circuit did not address how including smaller 
platforms fits within the broader interest of updating old laws for the digital age to further the traditional 
campaign finance disclosure interests articulated in Buckley in informing the electorate, preventing 
                                               
665 Id. at 521. 
 
666 See supra note 629. 
 
667 Transcript: Research Thesis Interview Three, at 190–91; see also supra note 629. 
 
668 Transcript: Research Thesis Interview Three, at 190–91. 
 
669 See supra note 629. 
 
670 McManus, 944 F.3d at 521–22. 
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corruption, and enforcing other campaign finance laws.  By shifting the focus from preventing foreign 
interference to these larger interests, states could better justify expanding the scope of their requirements 
for online platforms to include smaller platforms that were not the main targets of foreign election 
interference activities. 
 Fourth, on a broader scale, regulators are still trying to learn more about what the best approach is 
for increasing online political advertising disclosure.671 For example, regulators explained that there is 
often debate about how much targeting information is necessary for effective disclosure because, while 
the public is concerned about microtargeting of political ads, campaigns are reluctant to have that 
information disclosed and potentially reveal their campaign strategy.672 Additionally, in Washington, state 
regulators are exploring the possibility of an entirely different approach, which they describe as being 
based on distribution.673 One regulator in the state explained that, under the current record-keeping 
requirement where commercial advertisers must provide information to members of the public upon 
request, “it’s very hard, currently, for a member of the public to use the right of inspection for digital 
political advertising. It’s hard to figure out who to contact and then, even if that is discovered, there’s 
oftentimes no response that is received or only partial information provided.”674 Under this alternative, 
distribution-based approach, each political ad would have a digital identification tag that tracks the ad 
through the online ecosystem and reports back to the state.675 This identification tag would be reported to 
the state by the ad sponsor, and the tag would pull out key disclosure information as the ad travels 
through online platforms, without the need for platforms to publish information themselves.676 One 
                                               
671 See infra notes 673–677 and accompanying text. 
 
672 Transcript: Research Thesis Interview Two, at 185; Transcript: Research Thesis Interview Five, at 202. 
 
673 Transcript: Research Thesis Interview Two, at 182; Transcript: Research Thesis Interview Three, at 190; Transcript: Research 
Thesis Interview Five, at 199. 
 
674 Transcript: Research Thesis Interview Three, at 192. 
 
675 Transcript: Research Thesis Interview Two, at 182; Transcript: Research Thesis Interview Three, at 190; Transcript: Research 
Thesis Interview Five, at 199. 
 
676 Transcript: Research Thesis Interview Two, at 182; Transcript: Research Thesis Interview Five, at 199. 
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regulator explained that a benefit of this approach is that platforms like Facebook or Google may feel 
more comfortable resuming operations in the state:  
A side benefit of [this approach], if we can make it work, would be hopefully we can come up 
with some sort of scheme where more commercial advertisers feel comfortable operating in 
Washington State because they don’t feel like it’s going to be a ‘gotcha,’ where a member of the 
public comes in and says ‘I want to see more information about this ad, and I’m going to email 
info@politicaladvertiser.com,’ and that message goes into a general email inbox and never gets 
read by the right people, and all of the sudden someone’s broken the law.677 
 
 Thus, the various approaches outlined in this thesis for regulating online political advertising are 
not the only options. One approach of key provisions of the Honest Ads Act and several states has been to 
adopt these record-keeping requirements for online platforms that host political ads,678 which has become 
the focus of this thesis. Here, states have either expanded and clarified existing record-keeping 
requirements that applied to traditional mediums679 or established new requirements specifically for 
online platforms.680 This approach is new for ads distributed on the Internet, making it unclear where laws 
like this should fall within traditional campaign finance law,681 but it is not entirely novel in the sense that 
broadcasters are similarly required to keep records with information about the political ads that they 
run.682 However, regulators are continuing to think even beyond those new record-keeping requirements 
for online platforms, and, despite the work that has already been done in this area, these conversations 
show that policymakers are still early in the process of determining how best to provide greater 
transparency to the public. 
                                               
677 Transcript: Research Thesis Interview Three, at 190. 
 
678 See, e.g., H.R. 1 , 117th Cong. § 4208 (2021); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 84504.6(d) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 9 of 2021 Reg. 
Legis. Sess.); MD ELEC. LAW § 13-405(b)-(c) (West, Westlaw through legislation effective Mar. 5, 2021.); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 
19:44A-22.3(d) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 15 of 2021 Legis. Sess.); NEV. REV. STAT. § 294A.370 (West, Westlaw through 31st 
and 32nd 2020 Special Legis. Sess.); WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17A.345 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 8 of Reg. Legis. Sess.). 
 
679 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:44A-22.3(d); NEV. REV. STAT. § 294A.370; WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17A.345. 
 
680 See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 84504.6(d); MD ELEC. LAW § 13-405(b)-(c). 
 
681 See Wash. Post v. McManus, 944 F.3d 506, 516 (4th Cir. 2019) (“Disclosure obligations applied to neutral-third party 
platforms are thus, from a First Amendment perspective, different in kind from conventional campaign finance regulations.”). 
 





 Interviews with attorneys who filed briefs in the McManus case and with state regulators were 
included in this thesis project to further explore the lessons that legislators and regulators should take 
from McManus, how future legislation might avoid similar First Amendment challenges, and how future 
legislation might be crafted to increase transparency. Although the individuals interviewed do not 
represent all attorneys with expertise on campaign finance law or all state regulators exploring all possible 
approaches, their responses do provide some additional insight into online political advertising regulation. 
Pulling together responses from the attorneys and state regulators, three main, overarching points for the 
future of legislation in this area emerge across both sets of interviews: (1) while shifting responsibility 
from online platforms to ad sponsors and state governments would easily solve some constitutional 
issues, doing so would not meet the goals regulators have for increasing transparency; (2) any regulations 
for online political ads must be supported by a strong record of the harm legislators and regulators are 
solving for and focus on traditional campaign finance interests rather primarily focusing on election 
interference efforts; and (3) regulators are continuing to explore different options, and those discussions 
should include online platforms and other policymakers. 
 First, although the attorney who filed an amicus brief in support of Maryland thought that a clear 
way to avoid constitutional challenges from online platforms in the future would be to move record-
keeping responsibilities from platforms to the government, state regulators were wary of making that 
change.683 Similarly, while the attorney who filed an amicus brief in support of the plaintiffs explained 
that additional record-keeping responsibilities on platforms did not add significant benefits beyond the 
expenditure reporting requirements campaigns and ad sponsors must already follow, state regulators felt 
that involving ad distributors, like online platforms, served as an essential check in the legislative 
scheme.684 Previously, just recently, I, writing with Dr. Victoria Smith Ekstrand suggested that the 
                                               
683 See supra notes 594–598, 633–639 and accompanying text. 
 
684 See supra notes 615–616, 625–628 and accompanying text. 
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government take on this responsibility to avoid the potential constitutional concerns raised in McManus, 
where the plaintiffs asserted that publishing these records violated their First Amendment rights.685 
However, giving government agencies the responsibility of maintaining records full of information 
received directly from campaigns will likely be unable to achieve the same benefits regulators express 
they achieve by placing that responsibility with platforms. Not only does placing record-keeping 
responsibilities with online platforms allow state agencies to review multiple sources of campaign finance 
disclosures and, thus, better ensure that reporting from campaigns is accurate,686 but platforms are likely 
better able to provide the types of information required by these record-keeping responsibilities.687 Most 
of the public’s concern about online political ads relates to how those ads are distributed in our online 
environments, especially in terms of how ads are targeted and how many times ads are viewed. Indeed, 
that is what makes online political advertising unique compared to advertising on television and the radio, 
particularly on social media platforms where they can continue to be quickly and easily shared beyond the 
ad purchaser’s intended audience.688 Online platforms are more likely to have this information about the 
ad’s distribution through the platform and are likely better able to update it as ads move through that 
platform than would be the case for ad purchasers reporting directly to a government database.689  
 Second, if legislators keep this approach of placing record-keeping requirements on online 
platforms, the key question becomes how to defend it against First Amendment challenges from those 
platforms, and, here, the significant point is ensuring that the law is sufficiently tailored to achieve a 
                                               
685 Victoria Smith Ekstrand & Ashley Fox, Regulating the Political Wild West: State Efforts to Disclose Sources of Online 
Political Advertising, 47 J. LEGIS. 81, 110 (2021). 
 
686 See supra notes 625–628 and accompanying text. 
 
687 See Michael Parsons, Platforms Political Advertising, and Attentional Choice 12 DREXEL L. REV. 765, 797 (2020) (“[O]nline 
platforms--unlike government agencies--are in a unique position to provide dynamic contextual information to content 
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platform.”). 
 
688 See Abby K. Wood, Facilitating Accountability for Online Political Advertisements, 16 OHIO ST. TECH. L.J. 520, 557 (2020) 
(“At minimum, online advertisements should be subject to the same regulatory and disclosure requirements as other types of 
advertisements, such as those broadcasted on TV or radio.”). 
 
689 See Parsons, supra note 687, at 797. 
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compelling or important government interest.690 Both attorneys emphasized the need to build a record 
showing that these additional disclosure regulations achieve their asserted goals, or even that additional 
disclosure regulations are necessary at all.691 In the McManus decision, the Fourth Circuit focused almost 
entirely on Maryland’s asserted interest in preventing foreign election interference and concluded that the 
state had put forth insufficient evidence of interference on plaintiffs’ smaller platforms to justify 
subjecting them to record-keeping requirements.692 However, the attorney who filed an amicus brief in 
support of Maryland and state regulators in Maryland and Washington explained that updating disclosure 
schemes serves important interests beyond preventing interference.693 Indeed, according to regulators and 
Maryland in McManus, these laws also seek to promote the traditional campaign finance interests 
articulated in Buckley: informing the electorate, preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption, 
and aiding in the enforcement of other campaign finance laws.694 Thus, again, one lesson policymakers 
should take from McManus, is that policymakers should focus on building a record focusing on these 
interests rather than an interest on preventing foreign interference activity. 
 Finally, regulators are still trying to think about the best way to address online political 
advertising, and regulators are continuing to explore different options, like the project that Washington 
regulators described as a distribution-based approach where valuable information about the ads’ 
distribution through online environments can be pulled out without requiring online platforms to publish 
that information themselves.695 Thus, Washington’s distribution-based approach could form a type of 
                                               
690 Under exacting scrutiny, “there must be a ‘substantial relation’ between an ‘important’ government interest and ‘the 
information required to be disclosed.’” Wash. Post v. McManus, 944 F.3d 506, 520 (4th Cir. 2019) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 
424 U.S. 1, 64–66 (1976)). Under strict scrutiny, a law must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest. 
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010). 
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692 McManus, 944 F.3d at 520–24. 
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694 See supra notes 608–610, 623–628 and accompanying text; see also Brief of Appellants at 40–43, Wash. Post v. McManus, 
944 F.3d 506 (4th Cir. 2019) (No. 19-1132). 
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public-private partnership, where large online platforms help create software for digital ID tags that can 
be replicated in multiple states, and, in exchange, online platforms would avoid compliance burdens––and 
potential legal liability––associated with being required to maintain or publish records under various 
disclosure obligations from multiple governments.696 If such a project is technologically feasible, online 
platforms would not only avoid having to publish records themselves, but, from a public relations 
standpoint, they would be able to capitalize on the project as a positive boost to their image among a 
public that is increasingly worried about the role large platforms in particular play in our democracy. 
 Ultimately, this exploration of various approaches must include discussion with online platforms 
to determine what is technologically feasible as well as discussion with other states to adopt some 
uniformity for disclosure obligations for online platforms. The current marketplace for online political 
advertising presents a unique challenge for states because platforms like Facebook and Google have made 
business decisions to pull out of certain markets based on what individual states have done.697 At the 
federal level, the Honest Ads Act seeks to amend the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) to include 
requirements that online platforms distributing political advertising about candidates and national 
legislative issues publish records about those ads,698 but, based on how FECA defines a “candidate” to 
include only candidates for “[f]ederal office,”699 the Honest Ads Act’s disclosure obligations for online 
                                               
696 Public-private partnerships between governments and large technology companies are not new. For instance, in 2015, the EU 
Internet Forum formed a “public-private partnership to detect and address harmful material online.” Press Release, E.U. Internet 
Forum: Bringing together governments Europol and technology companies to counter terrorist content and hate speech online 
(Dec. 3, 2015),  https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_15_6243; see also Noa Mor, No Longer Private: On 
Human Rights and the Public Facet of Social Network Sites, 47 HOFSTRA L. REV. 651, 679–80 (2018). There, Facebook, 
Microsoft, Google, Twitter, and YouTube created “a shared industry database of ‘hashes’––unique digital ‘fingerprints’––for 
violent terrorist imagery or terrorist recruitment” materials that the companies had previously removed from their platforms such 
that “[o]ther participating companies can then use those hashes to identify such content on their [own] services, review [it] 
against their respective policies and definitions, and remove matching content as appropriate.” Partnering to help curb the spread 
of terrorist content online, GOOGLE IN EUROPE (Dec. 5, 2016), https://blog.google/around-the-globe/google-europe/partnering-
help-curb-spread-terrorist-content-online/. 
 
697 See, e.g., Political Content, GOOGLE, https://support.google.com/adspolicy/answer/6014595?hl=en (last visited Mar. 19, 2021) 
(noting advertising restrictions for California, Maryland, New Jersey, New York, Nevada, Virginia, and Washington); Ads about 
Social Issues, Elections or Politics, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/policies/ads/restricted_content/political# (last visited 
Mar. 19, 2021) (noting advertising restrictions for Washington). 
 
698 H.R. 1, 117th Cong. § 4208 (2021). 
 
699 52 U.S.C. § 30101(2)-(3). 
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platforms would not include advertising on state candidates and ballot measures. Instead, states would be 
left to decide individually whether and how they want to create record-keeping requirements for online 
political advertising on state candidates and ballot measures. The fact that states can each decide for 
themselves the approach they want to take for campaign finance disclosure in state elections is a hallmark 
of our system of federalism. However, when platforms like Facebook and Google operate nationwide, 
individual states who act alone to pass requirements for online platforms take the risk that the platform 
will leave the marketplace, taking away a key source of advertising for campaigns. Overall, getting 
multiple states and online platforms that operate nationwide on board with a standard approach is not an 
easy task, but it seems to be a necessary one if states want to include online platforms into their disclosure 
schemes without driving platforms from the marketplace. 
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Chapter Five: Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
 This thesis project has explored increasing transparency in online political advertising disclosure 
and, in particular, record-keeping requirements for online platforms that distribute political ads. Part One 
of this thesis examined states’ efforts to address online political advertising and compared those efforts to 
the proposed Honest Ads Act to explore the current realm of legislative possibilities. Part Two examined 
the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Washington Post v. McManus700 as well as the party and amicus briefs 
filed in that case to explore First Amendment concerns with placing record-keeping and publication 
requirements on online platforms, theorize what McManus suggests about similar requirements, and 
identify key legal issues that may arise in potential litigation in the future. Finally, Part Three examined 
the expert opinions of two attorneys who filed amicus briefs in McManus as well as four state regulators 
in Washington and Maryland to explore how future efforts could be crafted to avoid similar constitutional 
issues and consider what types of laws would be effective in achieving regulators’ goals of transparency.  
 Here, this Chapter seeks to build on that foundation by making recommendations for future 
efforts to regulate online political advertising. First, policymakers should expand and clarify sponsorship 
disclaimer and reporting requirements such that they expressly apply to online political advertising. 
Second, policymakers should establish record-keeping and publication requirements for online platforms. 
Third, to defend those record-keeping and publication requirements placed on online platforms against a 
First Amendment challenge, policymakers should push back on the Fourth Circuit’s continued distinction 
between the broadcast industry and the Internet as well as the Fourth Circuit’s suggestion that 
requirements placed on platforms are more constitutionally problematic than those placed on campaigns 
and direct political actors under traditional campaign finance laws. Fourth, when crafting these 
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requirements, policymakers should focus on the traditional campaign finance interests articulated in 
Buckley, rather than on foreign interference activities, and policymakers should build a strong record to 
ensure that regulations are supported by empirical evidence that also shows that the regulations are 
sufficiently tailored to achieve those traditional interests. Finally, policymakers should discuss future 
efforts with online platforms and with each other to continue exploring various approaches––and to work 
out technology and practical issues associated with those approaches––to address this issue. 
(A) Expand and Clarify Sponsorship Disclaimer and Reporting Requirements 
 
 First, policymakers should work to expand and clarify sponsorship disclaimer requirements and 
reporting requirements placed on campaigns to expressly include political advertising placed online. 
Although the focus of this thesis has been on disclosure requirements placed on online platforms given 
the novelty of that approach, ensuring that these other campaign finance disclosure tools apply to online 
ads can help bring more transparency to online political advertising as a whole. At present, at the federal 
level, some key disclaimer and reporting requirements, like those for electioneering communications, 
simply do not apply to online ads.701 Moreover, where sponsorship disclaimer requirements do apply to 
online ads, companies like Facebook have taken advantage of indecision at the FEC, creating more 
confusion about which online ads are actually required to include sponsorship disclaimers.702 The Honest 
Ads Act seeks to remedy this confusion at the federal level by expanding the statutory definitions of 
                                               
701 For example, the definition of “electioneering communications” expressly exempts political ads distributed online. 11 C.F.R. 
§ 100.29(c)(1) (2021). Additionally, according to a recent report by J. Scott Babwah Brennan and Matt Perault at the Duke 
University Center on Science & Technology Policy, the FEC’s reporting requirements lack sufficient specificity to easily track 
political ad spending because, first, the FEC often does not require reporting from consultants making advertising expenditures 
on behalf of political actors, and, second, in reports filed to the FEC, current requirements allow committees to use vague 
descriptors like “media” or “ads,” that do not adequately note that the expenditure was for a form of online advertising 
specifically. J. SCOTT BABWAH BRENNAN & MATT PERAULT, BREAKING BLACKOUT BLACK BOXES: ROADBLOCKS TO ANALYZING 
PLATFORM POLITICAL AD BANS 8–10, 12 (2021) https://scienceandsociety.duke.edu/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/CSTP-
Brief_For-Web_1.pdf. 
 
702 See Abby K. Wood & Ann M. Ravel, Fool Me Once: Regulating “Fake News” and Other Online Advertising, 91 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 1223, 1249–51 (2018); see also Katherine Haenschen & Jordan Wolf, Disclaiming Responsibility: How Platforms 
Deadlocked the Federal Election Commission’s Efforts to Regulate Digital Political Advertising, TELECOMM. POL’Y 1, 1 (2018); 
Pichaya P. Winichakul, Note, The Missing Structural Debate: Reforming Disclosure of Online Political Communications, 93 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1387, 1407–12 (2018). 
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electioneering communications and public communications to clearly include online political advertising 
and outlining more specific requirements for sponsorship disclaimer requirements placed on online ads.703 
 At the state level, in every state, campaigns and other parties making campaign-related 
expenditures are required to report those expenditures to the state in periodic campaign finance reports.704 
Moreover, over half of states expressly include political ads placed online within their sponsorship 
disclaimer requirements.705 However, of the states that do not expressly apply sponsorship disclaimer 
requirements to online ads, the vast majority include a general catchall term, like “general public political 
advertising” or ads distributed using “any other electronic medium.”706 While it seems very likely that 
these catchall terms would include political advertising placed online, the state of Indiana makes clear that 
that reasoning is not a guarantee. In Indiana, sponsorship disclaimers for political ads apply to ads 
distributed through a list of enumerated printed media as well as “any other type of general public 
political advertising.”707 However, the state’s campaign finance manual directly states that Indiana’s 
disclaimer laws do not apply to “[p]olitical messages on radio, television, or the Internet.”708 Although 
this is just one example, it highlights the confusion that can take place when online ads are not expressly 
included in existing campaign finance disclosure laws.  
                                               
703 H.R. 1, 117th Cong. § 4205–4207 (2021). 
 
704 For a general overview of states’ campaign finance reporting requirements, see Table One found at the end of Chapter Two. 
 
705 See, e.g., ME. STAT. tit. 21-A §§ 1014, 1055, 1055-A (West, Westlaw through 2019 Second Regular Legis. Sess.) (expressly 
applying sponsorship disclaimer requirements to ads placed on the “Internet”); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 22-25-110 (West, Westlaw 
through 2020 Special Legis. Sess.) (same). For a general overview of whether each state expressly applies sponsorship disclaimer 
requirements to online political ads, see Table One found at the end of Chapter Two. 
 
706 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-1-103(a)(7)(B)(i) (West, Westlaw through Acts 18, 20, 56, 60, 87, 94, 151, 154, 217, and 221 
of 2021 Reg. Legis. Sess.) (applying sponsorship disclaimer requirements to ads distributed via a list of enumerated media as 
well as by “any other electronic medium”); IDAHO CODE § 67-6614A (West, Westlaw through Ch. 15 of 2021 Legis. Sess.) 
(applying sponsorship disclaimer requirements to ads distributed via a list of enumerated media as well as by a means of “general 
public political advertising”); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3517.20, 3517.105 (West, Westlaw through 2019-2020 Legis. Sess.) 
(same); 25 PA. STAT. STAT. § 3258(a) (West, Westlaw through 2021 Regular Legis. Sess. Act 4) (same). For a general overview 
of whether each state uses a general catchall term that could apply to online ads in their sponsorship disclaimer requirements, see 
Table One found at the end of Chapter Two. 
 
707 IND. CODE § 3-9-3-2.5(b)–(d) (West, Westlaw through 2021 First Reg. Legis. Sess.). 
 
708 INDIANA CAMPAIGN FINANCE MANUAL at 72 (2020), https://www.in.gov/sos/elections/files/2020-Campaign-Finance-
Manual.FINAL.pdf (last accessed Feb. 26, 2021). 
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 To eliminate the confusion surrounding sponsorship disclaimers––and at the federal level, 
reporting requirements for electioneering communications––governments should follow the approach of 
the Honest Ads Act and of the over half of states that expressly encompass online political advertising 
within these requirements. The Supreme Court has upheld sponsorship disclaimer and expenditure 
reporting requirements for political ads based on the governments’ interests in informing the electorate, 
preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption, and enforcing other campaign finance laws, like 
contribution limits.709 Taking this step would simply update campaign finance laws to bring online ads 
into that regulatory framework,710 reducing confusion related to online ads specifically and providing 
some level of standardization for disclosure of political ads across different mediums. 
(B) Establish Record-Keeping and Publication Requirements for Online Platforms 
 
 In addition to updating statutory language to expressly apply to online political advertising, 
governments should also establish requirements that online platforms publish records about the political 
ads that they host. This requirement should include both record-keeping and publication to ensure that the 
information actually makes it to the public, and it should include some form of standardization in data 
formats to make records comparable across platforms for the public and for researchers.711 In 
Washington, one regulator explained that the state’s record-keeping statute provides a right of access 
requiring commercial advertisers, including online platforms, to provide records related to political 
advertising when they receive a request for those records from a member of the public or from the 
Washington Public Disclosure Commission.712 However, for large platforms like Facebook or Google, 
                                               
709 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 66–68, 84 (1976); McConnell v. FEC 540 U.S. 93, 196 (2003); Citizens United, 558 U.S. 
310, 366–67 (2010). 
 
710 See Abby K. Wood, Facilitating Accountability for Online Political Advertisements, 16 OHIO ST. TECH. L.J. 520, 557 (2020) 
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Democratic Tradeoffs: Platforms and Political Advertising, 16 OHIO ST. TECH. L.J. 493, 495–96 (2020). Legislative efforts 
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712 Transcript: Research Thesis Interview Two, at 178. 
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which together dominate the digital advertising market, members of the public simply do not know who 
to contact.713 Unlike local newspapers or broadcast stations, which have traditionally kept physical books 
of account on the political ads that they run in Washington, members of the public cannot walk into 
Facebook or Google and ask for these records.714 As a result, requests from members of the public may 
get sent to the wrong location, requests may go unanswered or get lost, the responses that are received 
may be incomplete, and the member of the public may involve the state government, which then initiates 
an enforcement posture to get the requested records.715 Maintaining records on online political advertising 
is only helpful for the public’s interest in transparency if the public has access to those records. Thus, 
online platforms should be required to publish these records in a publicly accessible database that can be 
proactively updated by platforms. 
 In contrast to this approach, New York has adopted a system for independent expenditure ads 
placed online under which ad purchasers report directly to the state government, and the state government 
maintains records about those ads, along with a copy of the ad, in a state-owned database.716 Previously, 
Fox and Ekstrand voiced support for this approach as a way of providing more transparency for online 
political advertising while also avoiding the First Amendment concerns Maryland’s requirements for 
online platforms raised in McManus.717 In McManus, the Fourth Circuit rejected the idea that placing 
disclosure requirements on online platforms fits naturally within existing campaign finance laws that 
place requirements on campaigns and ad purchasers.718 One attorney who filed an amicus brief in support 
of Maryland in McManus explained that a system where online platforms are required to give disclosure 
information to ad purchasers, ad purchasers are required to give that information to the state, and the state 
                                               
713 See Transcript: Research Thesis Interview Two, at 180. 
 
714 See Transcript: Research Thesis Interview Two, at 180. 
 
715 See Transcript: Research Thesis Interview Three, at 190. 
 
716 N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 14-107(5-a) (McKinney, Westlaw through Chs. 1 to 49, 61 to 71 of 2021 Legis. Sess.). 
 
717 Victoria Smith Ekstrand & Ashley Fox, Regulating the Political Wild West: State Efforts to Disclose Sources of Online 
Political Advertising, 47 J. LEGIS. 81, 110 (2021). 
 
718 Wash. Post v. McManus, 944 F.3d 506, 515 (4th Cir. 2019). 
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is required to maintain a database of that information would avoid similar First Amendment challenges 
from online platforms since they would no longer be compelled to publish these records themselves.719 
This attorney listed numerous benefits to this approach––including the cost efficiency of having 
information from all platforms in one location and the ability to maintain records of platforms that go out 
of business––but maintained that the shift was not constitutionally necessary.720 
  Although shifting disclosure requirements from online platforms to political ad purchasers and 
the government would more easily solve constitutional concerns from the perspective of platforms, doing 
so would also eliminate the benefits that state regulators explain that they receive by involving businesses 
that distribute political advertising in the disclosure process.721 For instance, in Maryland the state 
regulator expressed that providing disclosure information right where people consume the ad is more 
realistic about how people consume media and explained that most people would not go to a separate 
website or look through campaign finance expenditure reports to find this information.722 Additionally, 
one Washington regulator felt that shifting disclosure responsibilities away from what they call 
“commercial advertisers” would eliminate a key enforcement tool for the state.723 While the attorney who 
filed an amicus brief on behalf of the plaintiffs in McManus explained that citizens can look through 
expenditure reports to find similar, if not the same, disclosure information,724 this Washington regulator 
explained that including commercial advertisers in the disclosure scheme provides a key check to ensure 
that campaigns and ad purchasers are actually meeting their reporting obligations.725 Overall, if businesses 
that distribute political advertising were taken out of the process and all disclosure information were to 
                                               
719 Transcript: Research Thesis Interview Six, at 206–07. 
 
720 Transcript: Research Thesis Interview Six, at 206–07. 
 
721 See Transcript: Research Thesis Interview Two, at 182; Transcript: Research Thesis Interview Three, at 191. 
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723 Transcript: Research Thesis Interview Three, at 191. 
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come directly from campaigns and ad purchasers, regulators would be left with nothing to check that 
reporting against.726 Thus, similar to one of the government interests for disclosure articulated in 
Buckley,727 mandating disclosure in this way can help enforce other campaign finance laws.  
 Disclosure obligations for online platforms should also include both large platforms, like 
Facebook and Google, and smaller platforms. One purpose behind establishing these requirements is 
updating campaign finance disclosure for the Internet age by bringing disclosure requirements for the 
Internet more in line with disclosure requirements for other forms of advertising.728 Regulators in 
Washington and Maryland, which both apply obligations on large and small platforms,729 expressed 
concern that excluding smaller platforms from record-keeping requirements would undermine that goal 
because it may create “winners and losers in the marketplace, where you may drive more political 
advertising somewhere else if someone is trying to either skirt disclosure or go with the cheaper option 
because disclosure is not required . . . .”730 However, policymakers must craft rules that take into account 
the ad network relationship between different types of platforms to clearly define which platform is 
responsible. In particular, policymakers should place the bulk of these record-keeping and publication 
requirements on the party dealing directly with the ad purchaser, as Washington does.731 Thus, in the case 
of Google’s Display ad network, the responsibility would sit with Google, who placed and targeted the 
                                               
726 Transcript: Research Thesis Interview Three, at 191. 
 
727 In Buckley, the Supreme Court explained that one government interest justifying campaign finance disclosure is that 
disclosure obligations aid in the enforcement of other campaign finance laws, like contribution limits. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 
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ad, not with the website where the ad was ultimately published. This move would lessen the regulatory 
burden on the fraction of smaller platforms that only accept online advertising through ad networks. 
Instead of requiring such smaller platforms to maintain full records themselves, there could be a 
requirement that the ad link back to the ad network’s publicly accessible online records.732 
 In addition to the benefits regulators have expressed that they gain from involving businesses that 
distribute political advertising in their campaign finance disclosure scheme––and would lose if record-
keeping responsibilities were instead placed with the government––oftentimes these requirements for 
online platforms require maintaining information that the platforms are simply more likely to have 
compared to ad purchasers.733 For example, the Honest Ads Act requires that online platforms create 
publicly available records with information not only about ad sponsors and how much is spent, but also “a 
description of the audience targeted by the advertisement, the number of views generated by . . . 
advertisement, the number of times the advertisement was shared, and the date and time that the 
advertisement is first displayed and last displayed.”734 Similarly, Maryland’s provisions require that 
online platforms make records with information about the audience targeted and the number of 
impressions generated, in addition to copies of the ad and information about the ad sponsor and ad cost, 
available to the state for inspection.735 Washington also requires online platforms to keep records about 
“demographic information (e.g., age, gender, race, location, etc.) of the audiences reached . . . and the 
total number of impressions generated by the advertisement.”736 Key pieces of information required under 
these laws relate to how political ads are distributed. While political ad purchasers might have a good idea 
of the intended audience and the first and last days their ad will run, it is less likely that they have a clear 
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733 See G. Michael Parsons, Platforms, Political Advertising, and Attentional Choice, 12 DREXEL L. REV. 765, 796–97 (2020) 
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idea of how the ad moves online ecosystems in a way that would allow them to provide constantly up-to-
date information about the number of impressions an ad received or who actually saw it.737 
 For social media platforms like Facebook in particular, distribution is what makes online political 
advertising unique compared to political advertising in other mediums.738 For instance, on television, 
political advertisers purchase advertising slots in a specific media market. They have a general idea of 
who they are going to reach, and the ad is not likely to spread past that media market unless the ad is 
shown on a news broadcast or someone else records it and places it online. In contrast, “[e]ven when ads 
posted online are identical in content to those posted on broadcast and radio, they are capable of reaching 
many more people than ads run on TV and radio. Online ads can stay online indefinitely, and once posted, 
they can be retweeted and shared.”739 Our social media environments are also polarized and segmented in 
ways that make effective counterspeech difficult as users are often exposed to ideas that they already 
agree with rather than diverse viewpoints.740 In the context of political advertising, while there’s fear 
among the public that microtargeting capabilities will be used to spread mis- and disinformation to 
narrow audiences while avoiding public scrutiny, “even without disinformation, electoral competitors 
sometimes want to reach the same audience,” and “when advertising moves online, reaching your 
competitors’ audience ranges from possible if not simple (on Google) to impossible (on Facebook).”741 
 Wood contends that records for online political advertising should include not only the audience 
targeted but also the audience actually reached to better allow other parties to reach the same audience 
with counterspeech––just as they would target the same media market on television.742 As political ads 
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move through social media platforms, this information about who saw the ad or how many people saw the 
ad is constantly changing. As Parsons articulates, “online platforms––unlike government agencies––are in 
a unique position to provide dynamic contextual information to content consumers, such as real-time 
insights, targeting insights, and insights about the spread of paid content within the platform.”743 If 
record-keeping responsibilities were left to ad purchasers and governments, it would be difficult if not 
impossible to provide accurate information about how political ads move through the platform. Even if ad 
purchasers were able to receive constantly up-to-date information from the platforms, by the time those 
purchasers take an additional step to provide that information to the government, it would likely already 
be outdated. Thus, online platforms are in a better position to provide information related to ad 
distribution, which is what makes many online ads unique.744 
(C) Push Back on Key Points in McManus to Defend Requirements for Platforms 
 
 One risk with requiring online platforms to keep and publish records about the ads that they run is 
that online platforms may argue that those requirements violate their First Amendment rights by 
compelling them to publish records on political speech, which became an issue with Maryland’s 
provisions in McManus.745 Here, legislators and regulators should push back on some of the key points 
that the Fourth Circuit made in the McManus opinion. Ultimately, McManus was dealt with as an as-
applied challenge,746 meaning that a different case with different plaintiffs may easily lead to a different 
result. Furthermore, McManus is one decision from one federal appellate court; it is not binding law in 
other circuits, and it has not been reviewed by the Supreme Court. In the future, governments that 
establish these types requirements for platforms should start addressing the weak points of the McManus 
decision by targeting, first, the Fourth Circuit’s distinction of the broadcast industry and the Internet, and, 
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second, the Fourth Circuit’s suggestion that it is more constitutionally problematic to place disclosure 
requirements on platforms than on ad purchasers, as traditional campaign finance disclosure laws have 
done previously. The Fourth Circuit declined to determine the level of scrutiny that should apply in 
evaluating Maryland’s requirements for online platforms, leaving the open question about where 
disclosure requirements of this nature fall within First Amendment doctrine.747 However, targeting these 
two points can help make the argument that strict scrutiny and some of the non-electoral precedents relied 
upon by the Fourth Circuit are inapplicable in this context.  
(1) The Broadcast Industry v. The Internet 
 
 In reaching its conclusion that Maryland’s requirements for online platforms are distinct from 
existing campaign finance disclosure requirements, the Fourth Circuit expressly rejected Maryland’s 
argument that the state’s provisions were similar to the federal disclosure requirements that currently exist 
for broadcasters.748 This distinction between the broadcast industry and the Internet will likely continue to 
                                               
747 Id. at 520. This issue is not unique to campaign finance disclosure. In recent years, scholars and attorneys have explained that 
a similar issue in determining where disclosure fits in First Amendment doctrine has been brewing in the context of certain SEC 
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III, the D.C. Circuit considered an SEC regulation that required corporations to disclose whether the company’s products used 
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level of intermediate scrutiny to laws restricting commercial speech, or (3) strict scrutiny should apply in evaluating the rule’s 
constitutionality. Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 800 F.3d 518, 522–24 (D.C. Cir. 2015); see also Taylor, supra note 747, at 437–
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also citing the Supreme Court’s decision in Hurly v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, for the 
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what shall be orthodox in commercial advertising” by requiring dissemination of “purely factual and uncontroversial 
information,”’” but, otherwise, corporations’ First Amendment rights “appl[y] not only to expressions of value, opinion, or 
endorsement, but equally to statements of fact the speaker would rather avoid.” Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs., 800 F.3d, at 523–24 (citing 
Hurly v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 573–74 (1995)). Ultimately, however, the D.C. Circuit 
concluded that the rule would fail even the Zauderer Test because the agency had not shown that the rule would “alleviate the 
harms it recited to a material degree,” and the statement that a product is “conflict free” was based on a moral judgment that 
could not be “purely factual and uncontroversial,” as Zauderer requires. Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs., 800 F.3d, at 524–30 (internal 
quotations omitted). Overall, Taylor explains that “[i]f the view of the court in [NAM III] were widely adopted, many compelled 
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supra note 747, at 427. Posner notes that NAM III therefore creates controversy as to whether SEC disclosure regulations, which 
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Circuit’s decision in McManus, NAM III thus presents another scenario in which disclosure regulations in areas that have not 
previously raised constitutionally fatal concerns under the First Amendment may be viewed differently by courts. 
 
748 McManus, 944 F.3d at 519. 
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be a key legal issue in this area. Although the distinction between the two mediums may have made sense 
when it was first articulated by the Supreme Court in Reno v. ACLU,749 it no longer makes sense today, 
especially in the context of political advertising, as a brief history of the reasoning behind this distinction 
will demonstrate. 
 In Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,750 the Supreme Court upheld the fairness doctrine, which 
required broadcast stations to give “fair coverage” to multiple sides of public issues, and the more specific 
personal attack rule, which, under the fairness doctrine, “require[d] that the individual attacked [] be 
offered an opportunity to respond.”751 Although the plaintiffs in that case asserted that the fairness 
doctrine and personal attack rule violated their First Amendment rights, the Court explained that the 
broadcast medium is unique because broadcast frequencies are a scarce resource, and, thus, the 
government simply cannot give everyone a broadcast license.752 Applying this logic to the fairness 
doctrine, the Court explained that parties who are granted licenses have “no constitutional right to be the 
one who holds the license or to monopolize a radio frequency to the exclusion of his fellow citizens.”753  
 Approximately a decade later, the Supreme Court again addressed the constitutionality of 
broadcast regulations in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation,754 this time evaluating whether the FCC could 
censor indecent speech after Pacifica Foundation broadcast George Carlin’s “Filthy Words” 
monologue.755 In concluding that the FCC could restrict indecent speech on broadcast stations, the Court 
articulated two additional rationales for treating the broadcast medium differently than other mediums of 
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communication.756 First, the Court explained that “broadcast media have established a uniquely pervasive 
presence in the lives of all Americans.”757 Therefore:  
Because the broadcast audience is constantly tuning in and out, prior warnings cannot completely 
protect the listener or viewer from unexpected program content. To say that one may avoid 
further offense by turning off the radio when he hears indecent language is like saying that the 
remedy for assault is to run away after the first blow.758  
 
Second, and particularly relevant to the indecent speech at issue in Pacifica, the broadcast medium “is 
uniquely accessible to children,” and the Court concluded that this justified government regulation of 
indecent speech over broadcast stations.759  
 Interestingly, although Wood and Ravel compare record-keeping requirements for online 
platforms distributing political ads to the FCC political files,760 when the Supreme Court in McConnell 
considered a First Amendment challenge to § 315(e), which established additional record-keeping 
requirements for broadcasters distributing political ads, the Court did not strongly rely on the spectrum 
scarcity rationale of Red Lion or the other two rationales articulated in Pacifica.761 Indeed, the Court 
neither cited Pacifica nor mentioned the spectrum scarcity rationale in this portion of the opinion.762 
Instead, the Court more generally explained that the government has broad authority to regulate 
broadcasters, and the requirements created by § 315(e) were not all that different from existing FCC 
regulations.763 Therefore, “[a]ny additional burden that the statute, viewed facially, imposes upon interests 
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protected by the First Amendment seems slight compared to the strong enforcement-related interests that 
it serves.”764 
 In McManus, the Fourth Circuit relied on the Supreme Court’s spectrum scarcity rationale 
articulated in Red Lion.765 The Fourth Circuit also relied on the Court’s decision in Reno to further 
distinguish the Internet from the broadcast medium.766 In Reno, the Court explained that “the vast 
democratic forums of the Internet [have never] been subject to the type of government supervision and 
regulation that has attended the broadcast industry.”767 However, the distinction between broadcast media 
and the Internet is one that no longer makes perfect sense, particularly in the context of record-keeping 
about online political advertising, for three reasons. 
 First, in Pacifica, the Supreme Court found that one way in which the broadcast medium is 
unique is that it is more pervasive in people’s lives than other mediums of communication that existed at 
the time.768 However, in the subsequent decades, the Internet has become far more pervasive in the 
public’s life than broadcast media. Today, the public uses the Internet for nearly every aspect of their 
daily lives, from checking the news and furthering educational opportunities to connecting with friends or 
coworkers and shopping for groceries or other needs.769 Recently, in Packingham v. North Carolina,770 
the Supreme Court recognized that social media in particular allow users “to engage in a wide array of 
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protected First Amendment activity on topics ‘as diverse as human thought.’”771 The necessity of an 
Internet connection has only been underscored further as public health measures in response to the 
COVID-19 pandemic have pushed even more aspects of daily life online. In short, the Internet has 
become so pervasive in daily life that members of the public would likely find it difficult to be a 
functioning member of society without it.  
 The Court in Pacifica also explained that one result of broadcasting’s pervasive intrusion into 
daily life at that time is that “[b]ecause the broadcast audience is constantly tuning in and out, prior 
warnings cannot completely protect the listener or viewer from unexpected program content.”772 In Reno, 
the Court found that the Internet of 1997 was different than consuming broadcasted content because 
receiving information on the Internet required “affirmative” and “deliberate” steps on the part of the 
viewer.773 Although it is true that finding information on the Internet often requires affirmative steps, the 
public’s experience with the Internet today is no different than the description of broadcast media in 
Pacifica.774 Not only can anyone access nearly anything on the Internet, but most people likely understand 
that an unwitting search in Google or click on a trending Twitter topic can turn up unexpected––and even 
offensive––results. Consequently, the Supreme Court’s reasoning under this pervasiveness factor in 
Reno––and, by extension, the Fourth Circuit’s continued reliance on Reno––for distinguishing the 
Internet from the broadcast industry is untenable and understates the Internet’s role in modern society.    
 Second, the spectrum scarcity rationale also no longer makes sense as a basis for distinguishing 
broadcast media from the Internet.775 While the Court in Red Lion focused on the technological capacity 
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of the broadcast industry at that time, the more theoretical concern behind the spectrum scarcity rationale 
was an ineffective marketplace of ideas.776 Specifically, the Court explained that without government 
regulation of the broadcast industry, the marketplace would experience interference among broadcast 
frequencies, making it difficult for listeners to effectively hear the messages communicated.777 
Additionally, the Court also explained that broadcasters did not have a right to monopolize the medium to 
the exclusion of other citizens.778 Today, some have expressed concern with the marketplace of ideas 
online, arguing that counterspeech is ineffective because the structure of our online environments on 
major social media platforms often encourages division rather than exposure to various viewpoints.779 
Moreover, legal researchers, politicians on both sides of the aisle, and other members of the public have 
argued that large technology platforms have vast power over our online marketplace of ideas,780 with 
some politicians even arguing that that power has resulted in monopoly power that should be broken 
up.781 Thus, some of the concerns expressed about the marketplace of ideas associated with the broadcast 
media of 1969, which provide the theoretical basis for the Court’s spectrum scarcity rationale, are similar 
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to the concerns expressed about large online platforms today, in 2021, undercutting the Fourth Circuit’s 
rationale for continuing to treat the two mediums differently.782  
 Third, in the context of political advertising records specifically, the traditional reasons for 
subjecting regulations of the broadcast industry to less scrutiny are not the rationales that the Supreme 
Court used in upholding additional political record-keeping requirements for broadcasters under § 
315(e).783 In McConnell, the Court did not rely on the reasoning of Pacifica or mention spectrum scarcity 
of Red Lion––which the Fourth Circuit placed at the center of its analysis on this point––once as a reason 
for upholding the requirement.784 Instead, the Court explained that the requirement did not impose 
additional onerous burdens on top of the history of other FCC requirements that already existed.785 In fact, 
as described by one attorney who was interviewed for this thesis project,786 the lower court in the 
McConnell case––which held that the record-keeping requirements of § 315(e) were instead 
unconstitutional,787 before that decision was reversed by the Supreme Court788––discussed whether § 
315(e) served the traditional campaign finance disclosure interests articulated in Buckley instead of diving 
into how the broadcast medium occupies a unique place in First Amendment jurisprudence.789 
 Attacking the Fourth Circuit’s distinction between the broadcast industry and the Internet does 
not automatically mean that a court would uphold requirements that online platforms maintain and 
publish records of political ads in the same way that federal law has imposed similar requirements for 
broadcasters. However, the importance of pushing back on distinguishing the broadcast industry and the 
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786 Transcript: Research Thesis Interview Six, at 208–09. 
 
787 McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 811 (D.D.C. 2003). 
 
788 See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 234. 
 
789 See McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 811–13. 
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Internet in this context is twofold. First, it starts to shift the constitutional analysis one step closer to 
disclosure requirements that our society is already familiar with in the broadcast industry. Second, it 
provides one reason to shift the constitutional analysis away from a strict scrutiny analysis, which “in 
practice, is virtually impossible to satisfy,”790 and the higher level of First Amendment protection that is 
afforded to other, nonbroadcast mediums. 
(2) Online Platforms v. Political Ad Purchasers 
 
 In their decision, the Fourth Circuit also suggested that it was more constitutionally problematic 
to place disclosure requirements on online platforms than to place traditional campaign finance disclosure 
obligations directly on political actors and those purchasing political advertising.791 Here, the Fourth 
Circuit explained that the “infirmities” it identified in Maryland’s law––that the law was “content-based, 
pegged to political expression, and compelled speech in some form”––were also present in traditional 
campaign finance disclosure cases like Buckley.792 However, what made Maryland’s law different was its 
application to third-party platforms, rather than political ad purchasers.793 According to the Fourth Circuit, 
“political groups, by design, have an organic desire to succeed at the ballot box. And this ambition 
generally offsets, at least in part, whatever burdens are posed by disclosure obligations.”794 But, the logic 
of Buckley and traditional campaign finance disclosure cases breaks down in this context:  
[A] core problem with Maryland’s law is that it makes certain political speech more expensive to 
host than other speech because compliance costs attach to the former and not to the latter. 
Accordingly, when election-related speech brings in less cash or carries more obligations than all 
the other advertising options, there is much less reason for platforms to host such speech.795  
 
                                               
790 Wash. Post v. McManus, 944 F.3d 506, 520 (4th Cir. 2019). 
 
791 See McManus, 944 F.3d at 515–17; see also Ekstrand & Fox, supra note 717, at 108. 
 









Ultimately, according to the Fourth Circuit, disclosure obligations for online platforms may chill political 
speech and reduce the amount of political advertising in the marketplace.796 Although this concern is 
valid, as shown by Google’s decision to withdraw from the political advertising marketplace in multiple 
states with record-keeping requirements,797 the Fourth Circuit’s logic is flawed in that it characterizes 
regulations implicating online platforms’ indirect First Amendment interest based in advertising as being 
more concerning than those implicating political ad purchaser’s direct interest in core political speech.  
 In particular, the Fourth Circuit and the briefs filed by the plaintiffs in the case did not rely on key 
campaign finance cases like Buckley.798 Instead, the Fourth Circuit heavily relied on key cases from the 
compelled speech doctrine––like Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston,799 
Janus v. American Federation of State, City & Municipal Employees Council,800 and Wooley v. 
Maynard801––in treating Maryland’s requirements for online platforms as a direct affront to platforms’ 
expressive rights.802 In Hurley, the Supreme Court held that Massachusetts could not compel parade 
organizers to allow the Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston to march in their 
parade.803 There, the Court explained that “[s]ince every participating unit affects the message conveyed 
by the private organizers, [the Massachusetts law] . . . essentially require[ed] petitioners to alter the 
                                               
796 Id. at 516–17. 
 
797 Political Content, GOOGLE, https://support.google.com/adspolicy/answer/6014595?hl=en (last visited Feb. 26, 2021) (noting 
that Google does not accept political ads on state candidates and ballot measures in Maryland, New Jersey, Nevada, and 
Washington). 
 
798 McManus, 944 F.3d at 515–16 (explaining that Maryland’s requirements for online platforms are “different in kind from 
customary campaign finance regulations because the Act burdens platforms rather than political actors”); see also Memorandum 
of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction at *10–11, Wash. Post v. McManus, 355 F. 
Supp. 3d 272 (S.D. Ma. 2019) (No. 1:18-cv-02527-DKC); Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees at 24–30, Wash. Post v. McManus, 944 
F.3d 506 (4th Cir. 2019) (No. 19-1132). 
 
799 515 U.S. 557 (1995). 
 
800 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018). 
 
801 430 U.S. 705 (1977). 
 
802 McManus, 944 F.3d at 514–15. 
 
803 Hurley, 515 U.S. at 573 (“[T]his use of the State’s power violates the fundamental rule of protection under the First 
Amendment, that a speaker has the autonomy to choose the content of his own message.”). 
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expressive content of their parade.”804 Similarly, in Maynard, the Court held that New Hampshire’s 
requirement that individuals display the State’s “Live Free or Die” motto on their car’s license plate 
violated the First Amendment by requiring that citizens “use their private property as a ‘mobile billboard’ 
for the State’s ideological message . . . .”805 Most recently, in Janus, the Court held that requiring 
employees to pay agency fees to labor unions violated the First Amendment “by compelling them to 
subsidize [the] private speech [of the union] on matters of substantial public concern.”806  
 What each of the above compelled speech cases has in common––and what distinguishes them 
from requirements that online platforms publish records about political ads––is that the compelled speech 
cases involve situations where individuals were required to host or support an expressive message, and 
record-keeping requirements for online platforms do not. Requiring online platforms to publish records 
about the political ads that they host does not require platforms to subsidize political advertising, endorse 
a particular advertiser’s message, or even host advertising messages at all.807 Moreover, the expressive 
content in this area is the advertisement itself, and that is the expression of political ad purchasers like 
campaigns and political interest groups, not of platforms.808 The platforms’ interest in political advertising 
is not an expressive interest, it is primarily a business interest.809 While political ad purchasers have a 
direct interest in advertising messages because it is their message, platforms are simply selling advertising 
space.810 As one Washington regulator explained, online platforms will sell space for a political ad or a 
                                               
804 Id. at 572–73. 
 
805 Maynard, 430 U.S. at 715. 
 
806 Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty. & Mun. Emps. Council, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2459–60 (2018). 
 
807 See Brief of Appellants at 38, Wash. Post v. McManus, 944 F.3d 506 (4th Cir. 2019) (No. 19-1132) (explaining that 
Maryland’s record-keeping requirement in particular only required the plaintiffs to disclose information “related to 
advertisements that publishers have already chosen to accept”). 
 
808 See Parsons, supra note 733, at 793 (“[A] platform that opts out of hosting political ads because they are now marginally more 
expensive than hosting toothpaste ads is not ‘stopped’ from ‘speaking.’ The platform’s own content is not impacted at all. The 
content relayed in an advertisement is principally the advertiser’s, not the platform’s.”); see also Brief of the Brennan Center for 
Justice, supra note 761, at 15 (“[T]he advertisements that appear on [plaintiffs’] websites . . . are plainly not plaintiffs’ own 
political speech.”). 
 
809 See Parsons, supra note 733, at 793. 
 
810 See id. 
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dishwashing soap ad, and “[i]t’s understood that they are a business that provides a service, so they’re not 
the one that has the political intent, so to speak, of trying to influence voters.”811 
 The Fourth Circuit also relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Miami Herald Publishing Co. 
v. Tornillo812 in concluding that “Maryland’s law ‘intru[des] into the function of editors’ and forces news 
publishers to speak in a way they would not otherwise.”813 Although the Fourth Circuit heavily relied on 
Tornillo in determining that Maryland’s requirements were especially pernicious in how they affected 
plaintiff’s media platforms,814 the media receives no greater First Amendment protection than ordinary 
citizens.815 Thus, examining the Fourth Circuit’s use of Tornillo in this context is valuable beyond 
situations where members of the traditional media are involved. Overall, the Fourth Circuit’s reliance on 
Tornillo is also misplaced. 
 In Tornillo, the Court considered the constitutionality of a right of reply statute requiring that the 
Miami Herald give space in their paper to a political candidate who had been attacked in an editorial 
previously published in the paper and authored by another individual.816 There, the Court held that this 
right of reply statute violated the First Amendment because it intruded into the editorial discretion of the 
paper to determine what content is published.817 Here, again, the requirement that online platforms 
maintain and publish records with information about ads that they run is distinguishable from the 
requirement that a publisher host someone else’s speech. Maryland’s disclosure obligations for online 
platforms––and other similar requirements––require platforms to publish information about a transaction 
                                               
811 Transcript: Research Thesis Interview Two, at 179. 
 
812 418 U.S. 241 (1974). 
 
813 Wash. Post v. McManus, 944 F.3d 506, 518 (quoting Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 258). 
 
814 Id. at 517–18. 
 
815 First Amendment, CORNELL L. SCH. LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/first_amendment (last accessed Feb. 
26, 2021). 
 
816 Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 243–44. 
 
817 Id. at 258. 
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that they have already chosen to make.818 Although Maryland raised this argument in McManus, the 
Fourth Circuit rejected it, explaining that “another way of saying ‘opt out’ is ‘stop speaking.’”819 
However, here, the Fourth Circuit overreads the compelled speech precedents on which it relies. Again, 
the compelled speech cases cited by the Fourth Circuit all deal with circumstances where a party was 
required to alter or burden their own expression, host someone else’s expression, or subsidize someone 
else’s expression.820 However, Maryland’s requirements do not require any platform to dedicate space to 
a particular speaker, subsidize a particular message, or host any message at all.821 The “editorial” choice 
about whether to let a particular speaker purchase advertising space is left to the platform.822  
 Finally, further solidifying the point that platforms do not view political advertising as their own 
speech, at least one major platform for political advertising, Facebook, has been hesitant to exercise 
“editorial discretion” in political advertising because they do not feel that it is their role to determine the 
content of political messages.823 For example, although Facebook engages in content moderation, the 
                                               
818 Brief of Appellants, supra note 807, at 38. 
 
819 McManus, 944 F.3d at 518. 
 
820 See Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty. & Mun. Emps. Council, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2459–60 (2018) (concluding that requiring 
public employees to “subsidize a union, even if they choose not to join and strongly object to the positions the union takes . . . 
violates the free speech rights of nonmembers by compelling them to subsidize private speech on matters of public concern”); 
Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715–17 (1970) (concluding that New Hampshire’s law requiring drivers to display the state’s 
“Live Free or Die” motto on license plates impermissibly compelled drivers to promote a message); Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, 
Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 572–73 (1995) (concluding that Massachusetts’s law compelling parade 
organizers to include a LBGT group’s message in their parade impermissibly required the organizers to alter their own message); 
Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 798–800 (1988) (concluding that North Carolina law requiring 
charitable fundraisers to “inform[] donors how the money they contribute is spent” would hamper the effectiveness of 
fundraisers’ solicitation messages); Nat’l Inst. of Family and Life Advoc. v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2371 (2018) (concluding 
that California’s law requiring plaintiff crisis pregnancy centers to tell patients “about the availability of state-sponsored 
services,” including “how they can obtain state-subsidized abortions,” which the plaintiffs opposed, required the plaintiffs to alter 
the content of their speech); Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 258 (concluding that a right of reply statute requiring newspapers to publish 
another person’s message impermissibly compelled the Miami Herald to alter their own news product). 
 
821 See Brief of Appellants, supra note 807, at 38 (explaining that under Maryland’s record-keeping requirement specifically, 
editorial judgments regarding whether to publish content about political issues and candidates are “untouched by the Act”). 
Moreover, in McManus, the Brennan Center for Justice explained that “it is entirely unclear . . . whether, and to what extent, 
media companies like plaintiffs exercise any editorial discretion with respect to online political advertisements” because “many 
online publishers contract with third-party advertisements exchanges that supply advertisements to platforms in real time, via 
algorithms, with no opportunity at all for editorial control.” Brief of the Brennan Center for Justice, supra note 761, at 15. 
 
822 See Brief of Appellants, supra note 807, at 38. 
 
823 See Cecilia Kang, Facebook’s Hands-Off Approach to Political Speech Gets Impeachment Test, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 8, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/08/technology/facebook-trump-biden-ad.html; see also Mike Isaac & Cecilia Kang, Facebook 
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company has refused to fact check politicians and political advertising run on the platform.824 In response, 
Facebook has explained that the company wants to provide a platform for civic discussion, not be an 
arbiter of truth who decides what is and is not valuable speech in the political sphere.825 Instead, Facebook 
compared itself to the FCC in that the FCC also “does not want broadcast companies to censor 
candidates’ speech,” and the company explained that “[i]t’s better to let voters––not companies––
decide.”826 
 In addition to a First Amendment challenge brought by online platforms, it is worth noting that 
laws that require online platforms to keep and publish records about the ads that they run may face a First 
Amendment challenge from ad purchasers themselves, particularly if private platforms decide to stop 
accepting political advertising in response to these laws. Although such laws do not compel political 
campaigns and ad purchasers to disclose information,827 they may assert that such laws indirectly restrict 
their ability to engage in political speech. Under to Parsons’ attentional-choice theory,828 articulated in 
Chapter One of this thesis, such a challenge should fail because disclosure regulations for political 
advertising placed online––including scenarios where online platforms decide to no longer accept such 
                                               
Says It Won’t Back Down From Allowing Lies in Political Ads, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 9, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/09/technology/facebook-political-ads-lies.html.  
 
824 See Kang, supra note 823; see also Isaac & Kang, supra note 823. 
 
825 See Isaac & Kang, supra note 823. 
 




827 However, regulators also noted that, at some points, campaigns and other ad purchasers may also be resistant to the types of 
information that online platforms, and other businesses that distribute political advertising, are required to maintain under record-
keeping laws. For example, in Washington, regulators mentioned that campaigns and ad purchasers may be resistant to the idea 
of having microtargeting information disclosed––whether it is disclosed by the ad purchaser directly or by the online platform––
because they feel that that may reveal campaign strategy. See Transcript: Research Thesis Interview Two, at 185; Transcript: 
Research Thesis Interview Five, at 202. 
 
828 Parsons asserts that an attentional-choice theory of the First Amendment would focus on “our choices about who and what 
deserves our attention,” rather than primarily on the amount of speech in the marketplace of ideas, as traditional marketplace 
theory does. Parsons, supra note 733 at 770. According to Parsons, “[u]nder current doctrine, advertising is just another form of 
‘speech’ and advertisers are just another group of ‘speakers’ worthy of full constitutional protection,” but “[i]f, instead, 
advertising agreements and expenditures were recognized as being primarily economic transactions––ones with a highly 
distorting effect on the spread of content within the marketplace of ideas––then the government could have a much larger role to 
play in regulating the terms of those transactions.” Id. at 780. 
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advertising because of those laws––“do not ‘reduce the quantity of expression’ in the marketplace simply 
because they reduce ‘the size of the audience reached’ by a particular ad-purchaser in that 
marketplace.”829  
 Using Parsons’ rationale, a law that requires online platforms to keep and publish records of 
online ads and a platform’s subsequent decision to stop hosting political advertising in response to such a 
law prevents platform users from purchasing the ability for their political messages to gain the reach that 
a paid advertisement would have, but it does not silence users altogether.830 Indeed, users that are no 
longer able to purchase political advertising through platforms that have stopped hosting it would still be 
able to share their messages using organic content and engagement, like an un-promoted tweet or 
Facebook post that gets shared across the platform.831 Political campaigns could also use other methods of 
advertising and messaging that have been around for many decades, like purchasing political advertising 
through another medium that accepts it, making television appearances, canvassing, and appearing at 
town halls and debates. Thus, according to Parsons, “[t]he First Amendment protects the ability of a 
speaker to earn a large audience through attentional competition, not the power to buy whatever-sized 
audience that speaker has the economic power to afford.”832 
 However, “[t]raditionally, the Supreme Court has sought to protect any practices or expenditures 
that enhance the spread of content and has presumed that the spread of content––any content––is itself a 
virtue.”833 For example, in Buckley, the Supreme Court struck down expenditure limits, concluding that 
“[a] restriction on the amount of money a person or group can spend on political communication during a 
campaign necessarily reduces the quantity of expression by restricting the number of issues discussed, the 
depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience reached . . . because virtually every means of 
                                               
829 Id. at 791. 
 
830 Id. at 791–92. 
 
831 See id. at 791. 
 
832 Id. at 792. 
 
833 Id. at 773. 
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communicating ideas in today’s mass society requires the expenditure of money.”834 Here, platforms 
voluntarily leaving the political advertising marketplace in response to record-keeping laws is less 
restrictive than the expenditure limits struck down in Buckley because such laws do not directly place a 
limit on the amount of speech one can engage in, particularly if other mediums of speech are still 
available. At the same time, in McManus, the Fourth Circuit employed a similar marketplace metaphor as 
that raised in Buckley, explaining that, where platforms choose to exit the political advertising 
marketplace in response to laws like Maryland’s, the quantity of political speech will be reduced, and that 
will likely harm candidates in state and local elections.835 As the Fourth Circuit explains, “these chilling 
effects are not theoretical,” and platforms like Google have already prohibited political advertising on 
Maryland candidates and ballot measures.836 Courts viewing laws that require platforms to keep and 
publish records from the perspective of political advertisers would likely raise similar concerns rooted in 
the marketplace of ideas theory. This possibility also underscores the importance of working with online 
platforms to develop a system of transparency in which they will be more likely to participate. 
 Pulling together this subsection with the subsection on the broadcast versus Internet distinction 
above, these two legal issues are areas where policymakers can push back on the McManus decision when 
defending disclosure requirements for online platforms in future cases. In McManus, the Fourth Circuit 
used their reasoning, first, that the Internet was distinct from the broadcast industry and, second, that 
Maryland’s requirements for online platforms violated platforms’ expressive rights and intruded on their 
editorial discretion by compelling them to publish records as two points in reaching their conclusion that 
Maryland’s requirements were constitutionally problematic, even though the Fourth Circuit also refused 
to decide the applicable level of scrutiny.837 By pushing back on these key points form McManus, 
governments would be arguing that nonelectoral precedents like Janus, Tornillo, and Reno are not 
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applicable in this context and, thus, the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning that Maryland’s record-keeping and 
publication requirements for online platforms are more constitutionally problematic than other campaign 
finance disclosure laws or record-keeping requirements for broadcasters is incorrect. 
 (D) Building a Strong Record with a Focus on Traditional Campaign 
Finance Disclosure Interests 
 
 Fourth, policymakers should focus on the traditional campaign finance interests in informing the 
electorate, preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption, and enforcing other campaign finance 
laws rather than focusing primarily on foreign election interference activity or misinformation. In 
McManus, the Fourth Circuit focused almost entirely on Maryland’s asserted interest in preventing 
foreign interference in the state’s elections.838 Although Maryland did assert interests in informing the 
electorate, preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption, and enforcing existing campaign 
finance laws, the predominant focus in the case filings also centered around preventing foreign election 
interference activity.839 The Fourth Circuit briefly mentioned these more traditional campaign finance 
disclosure interests, but it otherwise ignored them in its analysis.840 As a result, the Fourth Circuit 
concluded that Maryland’s provisions were not sufficiently tailored to meet its interest in preventing 
foreign interference because they did not address unpaid content, they did not address paid content in the 
form of divisive issue ads, and the state did not present evidence suggesting that plaintiffs’ platforms had 
been subject to interference efforts.841  
 Interviews with state regulators in Washington and Maryland revealed that they see creating rules 
for online political advertising as serving something beyond eliminating foreign interference activity or 
misinformation, even if, in Maryland, those concerns were the impetus of legislative efforts.842 Instead, 
                                               
838 Id. at 520–24. 
 
839 See, e.g., Brief of Appellants, supra note 807, at 40; Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees, supra note 798, at 41–52. For a full 
discussion of the arguments asserted in the McManus case filings, see Chapter Three Parts B & C. 
 
840 McManus, 944 F.3d at 520–24. 
 
841 Id. at 521–23. 
 
842 Transcript: Research Thesis Interview Two, at 186; see also supra note 722. 
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these regulators viewed their efforts as a means of updating campaign finance disclosure schemes for the 
modern age.843 According to one Washington regulator, in doing so they are also addressing concerns 
about misinformation by providing the public with accurate disclosure information to help them evaluate 
sources and messages for themselves.844  
 The focus on foreign interference in U.S. elections not only helped tank Maryland’s requirements 
for online platforms, but empirical evidence about how online political advertising is used by campaigns 
thus far reveals that the public’s concern about targeted misinformation may be unfounded in the context 
of paid political ads.845 For example, despite concerns that campaigns will use microtargeting capabilities 
to secretly spread attack ads, misinformation, or divisive issue ads, empirical research of political ads on 
Facebook demonstrates that online ads are often less negative than television ads, and campaigns often 
use microtargeting to tailor partisan mobilization messages, not persuasive issue ads or misinformation, to 
their supporters.846 Instead, foreign interference activity and misinformation most often spreads as unpaid 
content, which is nearly impossible to regulate given the First Amendment’s longstanding protection of 
political speech and more recent protection of even outright lies.847  
                                               
843 See Transcript: Research Thesis Interview Two, at 178–79, 186; see also supra note 722. 
 
844 Transcript: Research Thesis Interview Two, at 186. 
 
845 See Kreiss & Barrett, supra note 711, at  512 (“[I]t is worth considering in this context whether political ads on platforms are 
full of lies . . . often lost in debates over micro-targeting is the fact that our best available evidence suggests that digital political 
advertising is often more about mobilization and therefore democratic participation than persuasion, which is comparatively more 
difficult.”). According to Wood, “we are still learning about the ways in which narrowly-targeted ads may differ from broad-
based appeals.” Wood, Facilitating Accountability, supra note 710, at 256. Specifically, while some researchers have found that 
Facebook ads are more partisan but less negative, Wood has also found that “among political ads run by outside groups, 
narrowly-targeted ads on Facebook are more negative than ads targeted more broadly, and that online ads from dark money 
groups are also more negative.” Id. at 526–27. 
 
846 Erika Franklin Fowler et al., Political Advertising Online and Offline, 115 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 130, 131 (2021); see also 
Michael M. Franz et al., The Issue Focus of Online and Television Advertising in the 2016 Presidential Campaign, 48 AM. POLS. 
RSCH. 175, 191–92 (2020) (finding that “the same factors that drive the decision to discuss an issue online are, by and large, the 
same factors that drive the decision to discuss an issue on television,” and “[o]ur findings, then, do not support the notion that 
people who watch a lot of television are seeing an entirely different presidential campaign, emphasizing an entirely different 
issue agenda, from people who are always online”). 
 
847 Kreiss & Barrett, supra note 711, at 516; see also William P. Marshall, Internet Service Provider Liability for Disseminating 
False Information about Voting Requirements and Procedures 16 OHIO ST. TECH. L.J. 669, 673–74 (explaining that while false 
political speech “faces severe obstacles––most notably the First Amendment,” the Supreme Court’s decision in Minnesota Voters 
Alliance v. Mansky, 138 S. Ct. 1876 (2018) “suggested that laws prohibiting ‘messages intended to mislead voters about voting 
requirements and procedures’ would be upheld”). 
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 As a matter of constitutional analysis, a strict focus on misinformation or foreign interference 
activities sets disclosure requirements for online platforms up for a losing battle. These requirements 
would have to pass either exacting scrutiny, and show a substantial relation to the asserted interest,848 or 
strict scrutiny, and show that the requirements are narrowly tailored to meet the asserted interest.849 When 
the asserted interest is preventing foreign election interference and misinformation, requirements for 
online platforms simply cannot meet that constitutional standard because those requirements will miss the 
bulk of the concerning material while also mostly sweeping in material that does not fall in either 
category of concern. Ultimately, because foreign interference activity and misinformation often take the 
form of unpaid content, legislation or regulation that seeks to bring greater transparency to online political 
advertising is a limited intervention with regard to those specific concerns. Instead, governments should 
focus on an interest in updating campaign finance disclosure schemes to better serve the traditional 
campaign finance interests articulated in Buckley. 
  In addition to focusing on traditional campaign finance interests instead of focusing on election 
interference and misinformation, policymakers should build a strong record highlighting how record-
keeping and publication requirements for online platforms serve those interests. As one attorney 
interviewed for this thesis explained, in McConnell, the government put forth a lengthy record describing 
why the then-new category of electioneering communications needed to be subject to further 
disclosure.850 Governments must do the same for online political advertising, and that record must also 
show why disclosure obligations should be placed on platforms and how the scope of those obligations 
should be drawn.851 Policymakers should enlist help from social scientists to continue to explore how 
                                               
848 Wash. Post v. McManus, 944 F.3d 506, 520 (4th Cir. 2019) (explaining that exacting scrutiny requires a “’substantial relation’ 
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850 Transcript: Research Thesis Interview One, at 176. 
 
851 Ekstrand and Fox previously made a similar point regarding governments’ interest in preventing foreign election interference, 
explaining that governments cannot speculate as to the electoral harm encountered on specific platforms and must instead 
produce “concrete evidence.” see Ekstrand & Fox, supra note 717, at 108. However, this same general idea of building a record 
should be used beyond an interest in preventing foreign interference to also support traditional campaign finance interests.   
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online political advertising is used by campaigns, how it spreads through online environments, and how it 
might differ from political advertising on traditional mediums, like television. For example, one concern 
with microtargeting capabilities is that many members of the public––including journalists, interest 
groups, and opposing candidates, all of which take on a role of evaluating and responding to political 
advertising––will not see the ad or be able to easily respond to the same audience.852 Policymakers should 
document the difficulties encountered on this point as well as how those difficulties work against 
fostering an informed electorate. 
 Furthermore, while the policy benefits of placing record-keeping requirements on online 
platforms are outlined above,853 policymakers should explore those points in greater depth and back them 
up with empirical evidence. Here, policymakers should build a record with empirical evidence about how 
people consume and evaluate political ads in online environments to examine further whether disclosure 
information should be placed directly on the platform or whether it is realistic to think that people may 
visit a separate state-owned website to get that information. Additionally, policymakers should build a 
record of how, as one Washington regulator indicated,854 record-keeping requirements for online 
platforms can serve as a valuable tool in ensuring that political ad purchasers are meeting their campaign 
finance reporting obligations. Building this type of record will help better-inform policy decisions in 
crafting these measures, but it is also strategically necessary in defending record-keeping requirements 
placed on online platforms from First Amendment challenges, if the record supports that approach.  
 At the same time, policymakers should also be aware that if the government interests articulated 
in Buckley––which was itself primarily concerned with tracking political spending855––can be 
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accomplished through means other than placing obligations on online platforms––such as placing 
disclosure obligations on ad purchasers and political actors as has traditionally been done––courts would 
likely be wary of pulling third-party platforms into the disclosure scheme for minimal, additional benefits. 
Similarly, in McManus, the plaintiffs argued that many of Maryland’s goals in establishing requirements 
for online platforms were already served by existing disclosure requirements placed on ad purchasers.856 
In response, the Fourth Circuit noted that “all the duplication in the world would not by itself condemn 
[the law], nor would the fact that the [law] is wholly unique serve alone to sustain it,” but “the duplication 
discussion does serve to illustrate that much of what Maryland wishes to accomplish through the [law] 
can be done through better fitting means . . . Maryland can apply the [law’s] substantive provisions to ad 
purchasers directly, rather than neutral third-party platforms . . . .”857 Therefore, to justify placing record-
keeping and publication obligations on online platforms and pass constitutional scrutiny, policymakers 
would likely need to build a record showing that such an approach is necessary to achieve the interests 
articulated in Buckley, rather than simply marginally better at achieving transparency. 
 (E) Work with Platforms and Other States to Continue Exploring Alternatives 
 
 Finally, legislators and regulators should work with large online platforms and other states to 
continue exploring alternative options in this area. In recent years, large platforms like Google and 
Facebook have withdrawn from the online political advertising marketplace or placed restrictions on 
political advertising in states that have established record-keeping requirements for online platforms.858 In 
McManus, the Fourth Circuit and the plaintiffs expressed concern that this trend would lead to less 
political speech in the online marketplace of ideas and that platforms’ decisions to pull out of the political 
advertising marketplace in certain states would hurt smaller campaigns with fewer resources.859 This 
                                               
856 Wash. Post v. McManus, 944 F.3d 506, 522–23 (4th Cir. 2019). 
 
857 Id.  
 
858 See Political Content, supra note 797; Ads about Social Issues, Elections or Politics, FACEBOOK, 
https://www.facebook.com/policies/ads/restricted_content/political# (last visited Feb. 21 2021). 
 




concern is valid, particularly in regards to electoral fairness among candidates and campaigns. Political 
advertising online is cheaper than advertising on television and provides the ability to more accurately 
target a campaign’s intended audience.860 Accordingly, recent research has shown that “a much broader 
set of candidates advertises on Facebook than television, particularly in down-ballot races.”861 Online 
political advertising thus provides an essential tool for campaigns, especially for down-ballot candidates, 
and eliminating that tool entirely would more acutely hurt those candidates. 862 
 The regulators interviewed for this thesis project understand the importance of ensuring that 
candidates have access to low-cost advertising tools, and they want to work with large platforms like 
Facebook and Google when developing regulations to reduce the likelihood that platforms would simply 
leave the political advertising market in their state.863 This thesis project sought to also include interviews 
with employees who work in or have worked in policy and product development positions related to 
political advertising at Facebook and Google, but that portion of the project did not come to fruition. 
However, policymakers should still try to have these conversations with industry players like Facebook 
and Google, especially since Mark Zuckerberg has expressed support for the Honest Ads Act.864 In those 
conversations, policymakers should focus on three main topics. First, policymakers should try to get a 
sense of what percentage of these platforms’ revenue comes from political advertising in their state to 
help inform whether platforms may be willing to leave that state’s political advertising market. Second, 
policymakers should ask these platforms about the process of and costs related to establishing their self-
                                               
860 See Fowler et al., supra note 846, at 131 (“The ability of ad spots on Facebook to be geographically targeted to avoid wasting 
impressions on viewers outside of an electoral district matters especially for down-ballot candidates; at the state house level, 
more than 10 times as many candidates advertise on Facebook than advertise on TV.”). 
 
861 Id. at 130. 
 
862 See id. at 130–31 (explaining that a “broader set of candidates advertises on Facebook than television, particularly down-ballot 
races”). Similarly, transparency measures implemented by platforms “help safeguard elections, but they simultaneously raise the 
cost of running digital political advertising, which as noted above is much more accessible to non-incumbents and non-elites than 
advertising during the broadcast, capital intensive era.” Kreiss & Barrett, supra note 711, at 511. As a result, “the unintended 
consequences of these otherwise democratically desirable changes might have the effect of privileging incumbents and large 
institutional actors such as professional consultancies over challengers and new entrants to the field.” Id. 
 
863 See Transcript: Research Thesis Interview Two, at 182; see also Transcript: Research Thesis Interview Five, at 198. 
 




imposed transparency measures. For example, Facebook and Google, along with other platforms, have 
already established their own ad transparency libraries.865 Although these libraries may not meet the 
specific requirements outlined in government record-keeping requirements––indeed, they do not meet the 
requirements of Washington State866––asking platforms about the technological challenges involved in 
creating those libraries as well as the costs and resources involved in maintaining them would give 
policymakers a better idea of what is technologically feasible and how substantial a burden placing 
record-keeping requirements on online platforms would be. Third, for similar reasons, policymakers 
should ask platforms that still accept political advertising in states with record-keeping requirements what 
measures they had to adopt to meet those requirements, the costs and resources involved in adopting those 
measures, and the reason why they choose to accept advertising in some states with record-keeping 
requirements, but not others. 
 In addition to speaking with platforms about what regulations are feasible, legislators and 
regulators should also speak with policymakers from other states to create a standard with some 
uniformity for online political advertising disclosure that can be used across the country. For instance, one 
attorney interviewed explained that the best approach may be for the federal government to articulate a 
standard that state governments can then adopt.867 Of course, the challenge is that while the Honest Ads 
Act seeks to establish disclosure obligations for online platforms distributing political ads related to 
federal candidates and national issues,868 states may establish their own requirements for online platforms 
                                               
865 Comparison of Platforms’ Political Advertising, CTR. INFO. TECH. & PUB. LIFE, https://citapdigitalpolitics.com/wp-
content/uploads/2020/05/Platform-comparison-tables.001.jpg (last accessed Feb. 26, 2021). 
 
866 See Transcript: Research Thesis Interview Five, at 196. 
 
867 Transcript: Research Thesis Interview Six, at 208. 
 
868 The section of the Honest Ads Act that proposes disclosure obligations for online platforms would amend the Federal Election 
Campaign Act (FECA) by adding a new section to FECA. H.R. 1 117th Cong. § 4208 (2021). This section of the Honest Ads Act 
would require online platforms to keep records of “qualified political advertisements,” which are defined as “any 
advertisement[s] (including search engine marketing, display advertising, video advertisements, native advertisements, and 
sponsorships) that (i) [are] made by or on behalf of a candidate; or (ii) communicate[] a message relating to any political matter 
of national importance including (I) a candidate; (II) any election to Federal office; or (III) a national legislative issue of public 
importance.” Id. § 4208(a)(k)(4). FECA defines a “candidate” as “an individual who seeks nomination for election, or election, to 
Federal office,” and “[t]he term ‘[f]ederal office’ means the office of the President or Vice President, or of Senator or 
Representative in, or Delegate or Resident Commissioner to, the Congress.” 52 U.S.C. § 30101(2)-(3). 
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distributing political ads related to state candidates and state issues, and states likely have different ideas 
on how best to approach this policy issue, including whether to establish requirements at all.869 However, 
if online platforms like Facebook are required to navigate multiple, different laws for federal elections 
and various state elections, that inconsistency creates an additional compliance burden and incentivizes 
platforms to leave the political advertising market in states that have record-keeping requirements.870 As 
the regulator from Maryland suggested, when multiple states adopt the same approach, online platforms 
may be more likely to continue accepting political advertising in those states because pulling out would 
disrupt their profits more than if only one state had these requirements.871  
 The result of these conversations with online platforms and other policymakers may be that 
requiring online platforms to keep and publish records about the political ads that they run is not the right 
approach. Establishing these record-keeping requirements, in addition to expanding disclosure and 
reporting requirements to increase clarity, would add an additional layer of transparency for online 
political advertising, and online platforms are likely best-suited to host these records for the reasons 
already discussed.872 These requirements for online platforms are also constitutionally defensible, and this 
Chapter has identified and discussed key points from the McManus case that policymakers can push back 
on to defend these requirements as well as outlined the types of information policymakers should compile 
                                               
869 Issues of preemption and whether federal agencies, like the FCC, have the authority to regulate the Internet and supersede 
state laws are beyond the scope of this thesis. However, the issue of who should regulate the Internet is one that has become 
increasingly important in recent years as policymakers consider Internet regulations related to net neutrality and data privacy. See 
David Shepardson, Net neutrality rules could return at state level under mixed U.S. court decision, REUTERS (Oct. 1, 2019), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-internet/net-neutrality-rules-could-return-at-state-level-under-mixed-u-s-court-decision-
idUSKBN1WG462; see also Cameron F. Kerry & John B. Morris, Jr., Preemption: A balanced national approach to protecting 
all American’s privacy, BROOKINGS, (June 29, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2020/06/29/preemption-a-
balanced-national-approach-to-protecting-all-americans-privacy/. 
 
870 See Parsons, supra note 733, at 798 (explaining that the Fourth Circuit in McManus failed to consider whether platforms 
withdrawing from the political advertising marketplace was a sign of under regulation). 
 
871 See supra note 722; see also Parsons, supra note 733, at 798 (“[A] decision by platforms to cease running political ads in a 
handful of states and localities in response to such legislation could well reflect the consequences of under-regulation. If 
Congress enacted the Honest Ads Act and more states and localities imposed similar regulations, would the platforms continue to 
decline hosting political ads altogether or would the shifting profit incentives make regulatory compliance worthwhile again?”).  
 
872 See supra Chapter Five Part B. 
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into a record in support of these requirements.873 However, regulators are also exploring other options.874 
In Washington, for example, regulators are exploring the possibility of what they call a distribution-based 
approach, where a digital tag would follow political ads through online environments and pull out key 
disclosure information that would then be reported to the state.875 Under this approach, if it proves 
technically feasible, regulators could more-easily obtain all of the distribution-based disclosure 
information that makes online ads unique without requiring online platforms to publish this information 
themselves, which would also avoid First Amendment challenges from online platforms.876 What this 
ultimately reveals then is that despite states’ efforts in this area, years-long debate about the Honest Ads 
Act, and this thesis’s attempt to explore online political advertising disclosure and, in particular, record-
keeping requirements for online platforms, the country is still fairly early in the process of determining 
the specifics of how best to bring more transparency to online political advertising and update campaign 
finance disclosure schemes for modern times. 
                                               
873 See supra Chapter Five Parts C & D. 
 
874 Transcript: Research Thesis Interview Two, at 182; Transcript: Research Thesis Interview Three, at 190; Transcript: Research 
Thesis Interview Five, at 199. 
 
875 Transcript: Research Thesis Interview Two, at 182; Transcript: Research Thesis Interview Three, at 190; Transcript: Research 
Thesis Interview Five, at 199. 
 
876 Transcript: Research Thesis Interview Two, at 182; Transcript: Research Thesis Interview Five, at 199. Similarly, in their 
March 2021 report, J. Scott Babwah Brennan and Matt Perault at the Duke University Center on Science & Technology Policy 
recently advocated for automating FEC reporting where feasible, asserting that “there is an opportunity for the FEC to work with 
platforms and other digital ad providers to devise a means of automating reporting requirements––especially if platforms also 
have additional reporting requirements to meet . . . we recommend that the FEC hold a series of workshops to explore how 
platforms, committees, and the FEC can collaborate to automate disclosures.” Babwah Brennan & Perault, supra note 701, at 11.  
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APPENDIX 
 
(A) Interview Protocols 
 
(1) Interview Protocol for Attorneys Involved in the McManus Litigation 
[Go over consent form BEFORE questions begin] 
 








(3) One point that the Fourth Circuit made is it distinguished the record-keeping requirements that 
Maryland had established for online platforms from similar requirements that exist for broadcasters under 
the rationale that regulations for broadcasters have always received less scrutiny because there’s a history 
of broadcast regulation and broadcast waves are a scarce resource.  
 
(3a) Does the distinction between broadcasters and other communication mediums, like the 
Internet, still makes sense?  
 
(3b) Why?   
 
(4) Some people might say that the impact of McManus is limited in that it’s a decision that comes from 
one federal appellate court and deals with an as applied challenge involving a specific group of plaintiffs.  
 
(4a) What do you think the effect of McManus will be on legislative attempts to address online 








(5b) The Fourth Circuit and many of the briefs filed in the McManus case focus on a concern 
about foreign interference in U.S. elections. In contrast, there seems to be a lesser focus on a 
broader interest in general transparency. A big part First Amendment analysis is the purpose or 
interest articulated by the government. So, in light of the McManus decision, how do you think 
that legislators seeking to place record-keeping requirements on online platforms should go about 




(5d) And then, on the tailoring prong of constitutional analysis, what do you think legislators or 







(6) If you were tasked with amending Maryland’s law in light of the Fourth Circuit’s decision in 
McManus, what would you change about it, if anything?  
 
(6a) Why would you make those specific changes? 
 
(7) The Honest Ads Act imposes record-keeping requirements on online platforms that are similar to 
those at issue in McManus. In light of the Fourth Circuit’s decision in McManus, what do you think about 
the provisions of the Honest Ads Act?  
 
(7a) Based on what you know about the Honest Ads Act, would you change anything about the 




(8) I wanted to touch on an approach that’s different than the one Maryland took. In New York, the state 
legislature has established similar record-keeping requirements for political ads that appear online. 
However, unlike Maryland, New York places the responsibility for maintaining those records with the 
state board of elections rather than with online platforms. In light of the Fourth Circuit’s decision in 




(9) Like Maryland, some states place these record-keeping responsibilities on online platforms that host 
political ads, while a different approach, like in New York, places that responsibility with a state agency. 
If legislators create record-keeping responsibilities related to political ads that appear online, where 
should that responsibility be placed? 
 
(9a) Can you elaborate as to why? 
 
(9b) [If they think that responsibility should be placed on online platforms]: What benefit is 
gained by placing these requirements on online platforms?  
 
(9c) Do you have any sense as to what compliance costs that might create for online platforms? 
 
(9d) Are the compliance costs for online platforms something that legislators or regulators should 




(9f) Do you think that we need these additional record-keeping requirements on top of the 
expenditure reporting requirements that are in place federally and in most states? 
 
(9g) Why?  
 
(9h) [If they think there should be record-keeping requirements for platforms]: How do you think 
we should draw the scope of which platforms are included in these requirements?  
 
(9i) Should be just be concerned with platforms like Facebook or Google, or should the 






(10) I wanted to ask about how online platform’s responses to regulation might influence how legislation 
is crafted. For example, Google will not accept political ads related to state and local elections in 
Maryland or Washington, maybe because Maryland and Washington put these extra regulatory, record-
keeping requirements on online platforms. The Fourth Circuit in McManus expressed concern that this 
might put state and local candidates at a disadvantage. Is that something that we should be concerned with 
as legislators craft legislation?  
 
(10a) Why?  
 
(10b) How might that concern be addressed while crafting legislation?  
    
(11) While reading the briefs filed in the McManus case, I noticed that they often referred to the values 
underpinning the First Amendment. One the one hand, numerous briefs referred to the marketplace of 
ideas theory and this idea that we don’t want to do anything that might chill political speech. On the other 
hand, a couple of briefs raised the idea that citizens might need more information about these ads to 
engage in effective self-governance. What role might these more theoretical underpinnings play in 
crafting legislation addressing online political advertising disclosure?  
 
(11a) If these values are potentially at odds with each other in this context, which direction should 
legislators take?  
 
(11b) What should their guiding principle be?   
 
(12) Is there anything else that I haven’t touched on that you want to add about online political advertising 

























(2) Interview Protocol for State Regulators 
[Go over consent form BEFORE questions begin] 
 
(1) Can you briefly describe the disclosure regulations for online political advertising in your state?  
 
(2) Different states have taken different approaches to regulating online political advertising disclosure. 
The biggest difference seems to be that some states place responsibility for maintaining records on online 
platforms. So, for instance, Facebook or Google is responsible for keeping records about the ads that they 
distribute and making those records publicly accessible. However, a different approach is to place the 
responsibility for maintaining those records with a state agency that then keeps a publicly accessible 
database run by the government.  
 
(2a) Your state [note the state’s approach]. Why did your state choose that approach?  
 
(2b) What benefit is gained by placing the responsibility for maintaining these records on online 
platforms? 
 
(2c) Do you think that we need these additional record-keeping requirements on top of the 
expenditure reporting requirements that are already in place federally and in most states? 
 
(2d) Why?  
 
(2e) Are people generally compliant with those record-keeping requirements?   
 
(2f) What are the current penalties for platforms that fail to follow record-keeping 
requirements? 
 




(2i) Do you have any sense as to what compliance costs placing record-keeping requirements on 
online platforms might create for those platforms? 
 
(2j) Are the compliance costs for online platforms something that legislators or regulators should 




(3) I wanted to ask about how online platform’s responses to regulation might influence how legislation is 
crafted. For example, Google will not accept political ads related to state and local elections in Maryland 
or Washington, maybe because Maryland and Washington put these extra regulatory, record-keeping 
requirements on online platforms. The Fourth Circuit in McManus expressed concern that this might put 
state and local candidates at a disadvantage. Is that something that we should be concerned with in 
crafting legislation or other regulatory measures?  
 
(3a) Why?  
 




(4) [If they think there should be record-keeping requirements for platforms]: How do you think we 
should draw the scope of which platforms are included in these requirements?  
 
(4a) Should be just be concerned with platforms like Facebook or Google, or should the 
requirements extend to smaller platforms, like the plaintiffs involved in the recent Fourth Circuit 
case, Washington Post v. McManus, which involved media organizations like the Washington 




(5) (Maryland & Washington Only) As we’ve talked about, your state places responsibility for 
maintaining records about political ads that appear online on online platforms. But, an alternative 
approach that exists is to place that record-keeping responsibility on a state agency. How feasible would it 
be for your state to transition to that alternative approach?  
 
(5a) Do you think that your state would have the resources to transition to that alternative 
approach?  
 
(6) What goals are your state’s regulations seeking to achieve with your current record-keeping and 
disclosure requirements? 
 




(7) What do you think works well about your state’s current record-keeping process for political ads that 
appear online?  
 
(8) If you had the opportunity to change your state’s current record-keeping process, what would you 
change, if anything?  
 
(9) This is an area that has evolved quickly in recent years. As regulators, what information do you feel 
like you need to make informed regulatory decisions?  
 
(9a) If you could talk to researchers and social scientists, what research would you want them to 
be doing in the area of online political ads?  
 
(10) Is there anything else that I haven’t touched on that you want to add about online political advertising 









(3) Interview Protocol for Online Platforms 
[Go over consent form BEFORE questions begin] 
 
Topic One: Political Advertising Revenue (send in advance) 
 
(1) How much revenue do you make from political advertising?  
 
(1a) Can you be as explicit as possible in describing what types of political ads that includes, 
based on how you define political advertising?  
 
(1b) What percentage of your total revenue is from that political advertising? 
 
(1c) Can you break down political advertising revenue by state? 
 
(1d) For political advertising on state candidates, what percentage of advertising on your platform 
is for state-wide races versus other down-ballot races?   
 
Topic Two: Political Advertising Products & Transparency Measures 
 
In recent years, platforms have added additional features to your political advertising framework, I 
wanted to ask about a couple of those features. 
 
(1) Verification / Authorization Processes: Can you walk me through how you came to adopt your 
verification process for political advertiser? 
 
(1a) Why did you decide to add this process?  
 
(1b) Was controversy surrounding the 2016 election a factor?  
 
(1c) Was the potential for future government regulation through the Honest Ads Act or 
other state laws a factor?  
 
(1d) Why? Please elaborate on that point. 
 
(1e) Could you describe the resources involved in keeping that process running? 
 
(1f) What is the human labor involved in maintaining that process?  
 
(1g) What monetary costs are involved in maintaining that process? 
 
(1h) What technical labor or technical needs are involved in maintaining that process? 
 
(1i) For example, what server capacity does it take to maintain the process? 
 
(1j) From the perspective of a political advertiser trying to get verified or authorized to run 
political ads, do you have any sense of what challenges that process presents for political 
advertisers?   
 




(1l) Do you think this verification process creates disadvantage for advertisers that have 
fewer resources compared to those who can work with a large consultancy to move 




(2) Building Ad Transparency Libraries: Can you walk me through how you came to adopt your ad 
transparency library for political advertisements? 
 
(2a) Why did you decide to create the ad transparency library?  
 
(2b) Was controversy surrounding the 2016 election a factor?  
 
(2c) Was the potential for future government regulation through the Honest Ads Act or 
other state laws a factor?  
 
(2d) Why? Please elaborate on that point. 
 
(2e) Could you walk me through the process of actually building the ad transparency library?  
 
(2f) Can you describe the resources it took to build the ad library?  
 
(2j) What monetary costs were associated with building the library? 
 
(2h) What challenges did you encounter in building the library?  
 
(2i) Can you generally describe the time and resources related to software development 
that it took to build the ad library?  
 
(3) Maintaining Ad Transparency Libraries: Now that the ad library has been around for a couple of 
years, could you describe the resources involved in maintaining the ad library?  
 
(3a) What is the human labor involved in maintaining the library?  
 
(3b) What monetary costs are involved in maintaining the library? 
 
(3c) What technical labor or technical needs are involved in maintaining that process? 
 
(3d) For example, what server capacity does it take to maintain the library? 
 
(4) Using & Measuring Success of Ad Transparency Libraries: When you decided to build the ad 
transparency library, how did you imagine it being used?  
 
(4a) What data do you collect on the use of the ad transparency library?  
 
(4b) Who are the key stakeholders that use the ad transparency library? 
 
(4c) How do different stakeholders use the ad transparency library? [Ask this about each 




(4d) [If not already mentioned] How do other entities like nonprofits or universities use the ad 
transparency library? 
 
(4e) Has your initial view of how the library might be used changed at all in response to feedback 
from those stakeholders?  
 
(4f) How so? 
 
(4g) What process do you have for getting feedback from key stakeholders? 
 
(5) Measuring Success of Ad Transparency Libraries: What goals are you trying to achieve with the ad 
transparency library?  
 
(5a) What standards do you use to determine whether you’ve met those goals?  
 
(6) Have your policies and procedures around transparency been influenced by what other platforms have 
done? 
 
(6a) How so? 
 
Topic Three: Navigating Laws 
 
In recent years, a handful of states have enacted or expanded laws requiring online platforms to maintain 
records on political advertising that they run. This is also similar to the federally proposed Honest Ads 
Act. I’d like to touch on a few of those state laws.  
 
(1) Maryland: Maryland requires certain online platforms to maintain records about political ads and 
provide those records to the public or to state regulators. The information required here includes ad 
sponsors’ identities and contact information, the costs of political ads run on the platform, copies of those 
ads, and information about the candidate or ballot issue discussed in the ad, the date and time the ad first 
and last aired, copies of the ad, the number of views it received, and the audience targeted. Maryland 
defines political ads subject to this requirement as campaign materials about candidates and ballot 
questions that are distributed on an online platform for a fee to at least 500 people. 
 
[If platforms still accept political ads on Maryland candidates/ballot measures (Facebook)]: 
 
(1a) Did these requirements lead to product or policy changes? 
 
(1b) What were those changes? 
 
(1c) Did the platform have to implement new transparency measures to comply with these 
requirements?  
 
(1d) What were those new measures? 
 
(1e) Can you describe the resources it took to adopt those changes/measures? 
 
(1f) What are the monetary costs associated with compliance? 
 




[If platforms do not still accept political ads on Maryland candidates/ballot measures (Google)]: 
 
(1h) Can you walk me through why you decided to stop accepting political ads on Maryland 
candidates and ballot measures? 
 





(1k) What new measures or policy changes would you have to implement to comply with 
Maryland’s requirements?  
 
(1l) Do you have any sense of what that would cost? 
 
(1m) Do you have any sense of what technical resources it would take? 
 
  (1n) What do you think Maryland was solving for in establishing these requirements? 
 




(2) California: California requires certain online platforms to include sponsorship disclaimers on certain 
political ads and to keep records about certain political ads run on the platform. These records include 
copies of the ad, the number of impressions the ad received, the date and time the ad was first and last 
displayed, the cost of the ad, a record of the candidate or ballot measure that is the subject of the ad, and 
the name and ID number of the purchasing committee. Within this requirement, California includes both 
political ads on social media and political ads placed elsewhere online that are unable follow separate 
rules requiring them to hyperlink to a webpage containing sponsorship disclaimers.  
 
[If platforms accept political ads on Calif. candidates/ballot measures (Facebook & Google)]: 
 
(2a) Did these requirements lead to product or policy changes? 
 
(2b) What were those changes? 
 
(2c) Did the platform have to implement new transparency measures to comply with these 
requirements?  
 
(2d) What were those new measures? 
 
(2e) Can you describe the resources it took to adopt those changes/measures? 
 
(2f) What are the monetary costs associated with compliance? 
 
(2g) What technical resources were associated with compliance?  
 
(2h) [for Google]: Why does Google accept political ads about candidates and ballot measures in 




(2i) What is it about the requirements in California, as opposed to those in Maryland, that 
led to this decision? 
 
  (2j) What do you think California was solving for in establishing these requirements? 
 




(3) Washington: Washington State also requires online platforms to maintain records about political ads. 
These records include the identities and addresses of ad sponsors and the cost of the advertising services 
provided. Within this requirement, Washington includes, first, electioneering ads that clearly identify a 
candidate and are distributed within a certain timeframe before an election, and, second, other types of 
political advertising that appeal to voters in any election. 
 
[If platforms do not still accept political ads on Washington candidates/ballot measures targeted 
to Washington (Facebook & Google)]: 
 
(3a) Can you walk me through why you decided to stop accepting political ads on 
Washington State candidates and ballot measures?  
 
(3b) Were the costs of complying with Washington State’s requirements for 




(3d) What new measures or policies would you have to implement to comply with 
Washington State’s requirements?  
 
(3e) Do you have any sense of what that would cost?   
 
(3f) Do you have any sense what technical resources it would take? 
 
(3g) [for Facebook]: Why does Facebook accept political ads about candidates and ballot 
measures from California and Maryland, but not Washington State?  
 
(3h): What is it about the requirements in Washington, as opposed to those in 
California or Maryland, that led to this decision?   
 
 (3i) What do you think Washington was solving for in establishing these requirements? 
 




(4) Given that all of the major online platforms have called for regulation related to the transparency of 
political advertising, from your perspective, what would a “good” regulation look like?  
 






(4c) If regulation includes maintaining records of political ads run outline, should those records 
be maintained by online platforms or the state itself?  
 
(4d) Why?  
 









































(B) Interview Transcripts 
 
(1) Transcript: Research Thesis Interview One 
 
Research Subject: Attorney who filed an amicus brief on behalf of the plaintiffs  
in Washington Post v. McManus 
Transcript Key: Research Subject (RS); Ashley Nicole Fox (ANF) 
 
 
ANF: We’ll go ahead and get started so that I don’t take up too much of your afternoon. What do you think 
that the Fourth Circuit got right in their analysis in Washington Post v. McManus? And then what do you 
think that they got wrong?  
 
RS: What they got right is the standard of scrutiny, I think. The briefs before the court were really arguing 
about whether strict scrutiny applies or exacting scrutiny. That’s not always dispositive in campaign finance 
law. Sometimes strict scrutiny applies and the government wins. Sometimes exacting scrutiny applies and 
the challenger wins. It’s not dispositive, but I think they did it right. Strict scrutiny, especially in how the 
Supreme Court has been treating compelled speech, how the Supreme Court has been treating various 
disclosures, and that kind of stuff. So, if you’re looking at the Janus decision from a couple of terms ago, 
the Reed v. Town of Gilbert decision, the National Institute of Family and Life Advocates, I always get that 
messed up, I just call it NIFLA.  
 
ANF: Yeah, I think everyone does.  
 
RS: Yeah. And so, that’s the trend. And the Supreme Court’s been pretty clear on applying strict scrutiny 
on these issues, and it’s going to be a real issue going forward for campaign finance disclaimers generally. 
As far as exacting scrutiny, the court didn’t treat it super strong because this law, Maryland’s law could 
also be described as a disclosure law, and that would be under exacting scrutiny. I still think it would fail 
exacting scrutiny, and the court applied that, but it could have been a little bit more robust. My other main 
issue is it focused mostly on the press because that was who the plaintiffs were in the case. And, of course, 
that makes good sense, that’s good judging, but the press isn’t just the institutional press. The Supreme 
Court has said this since 1938; like, the press can be anybody, anybody who’s running a pamphlet or 
anything that’s written down. Even in the campaign finance world, part of what Citizens United did was 
overturn a case called Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, which said that the institutional press 
was somehow special and allowed them to have more leeway when it comes to corporate spending on 
campaigns. Citizens United said, no, no one’s special, and one corporation’s the same as another. So, I think 
overplaying the press angle can be a little misleading on what the status of the law is right now.  
 
ANF: I think that makes sense. So, the McManus decision itself, it’s limited in that it’s an as applied 
challenge involving these specific plaintiffs who happen to be members of the traditional press. But what 
do you think the affect that McManus decision is going to have moving forward in that what effects do you 
think that the decision will have on legislative attempts to regulate online political advertising, if it will 
have one?  
 
RS: Well, I think for right now, it stopped various states from adopting mini versions of the Honest Ads 
Act. The federal government is still considering it. Portions of that idea are back in, I believe it’s Senate 
Resolution 1, which they’re working on right now. So, the idea is still out there, but states have put a hold 
on that because even passing it in Maryland was pretty contentious. There were a lot of fights. They passed 
it over the Governor’s, not really veto, but he said it was unconstitutional. So, he just sort of pocket let it 
pass. So, I think that it put a lot of pause, and real consideration needs to be made on whether these laws 




ANF: So, what lessons should legislators take from that if they’re looking at legislation?  
 
RS: I think. When you read the McManus decision, it’s imperative that the government must state exactly 
what it’s trying to prevent, what harm, exactly what it’s trying to do. Then, it must tailor that law to that 
harm. A lot of why it lost, why the state of Maryland lost, was because they didn’t tailor the law to the 
stated harm. And then, I think overall, like I said earlier, the Supreme Court and other courts, even the Ninth 
Circuit, have been very wary of lengthy disclaimers. These disclaimers are getting longer and longer and 
longer and having more and more information. So, even in the commercial speech context, the American 
Beverage case out of the Ninth Circuit said hey, you can’t make someone say all of this government script, 
that that’s insane, and that’s in commercial speech which is obviously not nearly as protective as political 
speech. And then the last part is, it’s going to be really important that if you mandate disclosure then that 
disclosure and the cost of that disclosure needs to be warehoused by the government. The government needs 
to pay for warehousing all of that information, not put that on speakers or platforms.  
 
ANF: That was actually one of my later questions, so maybe we’ll just jump to that one now. So you think 
that record-keeping responsibility should go with a state agency or with the government as opposed to the 
platforms?  
 
RS: Yes, for several reasons. One, the idea of a public file is an exception to the general rule. The public 
file exists in part because broadcasters get use of spectrum in the public trust. We the people own all the 
radio spectrum, theoretically, in the law. And the FCC grants licenses. And, therefore, broadcasters, whether 
they’re radio or television need to hold some things that people need to be able to inspect, that’s everything 
from how much educational programing has gone on to certain political spending. That’s the exception, not 
the rule. And it’s a real cost. And the more you put costs on platforms and the ways people speak, the less 
speech there will be. Whether the platform just doesn’t want to mess with it, which is the case where Google 
literally said, hey Washington state, we’re not going to even run ads that target anyone in Washington state 
now. Facebook and Google have threatened the same thing in Maryland. Anytime they’ve been told that 
they have to house this vast amount of information. And, it’s a lot. It’s a copy of the ad, it’s who donated 
to the organization, it’s the officers and board members in some cases of the organization. That’s a lot of 
personal information to warehouse, and they’re not capable of doing that in a cost-effective way. The other 
issue is quite frankly, data security. The more places that somebody’s information is, the more places it can 
be hacked and stolen and whatever, by nefarious actors. So, you have, like the Internal Revenue Services 
has a lot of protections on tax returns. They have high end cybersecurity, but also, they have protections in 
law. The president can’t just pick my tax return and just read it just for no reason, he has to have a reason 
now, in the statute you have to have a specific law enforcement reason, and they listed out what those are, 
so that the president doesn’t just pull the tax returns of his enemies, which is something literally that Richard 
Nixon did. So, having those protections, you don’t necessarily know if Facebook can put in some of that 
stuff. Maybe Facebook can. But what about a new startup organization, like Vine is now gone, but TikTok 
became huge overnight, and political speech is going on on TikTok, and so is Snapchat and all these other 
organizations. And so, how to we trust that, especially when we're worried about foreign interference and 
foreign governments getting this information, it's a real problem.  
 
ANF: So, if you were tasked with amending Maryland's law, or even tasked with amending the Honest Ads 
Act – well it hasn’t been passed yet, so you can’t amend it. But, if you were thinking about that approach, 
it sounds like you’re against putting this requirement on platforms, what would you do instead, if anything? 
 
RS: The short answer is I wouldn’t do the Honest Ads Act. I think it’s too much burden on speech for not 
a lot of gain. So, I think the best answer is don’t pass the law, full stop. To the extent that Maryland made 
it worse by putting the onus on platforms and speakers to warehouse vast amounts of information, that's 
worse. And yeah, I guess taking that out would be helpful, but it's still not getting at the constitutional harm. 
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The constitutional harm being that speech is being silenced. And that's the bigger issue, especially since  
the Internet is interactive in a way that broadcast isn't, right. If I'm listening to the radio in my car, and I 
hear an ad, and it says "Americans for a Better America," or whatever, I don't know who those people are. 
And there's no way for me to look it up, at least safely, because I'm driving my car. But on the Internet, if 
I'm scrolling on my phone, and I see a Facebook ad and I think "wow, that's full of disinformation," or, I 
really like it, "wow that's want I wanted to hear," I can not only click on the ad itself and find out more 
about them through the Facebook page or the Twitter page or whatever. I can just search, google search, 
and find out what's going on or yahoo or duck duck go or whatever. I can just search and find out more 
about these organizations. If they are a campaign or a PAC, all of these disclosures are already going to be 
there on the FEC website or whatever the version is for the state, in Maryland it's the Board of Elections, 
in Utah it would be the Lieutenant Governor's office. So, I can look that up, and because the Internet is 
interactive, you don't need to have these disclaimers, and you don't need to have this warehoused 
information in the way that you need to have - maybe, maybe you could argue, that you need to have for 
broadcast ads.  
 
ANF: Okay. So, I wanted to, I guess then, ask you about a different approach that New York has taken. So, 
they have similar, and I'm curious to know what your answer is going to be, because they have this similar 
idea that they're creating a database specifically for online ads, but it's housed by New York. How to you 
feel about that approach? Because it sounds like on the one hand, you think putting it on the state might be 
a little bit better, but, at the same time, it sounds like maybe do you don't think that's necessary at all to have 
a separate database for online ads. 
 
RS: So, I think it's best to take a step back and go back to Con law, right? And go back to basic constitutional 
law, whenever you have heightened scrutiny, you have to have an interest - whether it's compelling or 
substantial, it depends - and then narrowly tailored or some other tailoring aspect of it. It's best to take a 
step back and say, first, what are we doing here? What is the interest? and the interest in campaign finance 
law is really when you're talking about who's spending in support of candidates, you're more worried about 
corruption, which the Supreme Court has repeatedly said for decades is quid pro quo corruption, this for 
that. Straight up bribery, straight up public corruption, that's stuff that we understand. It's not about 
ingratiation, it's not about people being thankful. It's about, actual, this for that corruption. To the extent 
that you have disclosure, and you have these reports and stuff going in, sure if you're worried about a 
millionaire or a billionaire, to take one senator from Vermont's phrase, if you're worried about them swaying 
elections, fine, that's one thing. They can have compliance lawyers, and pay people like me, and take care 
of it, that's fine. But, the problem is these, whether it's New York's or it's Maryland’s, or its the Federal, 
they also include just talking about issues. And quite frankly, that's really hurting grassroots efforts to talk 
about what people care about in public policy. I think the phrase in the Honest Ads Act, at least as it was 
written, was "legislative national importance."  
 
ANF: National issue of legislative importance, what does that mean.  
 
RS: What does that mean? And quite frankly, we kind of get an idea, right. As American citizens, we kind 
of understand that they're talking about the big ones, you know. Abortion, and gun control, and those sorts 
of things. But, but it plays out in strange ways because people just really care about things sometimes. And 
we've seen this repeatedly in cases like the Tenth Circuit dealt with this, where literally a philosopher wrote 
a thirty-three-page paper asking about when does life begin, because she's a philosopher and that's what 
philosopher's do. The state wanted to regulate it because she was talking about something could be on the 
ballot as far as the issue on abortion, and she got caught up in the campaign finance world for being a 
philosopher. Like, that's insane. And, so, that's the real danger. The campaigns will always figure out how 
to comply, that's fine. It just raises costs. But, the individual speakers, the Ms. McIntyre's of the world. And 
there's a lot of them. It's not just the little old lady in Ohio. There's a lot of people who really do care about 
whether schools should open right now under COVID or not - take your pick - how vaccines should be 
 176 
 
rolled out, those sorts of things that are public policies that Americans have always hotly debated, we're 
going to lose that if we over regulate that. So, I think, the more we get away from that quid pro quo 
corruption, the more the law isn't tailored, and, therefore, the more we are losing under the First 
Amendment. That's exactly what the First Amendment was designed to protect - robust public debate on 
issues and, of course, candidates too.  
 
ANF: So, you're kind of saying, it's not really about what do we need disclosure about this specific of ad, 
it's more thinking about what are the purposes that we're trying to achieve with disclosure at all and do the 
regulations serve those purpose and what impact do the regulations have on ordinary speakers, not just 
candidates and campaigns.  
 
RS: I think that's a good way, an important way, of looking at it. It's important because, and this is why 
there was so much talk about foreign interference in elections and that sort of things. Does this law affect 
and prevent a future Russian attack on our campaigns? And I think the answer is unequivocally no. I take 
everything as true in the Mueller Report. I take everything as true in the various indictments and that sort 
of thing. And when you look at what the Russians did, they used free content. They weren't paying for ads 
very much, especially for a nationwide election. They only spent, according to the Mueller Report, only 
$100,000 for the entire country, that's not a lot of money, especially to a country like Russia. And they were 
impersonating Americans. They were impersonating people. So, they were stealing people's identity, 
people's social security numbers, and addresses, and all that to impersonate Americans. That's spy stuff. 
That's stuff that's best fought by the national security agencies or the CIA or the FBI. That's where the fight 
should be. I have a hard time believing that the NSA will miss it, the CIA will miss it, the FBI will miss it, 
our defense intelligence agencies will miss it, but somehow, someway, the Maryland Board of Elections 
will catch this. It's a little ridiculous all the way down. And that's the real problem. When the state wants to 
regulate speech, it needs to give a specific reason why, and the more novel it is, the more evidence they 
need. So, for example, when the idea of electioneering communications, which is speech that is near in time 
to an election, was invented in Congress in 2002, the challenge after that was McConnell v. FEC. In 
McConnell they had a 100,000-page record that involved expert testimony and studies and testimony from 
various political people on how they approach ad writing and creation and that kind of thing. All of that to 
prove why ads right close in time to an election matter. No state, not Maryland and the federal government 
has amassed a similar record to say why small Internet ads need to be regulated at this point.  
 
ANF: That sounds like an important point that goes to the tailoring and whether you know if you don't have 
any kind of record. I think we've covered a lot of what I wanted to cover. We're working through this in 
record speed. You're actually my first interview, so this gives me a good benchmark of how long this 
actually takes. So, I can give future people a little bit more of an accurate estimate.  
 
RS: Well hopefully I'm helpful. If you have future questions, by all means, email me later. I also talk about 
this a lot, so I've done this a lot, whether it's Honest Ads or any of this stuff just generally.  
 
ANF: Yeah, that makes sense. I appreciate that. So, I think, I guess my last question that I'll ask you is kind 
of broad about First Amendment theory. So, as I was reading the different briefs filed in the McManus case, 
there's a lot of references to underlying First Amendment theories, whether it's marketplace of ideas or 
democratic self-governance. Marketplace of ideas, this idea that we don't want to do anything that chills 
political speech. But, other briefs filed in support of Maryland raised this idea that citizens might need more 
information to be able to engage in effective self-governance. So, what role might these theoretical 
underpinnings play when legislators are crafting legislation, and, if those values are potentially at odds in 
this context, what should their guiding principle be?  
 
RS: I think they tend to be at odds, at least when you look at a very high level. The Supreme Court tends to 
argue about this a lot, right. If you're reading Justice Breyer's opinions on campaign finance, he talks a lot 
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about how the electorate needs to be informed, and that's fine as far as it goes. But, the information comes 
at a cost. And particularly in this age where, look, there's crazy people, and disclosing donors that are just 
everyday people who aren't trying to buy elections or anything else, but are just donating to organizations 
on public policy, is turning out to be relatively dangerous. To take a recent example, the Republicans in 
Colorado, in Douglas County, started publishing the names and addresses of public health workers in their 
county to harass people because they didn't believe in the COVID vaccine. That's a real problem. And 
names and addresses are a real problem. And, so, you don't want to sweep up every day Americans, 
especially the people who can't afford private security and all that. And also, what are you getting from it? 
The way to solve it is really back to the tailoring and the balance of those interests. It's okay, well you need 
an informed electorate, but not every piece of information relevant. It's important to know that a candidate 
isn't being bought off, that's fine. So then, disclosure directly to candidates makes sense. But does it make 
sense to talk about an organization that is worried about the Keystone Pipeline being put through? Do we 
need to know - to take that example actually, a lot of the fight over the Keystone Pipeline was done on 
Facebook, it's people organizing on social media, Facebook and Twitter, and trying to organize protests, 
and that sort of thing. There's no reason why anybody should be able to look up who these people are, 
especially because a lot of times they are indigent people on the reservations or whatever, who are trying 
to stop an oil pipeline from going through their front yard. So, that's a real danger, and that's something that 
we've already understood. We've already fought this out in the 50s and 60s with the NAACP case, right, 
that the civil rights cases walked through this because sometimes what seems like a fine disclosure law can 
be used against political enemies, and we've learned from that. And I think we need to keep that in mind. 
So, when we want more information as a society, it's not just oh it would be neat to have, it's is it essential 
to stop quid pro quo corruption? And if it's not essential to stop that, then we shouldn't be having that kind 
of disclosure.  
 
ANF: Okay. I think that's all of the specific points I had. Did you have anything else that you wanted to 
touch on or that you think is important to note?  
 
RS: I think that's about it. I mostly came into this wanting to emphasize that what really matters isn't how 
this came out. What matters is the test, and how to apply that test. And if states want to regulate the Internet 
in this way - first of all I wonder if it's within the states' purview to do so since the Internet by definition is 
something that goes across state boarders and national borders and everything else, - but even if they want 
to, they need to make sure that they're doing it for a very specific reason and only get information to fight 
that particular harm. It's not just "oh we would like more disclosure," because the more disclosure you have, 
the more it just makes it harder to speak, the more people don't speak, and the less information we get as 
far as ideas or challengers to incumbents or whatever, and that's not good for democracy.  
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ANF: So, we'll go ahead and get started, I guess, so I don't take up too much of your time. So, can we start 
by you briefly describing the disclosure requirements in your state? What are the different requirements 
that apply to online ads specifically? 
 
RS: Sure. I'll start describing things, and then if you want to move me in a different direction, feel free. 
Specifically, for online advertising, we don't necessarily have a separate category or distinction in the law 
between what's advertising online and what's advertising on other traditional media. For all political 
advertising, it's reportable by whatever campaign is engaging in it. If it's done as an independent 
expenditure, it has to be reported as well. And then there's some distinctions on the threshold for when a 
political ad needs to be reported. There's some timing distinctions that, I'm not sure if you're focused on, 
but we do have special categories for electioneering communication and then outright, direct advocacy. So, 
there's that reporting on the side of the sponsors, which is sort of your traditional campaign reporting 
requirement. But, as far as the advertisers that sells, our law is what I believe is unique in the state, is that 
we require that the advertisers that sell political advertising have to maintain what we call books of account 
and have those available for public inspection upon request. So, it's not something that requires them to 
publish anything or have something reported to the PDC, but they have to maintain records of this so that 
if a member of the public comes and asks them for, you know, certain information about an advertisement, 
then the advertiser has to have that - well the law contemplates that that has already been compiled and is 
available, and they can give it to the person upon request. You know, that law was written in the late 70s. 
The actual, the initial initiative was, our law was created by a vote of the people back in 1972, and the 
original version of the law actually required these commercial advertisers, as we call them, to report to the 
PDC. And then, soon after, a couple years later, that was changed to turn it into this right of inspection 
rather than a report submitted. To be honest with you, I don't know the whole history behind that. My guess 
is that the industry even back them was saying "wait a minute," we don't need to report things to you, but 
if people have questions, we won't withhold the information. So, anyway, that's, so the law evolved very 
soon after it was enacted to create this right of inspection. But, at the time of course, we didn't have digital 
advertising. So, the way the law reads. Well, I'll say this. The law is written in a broad way that I believe 
with perspective in the sense that it wasn't limited to print media or broadcast media. So, I think there was 
some contemplation there that this would apply to whatever is deemed to be political advertising. So, I 
think that was some forward thinking of the drafters back then. But, it does read in some sense like this 
would apply to a print shop or even to a tv or radio station that has a physical location, and that somebody 
could show up and then they would pull this book of account just off the shelf and open it up to 200 and be 




RS: But, in our view, the law applies as much to online advertising as anything else. So, it didn't require a 
change in the law to have it apply to these new times of advertising. And, so, we require the same standard 
of a digital, international company like Facebook that's producing billions of ads a week to be responsive 
to a request in Washington State for their activities in Washington State as anybody else would. That's 
where we're at right now. We do recognize that there may be room for tweaking that system and making it 
more efficient for these different types of digital platforms and, in the end, making it a better product for 




ANF: That's a great overview. I've looked at all state laws, and that's one thing that's really unique about 
Washington. That you guys have these kind of record-keeping requirements for - and they apply to digital, 
but not just digital - but unique in the sense that they apply to digital companies like Facebook. I'm 
wondering if you have any sense of why Washington chose that approach of putting record-keeping 
requirements on the commercial advertisers themselves?  
 
RS: Yeah. That's a really good question. I don't have specific information from the legislative history. It's 
an interesting idea of where that came from because, yeah, I don't think it was based on any other law. We 
were one of the first states, I think, that got into this business. So, it's interesting to see what the thinking 
was at the time. But, I don't have any specific examples. I think that the way that the law works, and you 
can see it the intent and purpose of the law, that putting the requirement on the advertiser is a way of sort 
of double-proofing the transparency requirements. And there's other areas of our law that we can point to 
to show that there's some intended redundancy in how things are reported so that you can match things up 
and make sure that everything is accurate and be able to follow how the money is spent. As well as, kind 
of creating a gap-filler where you might not have great reporting on the side of the campaign. Campaigns 
have to report where they make expenditures for political advertising, and they have to detail that in their 
reports. But, they don't always comply with that, and, on very few occasions that’s intentional deception or 
withholding, but for the most part it's usually just, frankly just sloppiness. They're just not doing what they 
need to do. So, the way we look at it is, for one reason if you're looking from the public's perspective, you 
see an ad that shows up on your doorstep, in your newspaper, or on your Twitter feed or in your Facebook 
feed, and it just pops up. And you have a question, "well where did this come from? Who is this that's 
telling me to vote for such and such or so and so?" And the first place they can go back to is from the place 
where they saw it, not necessarily back to - they should have sponsor ID on it, but that's not always there, 
and even if they do they have to go back to the records and find that. But, this is a way for the public to 
really figure out where something is coming from, from their perspective, from the point of the consumer 
of the advertising. And, so I think it kind of has both those aspects. It provides the intended redundancy in 
reporting, and it fills the gaps where reporting might not be complete.  
 
ANF: You read my mind because my next question was going to be, kind of, what additional benefit it 
adds. So, it sounds like you're saying the additional benefit is filing these gaps and making sure that there's 
redundancy so, from the point of view of the consumer, they can figure out where this stuff is coming from.  
 
RS: Yeah. And I want to make the distinction clear. We don't believe that this law is intended to shift 
responsibility to the sponsors to the advertisers so that the sponsors don't have to do as much because 
anybody who wants to know can go get it from the commercial advertiser. But, that it really is a key part 
of the statutory scheme that was set up, that there is a role for the advertisers to play since they're the ones 
disseminating the information to the public. But, it shouldn't be regarded as, and sometimes we've gotten 
this pushback from the industry, that they shouldn't be carrying the water for the sponsors, and that's not 
how I think the law works and definitely not the intent that they are the prime regulated community. It's 
understood that they are a business that provides a service, so they're not the one that has the political intent, 
so to speak, of trying to influence voters. Like Facebook says, we'll provide political ad, we'll provide a 
dishwashing soap ad, it doesn't matter to us. Any content, they're content neutral on that. So, yeah, just want 
to make sure that distinction is clear. 
 
ANF: Yeah, that makes sense. Do you find that the commercial advertisers and, I guess, particularly the 
platforms are compliant with the record-keeping requirement?  
 
RS: Yeah, that's a very interesting question. I think, you know, one reason I think we've gotten into the 
position we have now is that the law has largely been dormant from the side of the regulator. Like, we 
haven't had very many cases at all up until a few years ago when people started to pay closer attention to 
the effect of online advertising in political campaigns. And so, you know, historically, we found that the 
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print shops, particularly which is sort of the standard, traditional business in this area, were very much 
aware of the law and generally were compliant with the law, and so we didn't see many cases coming 
forward. We don't take that to mean that nobody was using the law, but that the law was working. 
Newspapers, the same way. But, what hadn't really been pressed is using the law into these emerging areas 
of advertising. And so, once that kind of got attention, and once the public became more concerned about 
it, we saw a real uptick in this, and the, frankly, I would say that most of the digital, well let me try and 
word this the right way. I don't want to indict them or give you some qualitative statement about that. But, 
my estimate, I guess, is that a lot of the digital platforms just simply weren't tracking this law. And, I think 
that's a fair thing to say. Was Facebook aware that our law existed? I don't know. I have a feeling like it 
wasn't very well known by industry. And so, once this kind of came up, it just sort of hit a brick wall. 
Because Facebook was like "what, we don't even know what this is. This doesn't apply to us. We're not a 
print shop, we're not a commercial advertiser." Less of a legal argument and more of I just think they hadn't 
really thought through this. And, of course, for a big corporation like that, I can see where in the corner, 
this small corner of the country, we didn't uncover this law that isn't really used in other areas, and we just 
weren't aware of it. Some of that precedes my time, so I'm sort of just leaving you with that guess. But, I 





RS: But, yeah. I think it's safe to say that they weren't following it. That's apparent. And the reason why 
they weren't following it - I don't think it was a conscious decision, it's just something they weren't tracking. 
And so, when we started to tell them "you have to, if somebody asks you" - but then the question is how do 
you ask Facebook a question? Who do you get in touch with? They don't have that traditional infrastructure. 
Again, I'll go back to that point that the law was written in the 70s, so how does somebody go to the front 
desk of Facebook and say "show me your books of account," you know "what are you talking about." So, 
we got involved in rulemaking in 2018, which some people mistake for when the law was created, that's 
where these requirements came from. They weren't. They were just sort of an update on an existing law, 
existing regulations, but just simply how it applied to a new type of media. And once we started that 
rulemaking, we got a lot of response from industry, and that's when I think a lot of this came to a head. And 
a lot of the ideas of, how do you regulate a digital platform like Facebook or Google? A lot of these types 
of entities where the transactions are almost entirely automated. It's not as - the way the law works just 
seems provincial when it comes to a company like that. So, the update in the regulations was just simply to 
give a bit more guidance on how it would apply to a different type of media. Again, not something that's 
new, we had a list of different media types and how it would apply to print, television, and such already. 
So, it was just simply adding another element there. And, in that, we did recognize what industry had been 
doing up to that point in creating ad archives of their own and publishing that. For a large part, well that 
really seems to fit within the spirit of the law, and so we wrote that into the rule to say "yeah, if you maintain 
a public ad archive and have that available to the public, then you don't have to deal with the person walking 
into the person and asking on demand, just point them to the website and give it to them there." What we 
found was that archives weren't comprehensive even as much as they intended it to be. There was a lot that 
we were getting calls on. When we started getting complaints, it was like "hey this ad is nowhere to be 
found on their website. Here's a copy of it. Here's where I saw it." And, so, we got into it. I think it had the 
potential to alleviate some of the problems, but what I think that we had discovered was that their own self-
regulating so to speak was just not as thorough and not really, it was inadequate.  
 
ANF: Do you have any sense of what compliance costs this creates for platforms in the sense that, have 
you gotten any feedback from them on that in order to make their measures comprehensive to comply with 
the law?  
 




ANF: That's fine. 
 
RS: I think they've brought up concerns about trying to build this, not so much a fiscal cost but just a lot of 
what we heard was "that's just not how we do it. We don't do it that way. So, we can't comply with your 




RS: this industry without contemplation about how to comply with a law that's been around forever. And 
then to say "well, you know, Facebook just doesn't work that way," is not, not really the best answer that 
we were looking for. 
 
ANF: Right. You're kind of like, "ok, well it's still there." 
 
RS: Yeah, yeah. But, there's definitely an appreciation for that situation. That's the world we live in. 
Facebook is a huge player in this market, and they don't have a way of just plugging their system into our 
disclosure requirements.  
 
ANF: I just want to follow up on that. So, are compliance costs for the platform - or I guess that feedback 
that you've heard from platforms - is that something that legislators or regulators should consider when 
they're creating these regulations?  
 
RS: Yeah, I think there's always room for improvement. And we try to be very responsive to concerns raised 
either by campaigns or by these commercial advertisers. And in this particular case, we are, we do recognize 
that these are essentially third-party actors in campaign finance commerce. So, they, they're concerns should 
be understood and, not necessarily because we have an interest to support their business, but because we 
want to have the best transparency to the public. And if we're constantly fighting to get things, to pull things 
out of these companies, then ultimately the public's not getting what it wants. So, part of what we've been 
looking at is looking at it from scratch and building back up like what's important for the public to see and 
how do we get that information to the public? And, we still think that the advertisers have an important role 
to play in that, but part of what [NAME] and I have been doing over the past year or so is to answer those 
questions and to get feedback from all interested parties to find out, is there a better way of doing this? We 
feel like we have the right legal requirements, the right statutory scheme in bringing them into regulation, 
but, just technically even, how do you best get the transparency, the information to the public?  
 
ANF: Right, and one thing that I've also noticed in looking into this is how platforms have responded to 
these state laws, not just in Washington, but also in Maryland. For example, I think both Google and 
Facebook won't accept political ads for Washington State candidates and ballot measures that are targeted 




ANF: Yes, so, that went up to the Fourth Circuit, and the Fourth Circuit was very concerned that this might 
hurt down-ballot candidates who maybe rely on digital advertising more if platforms take this approach. Is 
that something that we should be concerned with in crafting legislation or other regulatory measures, and 
how might we address that concern? 
 
RS: Yeah, it's a great point, and things that we've considered and heard from as well. And I'll say this, we 
definitely understand that digital advertising is an important tool for campaigns to use. And part of that is 
that it's very cost effective, so in some ways it equals the playing the field for a campaign that doesn't have 
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a ton of money and a campaign that does. So, if you're a well-healed incumbent that has no problem 
fundraising and you're a state legislator, you might not have as much interest to see that Facebook comes 
back and provides advertising in Washington State, there might be an advantage to that. I'm not saying that 




RS: So, yeah. There's definitely utility to this, and we don't see the decision by Facebook or Google, Twitter 
to pull out of Washington State as the best solution. It's definitely not the intent of our laws to push this 
type of advertising out. It has its place, and in many ways it's a good thing. So, we want to work with them 
to get them back into compliance. What we don't want is for it to be used as leverage to somehow give them 
a break in what is the most effective way of getting transparency to the public. We're not looking to stick it 
to them, but we're just saying that "if you are going to do this, and we recognize that your type of advertising 
for campaigns, then it has to be transparent to the public." And if we can't find a way of doing that, and if 
you're unwilling to do that, then, yeah, you're still going to be subject to the regulation here. But, I think 
there is room for a middle ground of finding, and trying to bring them along in offering some alternatives, 
which they have admittedly done through our rulemaking process and in other types of negotiations they've 
brought forward alternatives and other things, and some things we've picked up on, some things we don't 
feel like it really fits within the purpose of the law. But, having more of those conversations is going to 
eventually, hopefully bring a better product out than if we were to just bury our heads and say "nope, this 
is the law, and we're not going to listen to you."  
 
ANF: Right. That makes sense. And then I wanted to touch briefly on another approach that I’ve seen New 
York. We've kind of touched on this question generally already, so I kind of have an idea of what your 
answer will be. But, we've talked about how Washington, you place this record-keeping responsibility on 
the commercial advertiser, which includes digital platforms like Facebook, Google. But an alternative that 
I've seen that New York does, is they have a similar database for certain digital ads, but the database is 
maintained by the state government. So, the commercial advertisers aren't necessarily involved. How 
feasible would it be to transition to that approach? Maybe wouldn't fit with what you're trying to do. 
 
RS: We've had a lot of discussion about that, hosting our own archives and how to obtain that information. 
I guess the two elements of that answer are, first of all, we're not convinced that that's the best way of 
getting information to the public that doesn't involve some responsibility on the commercial advertiser. The 
second thing is it would be a considerable project as far as infrastructure to build something like that and 
hold it and make it effective for the public. It's one thing to say that you'll hold all this information, but then 
you have to make it searchable, understandable, and reachable by the public. So, maintaining that has been 
very difficult for us to figure out the extent of the cost and the resources that would be necessary for 
something like that. But, again, that's not the only thing. I think that if we saw that as being the silver bullet 
to all this, there would be more interest in investing in that solution. But, at this point, we don't see it as the 
best path forward that could work with all players. So, what we're looking at is more of a distributed model, 
where a concept that we have right now is where the sponsor would come to a political advertiser and have 
some duty to identify their advertising as political and to obtain some type of tag or code to the ad that then 
would be reportable to us but would also be something that would be attached to the advertisement itself 
and therefore could be traceable through a very complex system, as I understand, about how the advertising 
transaction work in this area. That it could still follow that and be either - the relevant information could be 
pulled out of that. How that actually works, I don't know. It's still a very open concept, but that's one way 
that we think both sides share some responsibility in this, but the commercial advertiser is really the holder 
of this information, not necessarily the party that is identifying what is political if they don't want to 
necessarily have to publish that. That's something that's part of our reporting scheme, and having a link 
between the sponsor's report and what the commercial advertiser has. There seems to be some benefit in 
doing that. But, again, that's more of a distributive model. I think the idea of us holding things - and 
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admittedly I think we need to do some more research with New York and have some more outreach with 
them to determine how their system is working - but the idea that all the different types of formats that these 
advertisements can take, and how you pull all that together. I can see if you had a more limited scope, like 
this is just for independent expenditures in a certain class or something, then you could have a special 
database for that. But we're trying to apply this to all advertising, so yeah, it's not something we've - we've 
thought a lot about that, and some of our commissioners have really been big proponents of that in the past 
to the point that if you read our rules, there's a placeholder there that says something like "all these rules 
until the PDC comes up with a public ad archive." That reflects some of the intention of the commission at 
the time that those rules were created. But, since then, we just haven't been able to crack that or see why 
that would be the best path forward. 
 
ANF: Right. I'm really curious why different states have chosen different approaches, which is exactly why 
I'm reaching out to all of you. 
 
RS: Yeah, and your work is so critical in all this because you're looking at the different options. We're 
trying to figure that stuff out too, but we're in our little bubble over here. We've done some outreach - I 
think we recognize the best solution here is to find something that is uniform and can be replicated and 
other states could join on to this and it can be replicated. So, we're not looking simply at the implications 
for Washington but understanding that for a lot of these advertisers if we can promote a solution that other 
states could adopt, that'd be great. So, in that work, we are interested in hearing other ideas and figuring 
this out. We were interested to see what was going on with Maryland and their view. We were hoping this 
last year that we would have more opportunities to even go and meet with other states, and of course that 
got side tracked. So, a lot of that effort has been reduced, and our goals in that have had to shift a little. But, 
I still think that's a good thing. So, I know that [NAME] and I were extremely excited to see that you were 
doing this work and you're joining that force of outsiders and academia to look and try to solve this problem. 
So, we'll be very eager to follow your research and what ideas you have analyzing what we're doing against 
what other states are doing. And if you have any recommendations to share with us, we'll be very receptive 
to that.  
 
ANF: Absolutely. Along that same line, because this is such a huge area that's constantly evolving, 
especially in recent years. As regulators, what information do you feel like you need to be able to make 
informed regulatory decisions?  
 
RS: The ultimate goal is what's the best product for the public. We always try to view it through that lens, 
and sometimes that means working with industry and finding some negotiation to some degree - "what's 
the best way to pull this information out of you guys." And sometimes it's just moving forward with "no, 
the public needs to see this, and it needs to see it this way." But, the type of resources we're looking for, at 
this point, a lot of that communication across jurisdictions and see what other states are thinking to answer 
those fundamental questions. If we look at New York and they say "our law's working fabulously, and we're 
able to get all this information out to the public, and it's wonderful," then, yeah, we want to learn more 
about that. In other contexts, we want to promote what we're doing and test that against what other states, 
what they think of that and even in the industry. So, this concept I mentioned, where we're at in our work 
is to shop that around to our stakeholders and ask their feedback - "do you think this is feasible? Do you 
think this is a good idea?" We're not wedded to it, but we think this is a way of achieving some improvement 
in the area. And, so, we're getting that feedback, and just hearing from more people out there, in particular 
from industry as well as campaigns and experts, to just to find out if this is a worthwhile path. And, at the 
same time, if it is, hopefully gathering some momentum and support from the outside that this might be 
used as a model or something that can be promoted even by industry if they say "well why don't you just 
do it like Washington does, we worked with them closely, and we're happy with what came out." That 
would be the ultimate goal. Just getting more people involved I guess is a big step for us. Because we 
recognize we're not the technical experts here. Whatever we propose is not, we don't know what's feasible 
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for Google and Facebook. They've come and explained their business to us on a number of occasions, and 
we get it from a conceptual point. But, if we say, how about just giving us all your targeting information? 
And they say, "no we can't do that." Well, we don't know whether they can or not. I can't evaluate their own 
internal assessments or how their systems are engineered. That's where we sort of get stuck or find the limits 
of what we're doing is industry will say that this doesn't work, and we're like "it doesn't work because you 
don't want it to work or it doesn't work because it's literally like extremely difficult for you to do that or the 
information just isn't obtainable that way,” whatever it is. We can't go down that road too much with them 
because they obviously know their business better than we do. So, we're trying to find a way of getting 
them on board and making something that's workable. But then they can kind of figure out that technical 
side of it. And as long as they see the utility in that, then they have the incentive to do it. Because right now, 
it's like we’ll fight something better or you're just going to do it the way we have right now, and you don't 
like that. Let's fight it out in court and see who wins. That's kind of what we're doing. If they lose that battle, 
then they're stuck back to where they were two or three years ago, which is they haven't made these records 
available, and they still are obligated to do it. So, they're going to be caught in this regulatory scheme, and 
we don't have to explain to them. I think they're very willing to think of new ways of doing it. But, at this 
point, we feel like we're the drivers of having to propose something. They just don't want it to be as hard 
on them, but I don't think they come from the perspective of serving the public's interest so to speak. They're 
not against it. It's not like they're trying to hide - well maybe some areas, like targeting information and all 
that, I don't know if you have any questions about particular bits of information, I'm happy to answer 
questions I just feel like I've been talking a lot.  
 
ANF: No, you're fine. I don't want to take up too much of your time. I'm always so interested in this, I feel 
like I could listen to people talk about it forever. But, I guess I just had a few more general questions. If 
you could briefly describe what goal your state's regulations to achieve with your current record-keeping 
scheme - the elevator pitch of what that goal is.  
 
RS: Right. The goal is to ensure that the public has the information it needs to know where the advertising 
is coming from and what's behind it, the relevant information behind it. Who's paying for it, how much it 
costs, and obviously the sponsorship and in some cases the scope of the advertising itself, which kind of 
goes to those questions of reach, targeting, other things that are purchased by the sponsors. 
 
ANF: And do you think that, in general, the regulation achieves those goals? 
 
RS: Yes, I do, when it works. When you have advertisers that aren't willing to comply with the law for 
whatever reason, might be very good reasons, then we get into enforcement. And, ultimately, the public 
suffers from that. We're not eager to enforce this law and drag advertisers into our regulation. And the more 
they complain about it and say it's a problem, I think we do have to listen to that and understand that we 
can continue to fight with them. And I think we sometimes need to have a hard line. But the bottom line is 
how do we best serve the public. And if we can come up with a more effective or easier way of doing that, 
that'd be great. 
 
ANF: That makes sense. And then, last couple of questions. Based on what you know, what do you feel 
like works well about the record-keeping process that you have, and what do you think could be improved?  
 
RS: What works well is that, I'll say what I said in the beginning. What works well is it's an intentional 
redundancy in the reporting structure. I guess another point about that too is that in some cases the advertiser 
has more information than the sponsor does. I hadn't talked a lot about those elements about what we require 
digital advertisers to disclose. But, these are clearly very important things to the public about where an 
advertisement is placed, who is targeted by the advertisement, and what is the reach of that advertising. In 
some ways, the sponsor is paying for that, so they're orchestrating what that is, but the sponsor doesn't 
always receive that information. That's more and more part of algorithms in computers somewhere. I think 
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that's another area where this law really works well in the current advertising environment. That we're able 
to reach that information. One other aspect of the law I should point out, is that it's not just the public 
inspection right, but we have the right to go to the commercial advertisers and ask them for this. So, if we 
had to issue subpoenas and do an investigation of those records without it being maintained by them, it 
would be a tremendous cost to us. And a lot of times that information might be lost before we even get it. 
So, having their requirement to hold and maintain that information for, I think it's five years, that that helps 
from an enforcement perspective as well. The areas where it could be improved, I think are the best ways 
giving the public access. Right now, it's a right of inspection, the public can ask for this, and there's a 
requirement that it's a 24-hour turnaround from the commercial advertiser. I think from both the public side 
and the advertiser side, that might not be the most efficient way of doing this. If you're a news reporter and 
are savvy enough to know how to reach these commercial advertisers, that's fine. But if we look at a general 
member of the public, their ability to even have time to go to show up at a place or deal with how to ask for 
it, that's a transactional cost for the public. And then also from the advertiser's perspective, if they start 
getting hundreds of calls, and somebody demands all this information - and there's no scope on it either, 
we've had people who asked for all the advertising Google has done in the 2019 election, we don't have any 
limitations on where that right, what's included in that right. So, that's a legitimate request that they have to 
respond to. I do think that that's an area where we could find more of a systematic way of the advertisers to 
provide this information. Either have it available, if they wanted to publish, again, I think the ad archives 
are a great solution. Given the McManus case and some of the legalities of that, I don't know that it's 
something we can force upon advertisers to publish this information. And there's also some limits on that 




RS: If you have a really good archive that works well, that's great. If you have a really bad archive that they 
haven't invested much in, even if it's just clunky to go through, does it really work? So, there are some 
limits. But I think the idea of them finding ways of just getting this information out is something that we 
should continue to explore. I hope I was clear enough in my answer in that those are areas where we think 
the law can be improved.  
 
ANF: Yes. And is there anything else that I haven't touched on that you want to touch on briefly or that you 
think is important to mention?  
 
RS: Um.  
 
ANF: I know we've covered a lot.  
 
RS: Yeah. These have been great questions. And it shows that you really understand, at least what we're 
looking at, these are the very questions that we're at. So, congratulations on all the work you've put in to 
have this understanding of the issue. The only other thing that I pointed to where I think there's a lot of 
concern is the targeting stuff. That is a huge issue. And it's a huge issue for regulators because we understand 
it's important for the public, and the public wants to see this. And, does it serve the purpose of campaign 
finance regulation? And this is where the campaigns, a lot of the campaigns will get involved. And they'll 
say "oh, no, no, no, you can't see our targeting, that's our strategy." Just like you can't know our focus 
groups or the reason why this ad looks like this to this group and different to another group, that speaks to 
the strategy of the campaigns. But, there's a growing concern that that stuff is really so potent in this area. 
And so, we wrestle with that. I don't need to get into the details. Having somebody like you, that's one angle 
that would be fascinating to see, what's the proper level of disclosure for that level of information. On the 
one hand, it's part of the product. In the beginning, we started to view this as, think of it as a receipt. You 
buy something and you get a receipt, this is what you paid for. And so, targeting is very much a part of the 
service is being provided, so why wouldn't that be disclosed like anything else? But it's unique too because 
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it deals with privacy interests, it deals with how these companies are collecting this information, a lot of 
things that certainly are beyond the scope of campaign finance. But, it bleeds into it. And I think the effect 
of it is it's almost too effective to some people's minds, that's where you bleed into the misinformation that's 
able to echo through these systems because of how it's manipulated to the right audience. And we're 
sensitive to that. It's not something that we're very willing to let go of because of the extreme importance 
of it. But, it's a hard thing to wrestle down, while recognizing that a lot of this is so sensitive that the 
campaigns themselves are saying "wait, you can't see that we're trying to target people who like cats in our 




RS: And, haven't really. What we ask for right now is a certain level of targeting, what we call 
demographics. Which still begs the question of what does that mean? What does that mean? But the way 
we've described it and given guidance, that's kind of your standard age, gender, race, which we understand 
that that's not a specific category, but areas like that as distinguished from interests. So, we don't need to 
see that everybody that likes McDonalds is on this list. So that's as far as we've gotten with it. We think that 
having some basic demographic disclosure on that is right to disclose but other deeper targeting information 
is something that goes beyond right now. 
 
ANF: That's an area that needs more focus, microtargeting.  
 
RS: And the other thing related to that, is the misinformation. We've gotten a considerable amount of 
pressure over the past few years over seeing ads that to some degree are misleading and that's another - 
we're not addressing that in our project, that's not the focus of what we're doing, but for the public, I think 
that's what brings them into this area, the concern of the manipulation of information. And, I think probably 
from your perspective, that's something that's more inclusive of what you're doing I would guess. For us, 
it's kind of segregated out, but it still has an element. We would say the disclosure does serve the purpose 
of identifying misinformation because you can't hide your voice, shouldn't be able to hide your voice. As 
long as you own it and are not hiding it from people, the presumption is as long as the public knows who 
you are, they can evaluate the information for themselves. Then we've done our job. But, I think we've been 
pushed a lot on that, and it's hard to talk even to legislators. I've been in legislative hearings where I have 
to talk about First Amendment rights. To be honest, it's not the most comforting or persuasive thing to have 
to talk about. The First Amendment does protect a lot of things in this area that you might not like. It still 
comes down to, "but they're lying about this." And we do have a defamation law on the books, but it's been 
trounced by our own courts several times. So, the writings on the wall with that. But, anyway, those are 
two areas, I think targeting and misinformation are obviously huge issues in this, and can't avoid them. But 
I think as far as what we're looking at right now, we're just looking at the disclosure side. 
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ANF: So, I guess we can go ahead and get started. I have a list of questions that I'm really excited about. 
But maybe we can just start generally. Can you describe the disclosure regulations for online political 
advertising in Washington? Like what do they have to abide by?  
 
RS: Sure. And when you say "they," I'm going to describe the duality of our system. So, we have sponsor 
ID, which is called the disclaimer, I think. And, so that is incumbent upon the sponsor of the advertising to 
identify themselves and provide certain information depending on what kind of ad it is and what kind of 
sponsor it is. So, if it's a candidate there's a certain kind of sponsor ID. If it's a political committee or another 
organization, there's different types of sponsor ID that includes information about funders. So, there's that. 
And then, on the other side, which makes Washington somewhat unique, is we have a longstanding law 
that puts some of the onus on the campaign vendor essentially who is providing the advertisement. So, the 
business that is in the service of providing political advertising distribution. And our law, dating back to 
the original initiative that founded the PDC does include some requirements for those types of businesses 
and entities. And they do need to provide certain kinds of information upon request of the public. And it 
can be any member of the public. It doesn't need to be a Washington State voter or anything, it just says a 
member of the public, or the PDC, the PDC also can request the information. And then, specifically what 
needs to be divulged when that request is received is defined in an administrative rule. The Commission 
overtime has divvied that rule up by type of business. So, if you're a printer, there are certain requirements 
for you. If you're a mail house you get certain requirements. If you're a newspaper, broadcast entity, and 
then just recently they went ahead and amended that rule to include specifics for digital advertisers 
providing that service. So, the understanding was always that they were subject to the law for producing 
information upon request, but, until 2018, there weren't specifics in the rule about what the member of the 
public would need to receive if they made that request.  
 
ANF: Okay. That makes sense. And, as you mentioned, Washington is kind of unique in that this put this 
sort of record-keeping requirement on, not just commercial advertisers, but even specifically online 
platforms, right. That they're one group that falls into that definition of "commercial advertisers." Since 
that's something that's kind of unique among different states based on what I've found, I'm wondering if 
you have any sense of why Washington choose that approach?  
 
RS: Yeah, it's a really good question, and I'm [inaudible], so this year is the 50th anniversary of our agency 
and the founding of it and the creation of campaign finance disclosure in Washington State. And, as part of 
that, I've been trying to seek out information about what went into the initiative and why it was written the 
way it was. And, there's not a whole lot of information. There's no information that I've been able to find 
about why commercial advertiser disclosure requirements were included. I think the initiative had a lot of 
really good ideas in it, including our state public records law, which we don't administer, but it was part of 
the original initiative. And, so, a whole bunch of good ideas got rounded up and presented to voters, and 
voters overwhelmingly agreed with them. And, so, the initiative was passed. We believe, and this is the 
argument that we see for the commercial advertiser law today and so we think it makes some sense although 
we don't have any evidence tying it back to founders and their intent. But, we believe it was provided as a 
check on reporting provided by campaigns. It is also a pivotal piece of law when there's anonymous political 
advertising. So, the advertising doesn't have sponsor ID and is not reported to us by a candidate or a political 
committee or another entity with reporting requirements. When that information is not available then the 
commercial advertiser law allows us to go to - if we can identity who put out the ad, who produced the ad 
- lets us go to that entity and request information, and then we can go to the entity who sponsored the ad 
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and talk to them about their possible reporting requirements. So, I think, I can't point you to a piece of 
information where it shows, yes, that's what the founders wanted. But, that seems, over time that seems to 
be the argument that has at least developed for the law and the reason why the Commission believes it is 
an important piece of the law - that we have those checks and balances.  
 
ANF: That's all really interesting. Building off of that a little bit, what benefit do you think is gained by 
placing these record-keeping requirements on online platforms?  
 
RS: Because it is, as I said, a check and balance. Campaigns have the duty to tell us what they spend their 
money on, and they'll tell us how much they spent on some political advertising. If there's any reason to 
doubt that, the commercial advertiser, or to doubt that they reported all of the advertising that they bought, 
we can go to the commercial advertiser and ask for information to check against the expenditure reports 
that we receive. And then, again, I can't underscore enough the importance of when there is an anonymous 
piece of advertising. That is where we see it used a lot, and, on a very grassroots level almost. So, you'll 
have, in my first year here at the PDC we had a couple of anonymous mailers, and we used the commercial 
advertiser law. Members of the public came to us and said "we received this but don't know who put it out. 




RS: And one was kind of anti a candidate and one was anti a ballot measure. We were able to go to the 
printers involved in those situations and ask for more information and figure out who was behind those ads 
and then told those people they need to report it. And it's interesting stuff. You know, there's a local 
construction, owner of a construction company who was putting out ads that were against a measure that 
would pay for a community pool. I mean, that's information that people want to know when they're trying 
to decide "what weight do I give this information, who's behind it. And that helps me to determine if I'm 
going to trust it or not." Or, if maybe the person has an ulterior motive. And then, in the other case, it was 
a former mayor in a little community that was putting out mailers criticizing, I think it was a current 
candidate on the city council. So, again, it's that information that allows the public to decide for themselves 
whether the political advertising merits attention and what weight it should be given.  
 
ANF: Right. That's interesting, I wouldn't have thought about the anonymous speech angle, so that's 
interesting.  
 
RS: Yeah, it's a very important investigatory tool.  
 
ANF: Do you, as far as you know, do you find that commercial advertisers or online platforms specifically 
are generally complaint with the record-keeping requirement?  
 
RS: So. Yes and no. So, traditional media who have been operating in this state are very aware of the rules. 
And they'll sometimes, print shops especially, you'll make a request to them, and they may not want to 
divulge who their client is so they'll try to lean on the client to give themselves up essentially. But, they 
know about the law, and, in the end, they comply with it. And many print shops are very forthcoming and 
very helpful whenever we contact them or whenever we send a member of the public to them. Broadcasters, 
same way. Newspapers, they'll, I don't know if they're still doing this given COVID and all that, but it used 
to be that you could go into a broadcast office or a newspaper office and look at their books of account. 
And they'll have all of their political advertising, and reporters would use that and go look to see who was 
doing the advertising, how much, and what time slots they were buying, that kind of thing. The digital 
advertisers, because, I mean it's been there for a while, but because it's a relatively new idea that they would 
be subject to this because we haven't gotten the questions, we didn't until about 2017, I don't think anyone 
had every asked us "what about digital advertisers." And we're like "yeah, they're subject too. They're 
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providing this service." And that's when members of the public started filing requests, and so digital 
advertisers became aware very quickly. And most of the digital advertisers, and not just the Googles and 
Facebooks of the world, but smaller DSPs that provide advertising services and access to networks, they're 
aware when I call them or when [NAME] and I contact them and say "hey, we want to talk to you about 
this." They're like "oh yeah, yeah, yeah, Washington." And, they know. The rub has been more in what they 
provide. So, the rules that the Commission set in 2018, there has been some concern voiced by some of the 
digital platforms about what content they have to divulge. So, we've had some conversations about that. 
We've had some enforcement cases with some digital advertisers. We're currently having some enforcement 
cases with some digital advertisers. So, you know, I would say that they're aware. And then, the mechanism 
and the content of what they have to provide is still a work in progress as far as getting them, some of them, 
there. They're not used to responding to requests directly from members of the public. They wish they could 
go through the PDC instead. We think the ability of the public to go directly to these entities without having 
to get the stamp of approval from a government agency like us, it's really fundamental to the law. And, so 
we've really pushed the digital advertisers to push to a member of the public, rather than, let's not get into 
an enforcement posture where we're having to request the information from you and then turn it over to the 
member of the public who wants it. So, yeah, I think they're aware. Compliance and what that looks like is 
still up for debate. 
 
ANF: What are, generally, what are the penalties for those that fail to comply?  
 
RS: So, we don't have like a penalty schedule or anything. So, the Commission itself are our appointed 
members that decide enforcement cases. They have penalty authority of $10,000 per violation. And, so 
what constitutes a violation depends on the case at hand. So, it can be, the eventual penalty can be much 
more than $10,000. And it can be much more than $10,000 if PDC staff and the respondent stipulate to 
higher and present that to the Commission for acceptance. Penalties start to rack up when the Commission 
decides to not decide the case and sends it to the Attorney General's office. And that's where we have seen 
the big penalties, especially involving Facebook and Google. And, that was the first round of cases. And 
we're into court on the second round of cases with both those entities, so we'll see what comes out of that.  
 
ANF: Do you think that those penalties are having enough of - I don't know if the word is deterrent, but, 
incentive maybe to comply? It sounds like you're on your second round of cases. 
 
RS: Yeah. So, we'll see, we'll see. We are dealing with companies with deep pockets and there is an open 
question about what amount is going to get their attention. Or is it an amount that is paid just to settle the 
case. The first settlement did not end with any kind of agreement to comply. So, after the first settlement, 
the result was that those two entities announced they were leaving the marketplace. I think the idea was 
we're going to settle these cases and then just not do this book of business anymore. The problem there, of 
course, is that they've tried to put in the controls to prevent them from accepting political advertising in the 
state, but they are not foolproof and people have gotten around them. And then they run political advertising 
on their platform, and members of the public request information, and we're back again in enforcement.  
 
ANF: Right. Kind of back at square one. That's another topic that I wanted to touch on with platforms' 
response to some of these laws. One of the things I'm looking into is the Washington Post v. McManus case 
out of the Fourth Circuit dealing with a similar law in Maryland. Maryland's was targeted only at digital 
commercial advertisers. But, one of the things the court seemed really concerned about was that Google, in 
response to Maryland's act, said "well we're just not going to accept ad in Maryland" and how that might 
affect down-ballot candidates that might rely on digital advertising more. And you mentioned that some of 
the platforms have taken a similar response in Washington. Is that something that legislators or regulators 




RS: It is a concern of the Commission. I can't speak to the constitutional aspect of that decision out of 
Maryland or anything. But, the availability of economical advertising for low-budget campaigns is a 
concern that the Commission has. They want there to be options for campaigns that need to run, that want 
to run social media advertising or other kinds of digital advertising because it allows them to reach a lot of 
people for a fraction of what it would cost to do the same kind of reach on tv or newspapers or even by 
mail. So, that is a concern, and that is one of the key reasons that [NAME] and I are working on the project 
about trying to come up with some sort of concept that would help facilitate this disclosure. Our end goal 
is to make it better for the public because it's very hard for the public right now in the digital advertising 
space to determine who's the commercial advertiser here. I mean, Facebook is easy. You can figure that 
one out, "okay, I'm going to go to Facebook." But, when you have a digital political advertisement that's 
not on that platform, it's very hard, it could appear on Seattle Times, and Seattle Times is not the commercial 
advertiser in that circumstance, there's going to be someone who sold that space, so who is that? And for a 
member of the public to encode that is nearly impossible. And then even if you do figure out who was in 
that transaction, how you get to that entity is even more difficult. So, what we're trying to do is make that 
more transparent by trying to tie the campaign finance reporting with the commercial advertiser disclosure 
so that when you see the campaign report there's some sort of link out to the commercial advertiser who's 
responsible for some kind of disclosure if it's requested. A side benefit of that, if we can make it work, 
would be hopefully we can come up with some sort of scheme where more commercial advertisers feel 
comfortable operating in Washington State because they don't feel like it’s going to be a gotcha, where a 
member of the public comes in and says "I want to see more information about this ad, and I'm going to 
email at info@politicaladvertiser.com" and that message goes into a general email inbox and never gets 
read by the right people. And all of the sudden someone's broken the law, an entity has broken a law that, 




RS: So, we're trying to help facilitate that and, hopefully, if we do it right, make commercial advertisers 
more comfortable in this space, that they can meet those disclosure requirements.  
 
ANF: Do you have any sense of what the compliance costs are for online platforms - what kind of costs or 
resources it would take for them to comply?  
 
RS: We haven't gotten that far. We're in the process, where we've proposed an idea, and we're in talks with 
people in the field about whether that would work. Right now, we're just asking them to shoot holes in our 
theory and let us know how to improve it. 
 
ANF: Okay. That sounds like a really interesting project. It sounds like a lot of moving parts to it too.  
 
RS: It is, yes.  
 
ANF: One of the unique things about Washington's law is that it applies to online platforms and it applies 
to these other commercial advertisers, right? And maybe not even what we would maybe think about as 
"online platform," not just your Facebooks and your Googles, but your Seattle Times, Washington Post, 
whatever. I'm wondering what you think about how we should draw the scope of what platforms are 
included within these record-keeping requirements. Should we just be concerned about the Facebooks or 
the Googles or should we be sweeping in some of these smaller platforms as well?  
 
RS: Well our law certainly encompasses the smaller platforms as well. So, as far as what we should do, I'll 
leave that for the policymakers. But, yeah, our law does encompass those smaller platforms, and I think, 
probably, any solution would need to encompass those so that you're not essentially picking winners and 
losers in the marketplace where you may drive more political advertising somewhere else if someone is 
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trying to either skirt disclosure or go with a cheaper option because disclosure is not required because that's 
something that the entity doesn't have to deal with. So, yeah, I think it would have to be more of a universal 
- and what we really wrestled with is when you get outside of the Facebooks and the Googles and you have 
multiple entities in an ad buying transaction, you have a campaign consultant, you have an ad buyer, you 
have a network, you have a [inaudible], whatever, the list seems to be endless. Which one of those is 
responsible? And so, our rules do speak to some of that. So, not everybody in that whole chain is 
responsible, there's one. And, hopefully, the marketplace can come up with some solutions here for 
disclosure, because it's hard for everyone in that transaction as well to figure out who's going to handle 
disclosure and if there was an industry solution that could help them, that would be all for the better.  
 
ANF: That's interesting. Because one of the things I'm looking at is how the scope of these things are drawn, 
like some laws will say - or even the federal proposal - will say "we're going to sweep in platforms with 
this many monthly users." But, in Washington, they kind of just sweep in almost everyone, which I thought 
was really interesting. Thank you for elaborating on that. And then I just wanted to touch on a different 
approach that New York has taken. So, we've talked about how in Washington maintaining records on 
political ads, that responsibility rests with the commercial advertiser, which includes online platforms. But, 
the alternative approach that exists in New York is they have a similar record-keeping responsibility, but 
the state agency maintains the record instead of the commercial advertiser. So, the candidates themselves, 
I think, have to say "yeah, I placed this digital ad on Facebook, and here's all the records, and the state 
agency says, thank you, we'll put this into our state database" and it rests with the state. I'm wondering what 
you think of that approach in terms of how feasible would it be to do something like that in Washington? 
 
RS: Well, I think it's feasible. But, it again gets from the fundamental premise of having checks and 
balances. 
 
ANF: Right, that's what I thought you would say. 
 
RS: Yeah. So, I mean, if you're getting all your reporting from one source, then you have nothing to check 
it against. So, that would be my only concern. It would be completely feasible for us to get that information 
from the campaign, technically. We may face a policy hurdle to convince campaigns that they should report 
more information to us, some of them already think that they have to report too much. Yeah, so. So, that's 
totally technically feasible, that we could build a system to do that. And, I'm sure, if it meant that we were 
backing off of commercial advertising disclosure, I'm sure we could get campaigns there because they 
would then see that as maybe a win because more would come back into the market. But, I'm not sure this 
Commission at least would go there as far as giving up what really has been a longstanding stream of 
disclosure for Washingtonians. Every Washingtonian has the right to request that information.  
 




ANF: So, in general, and I just have a few more questions, and they're more general, broad questions. If 
you had to give a brief description of what goals you're trying to achieve with these record-keeping 
requirements, what would you say - like what's your elevator pitch of what goal you're trying to achieve 
with this?  
 
RS: To provide the public with as much information as possible about political advertising that they're 
either seeing or that their neighbors are seeing. Some of the, especially in the digital space, some of the 
commercial advertising disclosure is especially helpful when I don't see an ad. So, if I didn't get targeted 
for that ad, but I heard about it, and I want to go look at it and have information about it. So, I think it's 
about providing the public the information it needs to evaluate the people and issues on their ballot. And 
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political advertising because it's all about communication by a campaign is a really big piece of that process 
for the public.  
 
ANF: And do you think the record-keeping requirements have generally been effective in achieving those 
goals?  
 
RS: You know, I think so. There has been some work, so Eli Sanders, a journalist here in Washington State 
is a complainant in a couple of the cases that we have worked on. And he's written, if you haven't read his 
coverage, he's written a lot about the information that he received from Google and Facebook through us 
because his requests were not answered. So, he received it through us after we got it. But, he's written a lot 
about what it told him as a reporter and, therefore, a surrogate for the public about a campaign. I think there 
is value in it, and it wasn't information that in those cases that he got from campaign finance reports filed 
by candidates and political committees alone.  
 
ANF: Right. So, and then, broadly, I guess we've touched on this, but I'll ask it anyway. What do you think 
works well about your current record-keeping scheme and what do you think could be improved?  
 
RS: Again, what works well is the duality of it that we have coming from two sources. And, there is a 
proactive reporting responsibility from the campaigns, which are really are prime subjects of regulation and 
then commercial advertiser disclosure is more upon request. So, they're not having to come to us and report 
all details. They're having to maintain it in case someone wants to know. So, I think that is a good balance 
given that commercial advertisers are not our primary regulated entities, it's the campaigns, but they do 
have a role. As far as what doesn't work well, I think it's what I described earlier. And that is, it's very hard, 
currently, for a member of the public to use the right of inspection for digital political advertising. It's hard 
to figure out who to contact and then, even if that is discovered, there's oftentimes no response that is 
received, or only partial information provided. So, I think the public is not served by the current situation 
given the complexity that we see in the digital advertising space. And, it's new complexity. It's not 
complexity we would have seen in more traditional media forms that a member of the public has used the 




RS: So, it's trying to develop systems and policies to recognize the increasing complexity in political 
advertising.  
 
ANF: So, given that this, as you've kind of said, this is a fast-changing area, it seems like it's evolving all 
the time. As regulators, what information do you feel like the Commission needs to make informed 
decisions? If you could talk to researchers and social scientists, what information would you want to make 
informed regulatory decisions?  
 
RS: Well, we always are seeking a deeper understanding of how the marketplace works because it's - I'm 
not arguing that laws or policies should be designed around the marketplace, but you should at least know 




RS: So, that's really helpful. And, we're continuing to try to build up our knowledge and share it with the 
Commission. That's a lot of the work that [NAME] and I have been doing. And I had something else I was 
going to say, what else do we need to know. And it has just flown my head. 
 




RS: Can you rephrase, can you ask the question again, maybe I'll think of it? 
 
ANF: Sure. So, as regulators, when you're trying to craft these regulations, what information do you want 
to know or feel like you need to know about online political advertising?  
 
RS: Okay. The other thing that would be really helpful to know - and we actually have a set of students 
from the University of Washington, they're master of public administration students who are out in the field 
now collecting some of this information for us - it would be good to know what campaigns are doing. 
Certainly, we have campaign finance reports and what campaigns tell us. But, we don't have a whole lot of 
other data about what advertising choices campaigns are making and whether those advertising choices are 
different today than they were, like in 2017 when they could still buy an ad through Facebook that they 
acknowledged as political advertising. So, we have, of course, expenditure reports that they provide to us. 
But, there is often not enough detail in those to figure out, okay you said you made an ad buy, but was half 
of that print mailers and half of that was digital advertising? There's not enough specificity in those reports 
to really know for sure what's happening.  
 
ANF: Okay. I think that's important, and I know there are a lot of researchers that are trying to figure that 
out, what are campaigns doing with digital ads? And I think it's a great question and something that can be 
looked into more. I think that's all I have. Do you have anything else that you want to add that we haven't 
touched on? If not, that's fine, I just wanted to give you the opportunity if there's anything else that you 
think is important.  
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ANF: Maybe we can just start by can you briefly describe the disclosure regulations in Washington 
specifically for online political advertising? What disclosure regulations do those ads have to abide by?  
 
RS: Yeah. So, you know better than most people that disclosure regulations, rules, regulations, statutes that 
specifically regarding electronic, digital advertising are few and far between because the world only 
changed recently. So, we have a very good law in Washington state, and I think many states look to ours as 
an example. We have made our traditional disclosure laws, we have brought them up to date by adding 




RS: So, right now, if you're a digital advertiser, you have to make the advertisements available to the public 
if they ask for it, which is the way it's always been with newspapers and tv stations, and radio stations, 
which, frankly, up until five or eight years ago was all there was. So, now it's a whole different world. And, 
now, while we have a pretty good framework for bringing digital media into the paradigm that was the 
traditional media, we don't, like most or all other states, have a really good framework for digital media as 
a separate entity, which is what we're aiming to do now. To figure out how best to keep the spirit and the 
intent of our disclosure regime and have it apply to what is a completely different world now than it was 
ten or eight years ago. I know that doesn't go very deep in specifics, but happy to go further with you and 
talk about that. But, I think what we're embarking on right now, and we're working with our friends in 
California and a couple other states. I hesitate because this last year has been, well for everybody, it's been 




RS: Yeah, so. We were hoping to be more advanced than we are. We're moving along pretty good, but 
we're hoping to get further. We were going to - are you familiar with COGLE, C-O-G-L-E, it's the Counsel 
for Government, oh shoot, it's an acronym, and it's our agency's equivalent all around the country. And they 
get together once a year, and it's in the late fall. We were going to use this one this last year to be able to 
talk in person with our colleagues from different states but also bring to them what we are hoping is kind 
of a new world order in addressing the needs that the public has in achieving the disclosure that's necessary 
from digital purveyors. 
 
ANF: That makes sense. And I know that Washington is fairly unique among states in that it has a record-
keeping requirement for online platforms. Washington applies that to all commercial advertisers, but it's 
unique that you guys also apply it to online platforms. Why did Washington decide to go with that 
approach?  
 
RS: You mean as opposed to an approach, a paradigm what is for digital media specifically?  
 
ANF: Just, in general, what was the reasoning behind saying "we think online platforms should host these 
databases with information about the political ads that they run"? So, the rationale for putting that 
responsibility on the online platform as well as what benefit you think is gained by having that responsibility 




RS: Well, I guess a couple things. One is, I think my predecessors were smart to bring digital media to the 




RS: So, I think that was good. That's a good thing. But, we didn't require, it's funny because on the one 
hand I don't want to give Washington State more credit than it deserves. We didn't tell Facebook and 




RS: They decided to do that on their own and not, obviously just for Washington state, but also nationally. 
That was their answer. They could have not done that and still complied with our law. They could have 
figured out another way to do it. They have a library of all that stuff. They could make it available to a 
journalist when they come and ask for it without having the online archive. Where this gets really 
complicated is, as you probably know, Google and Facebook, which are by far the biggest and obviously 
take up the vast portion of the market - not all of it, but the vast portion of it, so they created these online 




RS: Right, and that's why complaints were filed against both of them. They came to us, we took the action. 
We considered the action. As it turned out in the end, we forwarded each of them to the Attorney General's 
office because the proposed stipulated agreement that our staff worked out with AGs on our behalf was not 
satisfactory to us. So, I don't know how familiar you are with the regulatory framework. But, generally 
speaking, an agency like ours, there's a firewall between the agency and us on adjudicatory matters. So, our 
agency was working with Facebook for a year on a complaint that was filed by a journalist who was not 
able to get from Facebook the things that we require under our law, notwithstanding their archives. Of 
course, that was their defense. They said "hey, we created this archive. Aren't we great, we did this." And 
our answer was "whatever, that's fine, but that doesn't comply with our law." Now, that's different than a 
lot of states, maybe all states actually. Even that issue alone only arose because we required them to do 
certain things, and their archive didn't meet the requirements. So, a complaint was filed. Their first answer 
was, this was in 2019, their first answer was "well, forget it then. Screw you, we're not going to take any 




RS: Well, okay. We said "do what you want, but we're not making you do that. We just want you to comply 
with the law. If you're going to take the ads, then you need to meet the disclosure requirements of the ads. 
If you don't then that's up to you. But frankly we kind of hope you do because a lot of candidates rely on 
you." Okay. So, then, and that was a $250,000 fine. They said, "well screw them, we're not going to do it 
anymore." Well they say, it depends on who you believe, of course, another complaint was required because 
they didn't stop allowing advertising in Washington State, and they didn't follow the law. They still didn't 
offer the disclosure that we require. So, a journalist filed another complaint against them. And one of their 
answers to that - this is Facebook now - one of their answers was "we're so big, we have a left hand and 
right-hand problem here. We can't even control all the advertising that runs through our platform." The case 






RS: So, after a year of working with Facebook. And there's articles in the paper a little bit, but we honestly 
didn't know anything, the Commission didn't. Well then, it's all just given to us. "Here, at the next meeting, 
we're asking you to approve this stipulated agreement with Facebook." Facebook's lawyers were there for 
certification for what they thought was going to be just a pro forma kind of thing, the Commission is just 
going to sign off on it. By the way, this is going into this kind of deep, I don't know if you wanted me to go 
to that level with this specifically.  
 
ANF: Whatever you think is important to note.  
 
RS: Okay. Well, hopefully it's for context if nothing else. So, we looked at it, and we have two former 
judges on our Commission. A lawyer, another lawyer, and then a journalist is also on the Commission that 
reviewed that. And a majority of us were not satisfied. We thought it didn't actually achieve the purposes, 
and the proposed settlement was what most people, and you and I, would consider a very small amount of 
money for them, for them. Large amount for us, but small for them. 
 
ANF: Yeah, that's one of the other questions I had. What typically are the penalties if online platforms don't 
comply with these requirements?  
 




RS: There is no typical. We're creating it right now. You know, again, now I can only speak to Washington 
State, of course. But, we had the fine against Google and Facebook for a quarter of a million dollars in 
2019. They paid it, and then they said "screw you, we're not going to do it anymore. We're not going to 
have political advertising anymore." And then they obviously still did, and so we ended up right back where 
we started from. Yet, they violated the law now twice, or two years in a row. So, we felt like "no, this isn't 
going to work." I mean, what we did last time didn't work, so we have to do something else. The agency, 
our staff thought maybe it would work, but we disagreed. So, we rejected that and sent it to the AGs office, 
and they have the litigation with Facebook right now. And they're just starting the litigation again with 
Google right now.  
 
ANF: Right. So, do you think that the penalties that have been imposed so far have enough of a deterrent 
effect? You've said, it sounds like, this keeps happening. 
 
RS: The obvious answer to that is no. It didn't have a deterrent effect because they did it again the very next 
year. And we've only done it once, right. So, the second one was a proposed settlement with a fine that we 
didn't accept. So, we've only done that once, we have a fine. Actually, the AG did that on our behalf in 
2019, and that was actually a, that was another issue because we thought - now it was out of our hands once 
we gave it to the AG in 2019 - they settled for what we thought was, I don't think we had agreed necessarily 
what the money was, what fine would be appropriate. But, what they didn't do, what the AG didn't do was 
say "okay. Facebook you now have to comply with the law, and this is what you need to do." All they did 
was take the money, essentially. Now, you'd have to ask them whether they thought that was going to be 
sufficient at the time. This is all pretty new. People are just figuring out how to deal with these guys on 
these issues now. So, where this gets even more complicated is that the online archive that we're developing 
now, or the mechanism for disclosure to the public that we're developing right now. We need and want at 
least Google and Facebook to work with us on that because we want to create a regulatory framework that 
meets our, the spirit and letter, of our laws. But we also want them to work. We want to create something 
that works and, while there are some on the Commission that feel more strongly on this than me, we also 
want to make sure that we don't discourage a mechanism that is available to campaigns, especially small 
ones actually, well all of them, but small ones rely on them even more. We don't want to preclude that in a 
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world where newspapers and tv and radio is not really the focal point anymore, or at least not as more. We 
want to at least, we don't want to preclude that possibility.  
 
ANF: That was going to be one of my questions. I've read the Washington Post v. McManus that came out 
of Maryland that has a different kind of record-keeping law. But one of the concerns that the Fourth Circuit 
raised in that case is that Google had said "well, we're just not going to take political ads for candidates in 
Maryland because we don't really want to deal with it." And so, the Fourth Circuit was very concerned 
about how that might impact down-ballot candidates, especially. So, how, as regulators, how do you address 
that concern when you're trying to craft legislation - or legislation or regulation?  
 
RS: Legislation or regulation, right. The short answer is, I don't know, we're trying to figure that out. But 
what's really complicated now is that we now have an adversarial relationship with both Google and 




RS: So, but they're very large companies. Now, we're hoping that we're able to talk to the left arm while 
we're fighting against the right arm. And I think, I'm actually somewhat optimistic, mostly about Google 
frankly because California who we talk a lot with and who have very similar goals as us, they have a very 




RS: I mean in the sense that Google created this, we had this seminar, this symposium about a year ago 
now, and we invited them and they came, a bunch of the California folks. And they created a process to 
what they're doing in California. I forget what they call it now, but they have a bunch of experts and people 
that sit on this thing. Well Google has offered to give them space to have people sit on it to give them space 
at their offices to work with them. We don't have that yet with either Google or Facebook. When I talk to 
the chair of the FPPC very recently, their relationship with Facebook has changed. Facebook was really 
not, according to him, they were not interested in talking, but now they are. So, I'm optimistic that we will 
be able to also.  
 
ANF: Do you have any sense of - or have these platforms expressed - what the compliance costs are 
involved in complying with Washington's regulation? It sounds like maybe those talks are kind of in the 
works, that's maybe a goal to talk with them more about that. 
 
RS: It's a good question, and the short answer is no. I don't feel like I have a good idea of what their 
compliance costs would be. I don't know that they do either, frankly. I don't think they'd be significant, but 
what do I know. I don't work for Google or Facebook, but I don't sense they'd be significant. But, what's 





RS: And this is right now. We're literally just now talking seriously about this and creating a map about 
how this is going to work. We are working on the possible creation of a distributive methodology for 
regulating digital formats. So, in other words, instead of saying to Google or Facebook or anybody else that 
has a digital platform "you need to make available to anyone who asks all these things" that we say under 
our law you have to do. They fight us like crazy over that, and they're going to keep fighting us like crazy 
over that. And we started thinking, "is that even the best way to accomplish what we want to accomplish?" 
So, what is it that we want to accomplish. We want to allow Ashley or a New York Times reporter to be 
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able to go to Facebook or Google or any other online platform and - I'm sorry let me go back. What we 
want to enable you to do is to have access to an online ad that anybody takes and pays for in your state.  
 
ANF: Right, okay. 
 
RS: Okay. That doesn't necessarily mean, and I have to confess that I was actually a person who thought 
only in the traditional framework model, and only recently I've been educated and realized "wait a minute." 
The goal is to allow Ashley to have access to it. Does that mean that she necessarily has to have access at 
Google or Facebook? That doesn't make any sense. So, we were originally talking about creating the first 
in the country public online archive. So, everybody that takes out an ad, we were talking about whether it 
would be the sponsor's responsibility or the advertiser's responsibility. But, either way, we would have to 
get the ads. All those ads that show up in any digital format would then be housed on a website or on our 
website that we own, we being the state of Washington. And, so that was the traditional thinking was. 
Google and Facebook, they impress some people, they don't impress me in terms of their online archives. 
It's a little bit, but it's not nearly enough. Whatever, it's a private company, they do whatever they want. 
But, their interest is not the public interest. Their interest is their own commercial interest. Our interest is 
the public interest. So, to enable Ashley or anybody else to get access to any online advertisement, political 
advertisement that occurred in your state, we could either do it by getting all that information and housing 
it ourselves and make it a totally open and publicly available. So, you could just go and find it. But, there's 
another way to do it. We could actually require all sponsors of ads, the people who take out, who create the 
ad, the people who pay for the ad, whether it's a candidate or a PAC or any other specific interest that takes 
out a political ad, right. We could require them - this is what we're really working on right now - require 
them all to have a digital signature. Each one of those ads would have a digital signature. They would have 
to make those available to us, they have to let us know what that is. They'd have to give us that digital 
signature, and then we would publish online the digital signature, and then Ashley could go to our site and 
get it, but we're not housing it. So, in other words, that digital signature would be at the Charlotte Times.com 
or whatever, where ever the ad appeared. And, you would be able to access it, but we don't have all that 
information. And we don't have to deal with Google and Facebook and the Seattle Times and everybody 
else giving us Fourth Circuit, First Amendment arguments about "hey, that's not our job to create all that 
stuff." Which, by the way, I'm not worried about here in Washington state. We don't have that same issue. 
We have a very different constitutional and statutory framework here. That case would not be successful 
here, I'm not worried about that. So, but, obviously it is there, and it was, and it would be in many other 
states as well. So, we think this distributive technology solution might be the answer that a number of states 
can join us and do.  
 
ANF: That's interesting.  
 
RS: Yea, because the goal - I think it's really important as a regulator, as a legislator, as anybody who makes 
or implements public policy should always, always take a step back and say "what is it we're trying to 
accomplish - what is the public interest here - what is it we're trying to accomplish, and what are the different 
ways it can be accomplished." So, the purpose is that Ashley and the New York Times reporter and, 
unfortunately more likely, campaign operatives from various campaigns want to have access to all this 
information. And they should. We're just trying to figure out the best, easiest, most inexpensive way to do 
that. Because, in our state and I think it's the case in most states, whenever we start talking about a public 
online archive that we own, all of the sudden legislators and opponents will immediately start talking about 
costs and how much money it's going to be.  
 
ANF: Yeah, that was going to be my next question. Do you think that you have the resources to do 




RS: Well, it's a really good question, but I'm not convinced it's very expensive, frankly. And I do think the 
discussion before we get to the amount of money, in this case if it was the state of Washington, the amount 
of money that it would cost us to do that, I think a strong groundwork needs to be laid for what it is we're 




RS: And I say that, and it sounds like "of course, that's obvious." Except, having worked at the legislature 
for years here and in Connecticut and Washington D.C., the quickest anything is to make it about money. 
And oftentimes that's done long before you even know what the it is. So, with that said, I've talked to, we 
don't have Google and Facebook in our backyard like California does, but we do have Microsoft. And we 
have Amazon. So, I have talked to Microsoft, they're very interested in helping us in whatever way possible. 
Of course, they'd love to house it or furnish the space for it. But I'm not convinced based on my discussions 
with them and the research I've done, I'm not convinced either method - either a distributor method, which 
is incredibly cheap for us, or a method where we have to create all the bandwidth and house it all - I'm not 
convinced either one is actually very expensive. I'm really not. And frankly, nobody has said otherwise. 
Nobody that I know of has credibly said otherwise. If Facebook or Google were to come with us and say 
"we've done the cost estimate and even to comply with Washington state laws, building our archive in 
compliance with Washington State laws will cost x amount of money." They've never done that. And I 
think that’s because (a) I don't think it's very much, and (b) they haven't even taken the time to figure it out 
yet. That's my sense.  
 
ANF: Right. And, sorry I'm just pulling up my notes here.  
 
RS: Go ahead, no problem.  
 
ANF: And. I guess I'm wondering what do you think this additional layer of transparency for online ads 
specifically - what additional benefit does that add on top of the traditional expenditure reporting 
requirements that folks already have to comply with?  
 
RS: Well, I'm not sure I totally understand the question. Are you asking, what would requiring digital 
advertisers to make their advertisement available offer the public in terms of transparency?  
 
ANF: Sure. So, I'm thinking. One of the arguments opponents have is this idea that "well campaigns or 
people buying independent expenditures, they already have to fill out campaign finance reports in every 
state, and it's already disclosed, so why do we need this additional layer of transparency where people can 
go look at the ad and have all this other information about online ads?" What would your response be?  
 
RS: Well, it depends on what you mean by all the other information, but just the ad itself, let's talk about 
just the ad itself first. Why is online ad access any different than access to a tv commercial or an ad in a 
newspaper? All it is a new version of that. What's really interesting is in terms of transparency, the public 




RS: Right. We could argue whether it's enough, and I would argue it isn't enough, but there is something 
there. There's a framework there. Interestingly what the public doesn't have is the actual ads.  
 





RS: Exactly. And what was really easy, of course in retrospect, it appears that way. But, what's really easy, 
and I'll use Washington State as an example. If a statewide candidate took out an ad, a tv buy, that would 
be pretty easy because we'd probably, everybody would see it first of all. And secondly, you could go to 
KIRO-TV and get a copy of it if you want. It was just one ad, or two or three ads, but it was all over, 




RS: So, we know, a statewide candidate in Washington State will take out a narrowly crafted, very specific 
demographic ad for Yakima, Washington, and their goal is to hit nineteen to twenty-five-year-old Hispanic 
males. That's a whole different ball game. We've never had that before. We've never had the technology to 
do that before, and now we have that. So, one could ask the question, I suppose, should somebody in Seattle 
be able to see what Mary Public who's running for U.S. Senate is doing in Yakima and how they're trying 
to convince people in Yakima. What are they saying? I hope that most reasonable people would agree the 
answer is that's important stuff, that transparency should include access to the ad. Well, now with online 
stuff, it becomes much more complicated because microtargeting, there are lots of people, there's all kinds 
of really interesting discussions about how much information should be accessible to the public. So, in other 
words, if Mary Public is running for U.S. Senate, through her pollsters and others have decided that women 
that own cats and maybe two or three other markers that live in a certain area, that's a critical constituency, 
they have to get that group. Well, I would argue that that's important for everybody, we all should know 
that. There is lots of misinformation out there, less so in Washington State than most states. But, clearly 
there is misinformation out there. If somebody is running an ad in, let's say. In Washington state the 
Cascades are a real dividing line between blue and red. So, let's just say somebody takes out, a statewide 
candidate takes out an ad in Spokane, which is much more conservative, and it's a racist ad or it implies 
that Native Americans are taking too many fish, or whatever. But, they would never do it in the Western 
part of the state. But they would do it over there because it would resonate. Well, we should know. I want 
to be able to know, I want reporters to be able to know so they can report on that. Those questions about 
how much information are very sticky and very controversial amongst regulators. There are people in 
Washington State, and it's probably going to be the prevailing view, that we should essentially stick with 
what we already require. I probably would go a little further than that, and I'll probably lose that battle. But, 
again, it's, we're so far advanced from other states. So, on the one hand, we're much better than other states, 
but, I believe, especially in 2021 we should be better than we are. But, again, one battle at a time I suppose. 
But, let's first get an online achieve so that anybody can go see it. Right now, they can't. We're not even 
close really. Look how at the billions that were spent in the 2020 campaign, and there's no way to track 
digital advertising, there really isn't. And most agency regulators, state regulators like us are reliant are 
complaints. So, you know, we're just about to start to do some audits, but we haven't. So, everything is a 
complaint. So, we'll only go pursue something if somebody has a complaint. But, think about all the ones 
that we just don't know about. And that's just us. What about all over the country? 
 
ANF: Right, that makes sense. As you're thinking about regulations should be in place - like you mention 
this is an area that's evolved so quickly, especially in recent years. So, as regulators, what information do 
you feel like you need to make informed regulatory decisions? If you could sit down with researchers or 
social scientists, what research would you want them to be doing that would help you make these decisions?  
 
RS: Boy, I'll tell you that is a great question. 
 
ANF: I'm hoping to pass it off some of the professors and my colleagues as I graduate and say "hey this is 
what you guys should be doing next."  
 
RS: Well, you know. Honestly, Ashley, it's funny that you ask that question. It's a great question, and it's 
one I consider a lot here. But, I have to say, realistically, it's an academic question. It's a question that you 
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and your peers will discuss and talk about. And, I don't say that with derision, I actually say that with 
admiration. I'm with you. I agree with that. Regulators, not so much, not so much. You know, there's a 
woman who is - I can't think of her name right this second, but I can email you her name if you want - she 




RS: And she said some things once - I was on the call with her - and she said some things once, and I 
thought "man they're fantastic." They were great, so I connected with her, and she feels very strongly about, 
what's the term, equal, it's not equal speech, but it's, I can't think of the exact term. It's, the notion that -  
 
ANF: Equal time maybe? 
 
RS: No, it wasn't equal time. Let me tell you what it is, and then you can look it up. In the old days when a 
[inaudible] took out a $5,000 media buy with CBS in Seattle, her opponent had the opportunity to reach 
that very same audience and answer whatever claims she made. Because they knew what the ad was. Now 
you can't do that. You just can't unless we know everything. And because things happen so quick on the 
digital side, it's arguable whether it will ever be possible. But her point is - and she's written a paper on this 
- her point is whether it's digital or online or print or radio or tv - digital, tv, radio, or paper - the theory 
should be the same. If I take out an ad in parts of the state but not over here in other parts of the state, I do 
a bunch of online advertising. And, let's just say it's not particularly scrupulous or let's just say it attacks, 
it's an attack ad. It really attacks you, you're the other candidate. Should you even have an opportunity to 




RS: It's always been the case that you have had that opportunity without us making it so. It just was because 
print and tv and radio were pretty easy. But now it's not that way. So, I believe that that should be a factor. 
But, I can tell you, honestly at least in the short run, I will lose that battle. Also, there are, a big battle is 
specific demographic targeting information. Nobody wants to give that up. The people that create it, they 
definitely don't want to give it up. The candidate doesn't want to give it up and expose it. And, frankly, 
neither do the online advertisers. They don't want to give it up either. So, if Mary goes to Google or 
Facebook and says "I want to reach x type of people." Google and Facebook have the wherewithal to say 
"let me tell you, to reach those people here's how you do it. And we know exactly how to do it and it'll cost 




RS: We never had that information before. Well, Google doesn't want to share it with us, and Facebook 
doesn't want to share it with us. The candidate doesn't want to share it. Nobody wants to share targeting 
information. But the question is, should targeting information be available to the public? I mean, the fact 
that Mary decided to hit, to go after women between forty and fifty that owned cats, should that be 
important? Now, obviously they're doing it for very specific political reasons. But is that enough? Should 
that be enough that the public should have access. That will be a huge fight. But, I think it won't be a fight 
in the near future, because we're not even anywhere near that. I mean just making the ads available, we're 
not even there yet. And that's just making the ads available. But, I believe your colleagues and academics 
around the country especially and also interest groups, there are some great groups out there on transparency 
and disclosure considering this issue and thinking about that. But, I'll tell you, it doesn't resonate, those 




ANF: That’s interesting. So, I think we've pretty much touched on everything that I wanted to touch on. 




ANF: Is there anything else that we haven't touched on that you want to note or that you think is important 
to note?  
 
RS: No, it's just that what you're doing is fantastic, I love it. And, your timing is not - I mean that's always 
going to be the case. Whenever anybody does a research project like this, you're obviously stuck with the 























(6) Transcript: Research Thesis Interview Six 
 
Research Subject: Attorney who filed an amicus brief in Washington Post v. McManus 
Transcript Key: Research Subject (RS); Ashley Nicole Fox (ANF) 
 
 
ANF: We’ll go ahead and get started with a general question. What do you think that the Fourth Circuit got 
right in their analysis in Washington Post v. McManus, if anything?  
 




RS: which was appealed to the Fourth Circuit. So, in the lower court decision, the district court analyzed - 
let me take a step back. The law that we're talking about imposes disclosure requirements related to political 
ads that are run on digital platforms, and, in Maryland, they define platforms based on the threshold of 
monthly users, I think they apply a threshold of 100,000. So, that applies to social media platforms like 
Facebook as well as newspaper platforms like the Washington Post, which was the lead plaintiff in the case, 
that have online platforms that sell and run political ads on their platforms. And, what the Maryland law 
does is require the platforms themselves to disclose information about the ads, who paid for them, other 
information on their own website. So, that that information is accessible to the public. And, federal law and 
many state laws have long had requirements that apply to ads on tv and radio, and actually the FCC requires 
broadcasters to collect and make available publicly the same kinds of information. What the Maryland law 
was attempting to do was extend similar kinds of requirements that apply in older forms of media like TV 
and radio to the Internet. And, because it's kind of a new - well, online ads are not new, but a lot of 
governments, federal and state level, have really failed to keep up with the way advertising has evolved. 
And so, even though this has been around for a time, we don't have lots of laws, there aren't cases really 




RS: So, in that sense, this case presented a novel question about the application of traditional campaign 
finance jurisprudence to add to laws that require transparency about online ads. And, Maryland argued, and 
amici argued in support, that there's no reason to view these laws any differently than other types of laws 
requiring transparency about ads on tv and radio. The exact same interests that the Supreme Court has relied 
on in upholding these laws, which relate to the public having a right to know who is trying to influence 
their votes, they apply the same to digital ads as they do to tv and radio ads. And, under those cases, the 
Court applies an intermediate level of scrutiny, which just questions whether the law is substantially related 
to an important government interest. And, traditionally, frequently, those laws are upheld under that 
standard. And, the district court looked at those cases and concluded that Maryland's law was different 
because it applied not to the people paying for the ad but to the third party platforms hosting them, and, in 
the district court's view, that distinguished Maryland's law so much from other cases that it applied a 
different standard of review called strict scrutiny, which, as the Fourth Circuit on review recognized, strict 
scrutiny is essentially - it's essentially like saying the law is guaranteed to be struck down. Very few laws 
end up surviving strict scrutiny. The court, in applying that standard, looks at whether this particular 
legislative approach is the least restrictive means of addressing the government's interest, which has to be 
compelling. And so, if the court can come up with any other approach to addressing the government's 
objectives, then the law will fail. So, that's what happened in Maryland. The district court said, under strict 
scrutiny, this law fails. I think there are a couple of important notes, which are that one of the things the 
court really focused on was on that the legislative record that Maryland - Maryland's legislative record in 
support of the law focused heavily on foreign interference, and the court concluded that the law seems to 
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miss-matched to address that problem, that Maryland hadn't really come up with a record showing a 
problem of foreign interference in Maryland elections to be addressed. And, so the law seemed like an 
aggressive way to combat a problem that hadn't been adequately documented. And, it wasn't clear to the 
court how the law would actually address that particular problem. So, in my view, I think the district court 
decision was just flat wrong on applying that standard of scrutiny, and I think that was crucial to its decision. 
I think reasonable minds can agree or disagree about the scope of the record. Certainly, having a fuller 
record about the problem of foreign interference could have helped. And, in Maryland, I also think because 
the law really addressed a broader problem, which was updating Maryland's law to address digital political 
advertising, I think a fuller record addressing how the law or explaining how the law addresses that problem 
could have been helpful. So, but I think that the district court was just completely wrong. It applied a body 
of caselaw that does not apply to campaign finance disclosure requirements in its decision to apply strict 
scrutiny and find the law unconstitutional. So, I think that was a mistake by the district court. On appeal, 
the Fourth Circuit, to its credit, did not embrace and affirm the district court's finding that the law should 
be subject to strict scrutiny. So, I think that's an important thing that the court at least sort of got right. It 
got right not to apply strict scrutiny. It also didn't find that the intermediate or exacting scrutiny standard to 
applied. It just kind of took a cop-out and avoided making any decision about what standard applies. And I 
think even that approach is somewhat telling because the court, the Fourth Circuit spent a fair amount of 
time kind of recounting [inaudible] decisions that applied outside the context of election disclosure law in 
characterizing Maryland's law as content-based restrictions and talking about how they target political 
speech and compelled speech. And all the cases that it was relying on are not the campaign finance 




RS: But then, it avoided going the further step of saying the standard that those cases apply, apply in this 
case, in recognition, I think of the fact that - and I'm looking at the decision now that says, "strict scrutiny 
in practice is virtually impossible to satisfy." And it goes on to say that "to declare an invariable reviewing 
standard of strict scrutiny would be an attempt to strip the future in the face of novel challenges to electoral 
integrity that we know not of and cannot foresee." And I think that's really important because it seems like 
the court is recognizing that what Maryland is trying to address is a real, serious problem. We saw in 2016, 
and it has continued since, there's a real problem with foreign nationals and others trying to interfere in our 
elections, and online platforms are increasingly the medium of preference for those influences. And, the 
ability, one of the things that people seeking to interfere in our elections find so appealing about the Internet 
not only is that it's cheap and accessible, but that it's largely unregulated. And, so, it's a really easy means 
of, sort of, concealing, not sort of, but it's an easy means to conceal who you are when you're trying to do 
this. It seems like the Fourth Circuit recognized that or the Fourth Circuit was wary of putting itself in a 
position or making it impossible for the Maryland legislature or other states legislatures to take action to 
address this real problem. And, it just didn't like this law. I think they felt like the legislative record, again, 
didn't quite match up with the approach that the law took. And the fact that the threshold that they mentioned 
in Maryland, any platform with 100,000 users, is swept in, meant even those small newspaper platforms in 
Maryland were taken in. Other states, and even the federal proposal that have similar requirements set 
thresholds at like 50 million or 70 million I think is the newer threshold, so much, much higher than in 
Maryland. So, it was unique in that respect. But, I think, where it was correct, is a good thing that the Fourth 
Circuit avoided issuing a holding that strict scrutiny applies. But, I think its analysis of applying cases that 
apply such a strict standard was incorrect. I think another good thing about the Fourth Circuit decision is 
that it was narrow, and it really did focus on the unique features of Maryland's law, including the fact that 
it applies, it poses the transparency requirements on the platforms themselves and the low threshold. So, I 
think it certainly left room for other jurisdictions, and even Maryland, to try to address the same problem 
through even, perhaps, similar ways, but in a more clearly supportive legislative record and perhaps more, 
whether a higher threshold or perhaps just a little bit more thought into making sure that the law really 




ANF: Yeah, I think that all makes sense, and that's kind of one of the things that I've been thinking about 
as well, right. Some people might thing that the impact of this particular case is limited, right. It's a decision 
from one federal appellate court, it's ultimately decided as an as applied challenge. What do you think the 
effect of McManus will be on legislative attempts to address online political advertising moving forward, 
if it will have an effect? 
 
RS: So, I think it definitely counsels in favor of making sure there's a record documenting the need to update 
political disclosure laws for digital media. And that, aside from - this isn't just about foreign interference, 
this is about all political ads. And making clear there's plenty of evidence to explain why there's a need for 
this, but the fact is laws are largely outdated. So, it's out there, and I think that legislatures will, legislatures 
and policymakers will and should rely on that to support laws and regulations. But, I also think that it raises 
questions about who should these disclosure requirements fall on. I think, so obviously Maryland took this 
approach of imposing requirements on the platforms. I think New York has a law that the requirements are 
on the advertisers and then the ad library or the ad archive is hosted by the government. There’re certainly 
some benefits to that approach, having a sort of more centralized receptacle of all digital ads where anybody 
who wants to see them can just go, regardless of what platform they may be on, they're in one place. An 
additional benefit is smaller platforms may come and go, and you don't have a situation of the possibility 
of a platform going out of business and, along with it, a record of its ads. And then, I think there can be 
some cost efficiencies and other efficiencies to having things in one centralized place. You don't have to 
continue to replicate certain archives, and they can all be consistently maintained. I think an obvious, major 
question is cost. Right now, we're in the middle of a pandemic. A lot of governments are strapped and have 
different priorities, and so, coming up with the money to build in some of this ability to host that may be a 
real question for legislators in looking for ways to try to streamline some of that so that legislatures can or, 
I'm sorry, so that government agencies can afford to maintain, take on that additional requirement I think 
would be crucial. But, yeah, I think that there may well be a shift, at least to looking at the ability of states 
to host it. To be clear, I'm not sure that's constitutionally necessary. I think the Fourth Circuit decision does 
leave some room for that, and, even in the context of Maryland law, there are specific aspects of it that if 
altered would still leave as a question whether either of the courts might have reached a different conclusion 
about an archive requirement or a disclosure requirement on the part of the platforms themselves. And this 
idea that they're sort of neutral third parties, I think is flawed. I mean, they are choosing to sell these ads, 
they're putting them on their websites. And the very argument that it's burdensome for them to alter their 
own speech I think is in tension with the notion that this isn't their speech in the first place, right. If an 
advertisement is not the government’s speech and that's the reason why it's extra burdensome to ask them 
to do anything about it, then it shouldn't actually be so burdensome to alter that to require a disclaimer or 
information about the source of that speech if it's not theirs. And, this isn't, nothing about this act requires 
alterations to the speech, it's requiring additional information about who paid for it. So, it's really not 
consistent with the jurisprudence about content-based requirements. 
 
ANF: Right. So, you've mentioned a couple of times that the Fourth Circuit decision left some room to look 
at these kinds of laws in a different way. So, if you were tasked with amending Maryland's law in light of 
the McManus decision, what would you change?  
 
RS: So, I think, I mean one thing I think I would do is get rid of the low threshold. Well, two things, I think, 
two big things. One is, I would shift the requirement, the disclosure requirements from platforms to the 
government, well to a combination of the advertisers and the government agencies. So, in other words, 
instead of requiring platforms to collect information, post it on their website, and then turn it over to the 
government, I think I would suggest requiring the advertisers, to the extent that they have the information 
already, to maintain it and report it to the government and if there's some information about the ad's run on 
a platform that they don't have in hand, they can ask platforms to provide that to them. And, as the person 
purchasing the ad, they clearly have a right to that. I think it would even be fine a requirement that the 
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platforms provide that information to advertisers so that they can comply with their legal requirement. I 
don't think that that would be burdensome. There’re no First Amendment issues implicated there. And then, 
I think it would be perfectly reasonable and consistent with both the analysis of the district court and Fourth 
Circuit decision even in McManus to say that then advertisers have to provide this information to the 
government - a copy of the ad, information about who paid for it, when it was run, those sorts of details. 
And then, for the state agency to collect and provide that information publicly. And I think if you take that 
approach, it doesn't really matter whether the law applies to platforms that have 100,000 monthly visitors 
or 50 million monthly visitors because there isn't really a burden on the platforms at that point. And so, I 
think you could accomplish Maryland's goal of making sure that ads on small platforms are still transparent 
without implicating the concerns about burdening smaller platforms. 
 
ANF: Interesting. And then, you said there were two points - I think I only picked up on one. 
 
RS: Oh sorry. The two were (1) shifting the reporting requirements from the platforms to the government 
 
ANF: Right.  
 
RS: I guess sort of three. Secondly, having the government make that information available. 
 
ANF: Oh, okay. 
 
RS: And third, getting rid of the threshold requirement for platforms and just saying that it applies to any 
platform. But the platform doesn't actually have the disclosure requirement itself.  
 
ANF: Okay, that makes sense. I had just written it down wrong.  
 
RS: No worries. I probably spoke quickly. 
 
ANF: So, let me scroll through my notes. You've said so many interesting things that I'm trying to decide 
what to follow up on and where to go next. So, we've talked a little bit about Maryland's law, but given this 
decision, what do you think of the approach in the Honest Ads Act? They kind of take a similar approach, 
aside from the difference in the threshold, which you've mentioned.  
 
RS: Right. Yeah, I think the Honest Ads Act is great, and no law always does all the things we would like 
it to do. I think having an archive hosted by the federal government, whether it's the FEC or some new 
entity, however that might be maintained, I think would have some advantages over imposing the 
requirements on platforms for the various reasons I mentioned. But, I don't necessarily think that the Fourth 
Circuit decision imperils the Honest Ads Act. I think the law is different in some really significant ways, 
including the threshold, very clear that the Honest Ads Act is not just a response to foreign interference, 
but is precisely about this concern about transparency in political advertising. And, frankly, I think 
Facebook has previously endorsed that approach, or at least I know that it endorsed the Maryland approach. 
So, large platforms like Facebook and Google and others are increasingly creating their own archives of 
political ads, which makes it somewhat less likely that at least those platforms would challenge a 
requirement that they do the very thing they've already done. I think, I certainly wouldn't mind if the federal 
legislation required an ad archive to be hosted by the government, but I think it's defensible to require that 
it be hosted by the platforms themselves.  
 
ANF: Okay. I think that makes sense, especially since there are some differences there. One of the other 
things I wanted to touch on - I wanted to talk about how online platforms responses to regulation might 
influence we think about how legislation is crafted. So, for example, Google doesn't accept political ads in 
Maryland and Washington, and I think in a few other states. It seems that maybe - I guess I don't know 
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because I haven't talked to Google, right - but maybe because they have these extra record-keeping 
requirements. And that was a concern that the Fourth Circuit raised. Is that something that we should be 
concerned about as we try to think about how to craft legislation?  
 
RS: Well, I think it's common for legislators to solicit and receive unsolicited input from various regulated 
parties. As I mentioned, I think Facebook was vocal in explicitly supporting the Maryland law. I know that 
Google was quoted in a report saying that they were going to stop running ads. But, they're running plenty 
of political ads. So, I don't think that those platforms are sort of very well situated to be complaining that 
this is so burdensome for them. They clearly, Google and Facebook both do a fair bit of this even without 
government requirements to do so. Because it's advantageous for themselves to do so given the public 
pressure and backlash that they've received for what's happened on their platforms. And, in many ways, I 
think it might be easier for platforms to have a uniform standard that they have to comply with. This is one 
of the reasons why, although I think there were a lot of good things about Maryland's law, I think ultimately 
the most, the best solution is for a federal requirement that applies across the board. When we have these 
sorts of ad hoc approaches that vary by platform and by state, it can be complicated and expensive for the 
platforms themselves to comply and also for the public to figure out how to access information on all of 
these different, under different standards and different technological approaches. So, and it certainly would 
be less expensive to just have one standard, and states can adopt the federal standard themselves. That 
would be easier for the platforms. They can just comply with the law, they don't have to keep figuring out 
all of these pieces themselves. 
 
ANF: That makes sense. Yeah, I imagine it's probably difficult for them because they're dealing with not 
only federal laws but fifty different states and how can they keep up with all of it. So, I feel like we've 
covered a lot of what I wanted to cover. You've been really great. I think sending more information on the 
topics ahead of time was helpful for keeping us on track. 
 
RS: Yes, definitely, thank you for doing that. 
 
ANF: I'm glad that it was helpful. I'm just scrolling through my notes. I have a second screen here. I should 
have mentioned that.  
 
RS: Oh, that's okay. Totally understand. 
 
ANF: I think a lot of people know now, but when "work from home" first started I got the second screen. I 
saw a video of myself looking away and thought "oh, I should warn people so they don't think I'm ignoring 
them'" when I'm in meetings. Let's see. So, I guess one of the, back to the Fourth Circuit's analysis maybe, 
one of the points, and I don't think I put this in my email, so I apologize. If you don't have thoughts on this, 
that's totally fine. But, one point that the Fourth Circuit made was distinguishing the record-keeping 
requirements that Maryland had established for online platforms from the similar requirements that exist 
for broadcasters that we've talked about a little bit already, right. And they kind of use the rationale that 
regulations for broadcasters have always received less scrutiny because there's a history of broadcast 
regulation and broadcast waves are a scarce resource. That's kind of the traditional rationale for regulating 
broadcast differently. Do you have any thoughts on whether that distinction between broadcasters and the 
Internet still makes sense under First Amendment law? 
 
RS: Yeah, I don't agree with that analysis, and I actually think if you look at, so the court in the McConnell 
case - I think it's the lower court decision - dug into that question a little bit in a few different opinions. I 
think, collectively, in analyzing the requirements for broadcasters, aspects of that McConnell, some of the 
judges in McConnell actually talked about the government interest in informing the electorate. So, I think 
even in analyzing the requirements in a case where they were challenged in a similar way here, the judges 
recognized or relied on the very same interests that apply in this context. That's one reason why I don't think 
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the analysis quite works. And, separately, sure broadcasting has been around for a long time, and so we've 
always done it. To the extent that the Internet has been around, it is increasingly the preferred medium for 
political advertising. So, I don't think it - it doesn't strike me as particularly convincing to just say "because 
this is new, we should apply a totally different standard." Certainly, if the public has a right to know who 
is trying to influence their vote when those advertisements are run on tv and radio, and now more 
advertisements are run online than on tv and radio, it can't be the case the public has less of a right to know 
who is behind those ads. And, you know, in other words, those statements should apply in both contexts. 
And yeah, I just don't find that argument particularly persuasive. And I don't think that the McConnell 
record necessarily supports it. 
 
ANF: Yeah, I'm actually happy that you mentioned the McConnell case because I was reading that case 
just last week trying to think about this question as well. And I'm reading through the case, and I'm like 
"well, they're looking at these same requirements for broadcasters, and they don't mention spectrum scarcity 
at all." This is not the basis for their decision, so why are we using it as the basis for a distinction. 
 
RS: Yeah, if you - I don't know if when you looked at McConnell you looked back at the three-judge court 
opinion, not just the Supreme Court's decision. But that's also worth taking a look at. There's some good 
discussion of this question in that case. 
 
ANF: I will do that. I appreciate that, that's really helpful. And then, I think we've touched on a lot of the 
specific questions that I wanted to touch on. Again, I should just send a little more information on the topics 
to everyone - we can get through this quickly, and I don't have to take up so much of everyone's time. So, 
I guess I just have one more question about how theories of the First Amendment might inform this. And 
while reading the briefs filed in the McManus case, I noticed that they often refer to different values that 
underpin the First Amendment, right. On the one hand, a lot of briefs refer to the marketplace of ideas 
theory, this idea that we don't want to do anything that might chill political speech. And, on the other hand, 
you have briefs that raise the idea that citizens need more information about these ads to engage in effective 
self-governance. What role do you think these more theoretical underpinnings might plan in crafting 
legislation to address online political advertising disclosure in this area?  
 
RS: That's a really interesting question. 
 
ANF: It's a big question. 
 
RS: Yeah, I think it's almost like a question of what are the values of our democracy, right? The idea about 
a marketplace of ideas I think is part and parcel, integral to the notion of an informed electorate because in 
order for people to be able to express their ideas and have competing ideas, you sort of need information 
about the source of the messages you're receiving. If you, see an ad in a particular, let's say you're in 
Maryland, and you're seeing an ad that's ostensibly, an ad about, well now a hot issue is about taxing, 
actually about taxing digital ads, interestingly enough. Let's say that there's some national group or a group 
based in New York City that doesn't like, is concerned about the possibility that this type of legislation will 
expand to other states. And they form a group, and they call themselves "Maryland against Digital Taxing," 
but actually it's just three wealthy New Yorkers running this ad, and Maryland sees this and things "oh, you 




RS: You want information about who those people are. You can be influencing the way people make 
decisions based on a misperception about that message. And the information about who is behind the 
message really allows people to fully understand what it's about, and who is behind it. I mean that was kind 
of a rough example that I just made up off the top. But, I think it really goes to the notion of how our 
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democracy is supposed to work in that it's a democracy for the people and by the people and the people 
have a right to participate and do so in an informed manner. And, this notion that having to be transparent 
about who you are when you're trying to influence how people vote, that that somehow is chilling is just 
not consistent with the way that our democracy works. It's not consistent with the Supreme Court's 
jurisprudence in this area, which consistently recognizes that in the context of electoral speech, that there 
are these competing First Amendment values of making an informed decision and having the right to do 
that and that there isn't some fundamental First Amendment right to influence people's electoral decisions 
in secret - it's just not a thing. To the extent that there are First Amendment rights to privacy and other 
contexts, they just don't apply in the same way when you're influencing elections in this country. So, I think 
that that is just really important to properly frame the issue in that way.  
 
ANF: Yeah, I like the way that you've framed it in that way. Reading the briefs, it kind of seemed like, at 
least in this case, it kind of seemed like the marketplace of ideas theory and the democratic self-governance 
theory were at odds in this context. But, it sounds like what you're saying is people need the information to 
be able to effectively engage in the marketplace of ideas. They shouldn't be things that are at odds, they 
work together in this important way. 
 
RS: Yeah, and there's a famous quote from Justice Scalia of all people, who despite being an opponent of 
lot of campaign finance regulation was a huge proponent of transparency. And it's in the Doe v. Reed case, 
and I'm not going to get the quote completely right, but you can find it easily by googling Scalia and Doe 
v. Reed because people cite it all the time. But, he said something to the effect of - it requires civic courage 
to participate in democracy, and without which democracy is doomed. And, this is how democracy works. 
There is not a First Amendment right to influence elections in secret, and the marketplace of ideas only 
really works if it’s an informed, if people can participate in that marketplace in an informed manner. 
 
ANF: That makes sense. Well I think that's pretty much everything that I had. Like I said, you've been really 
great in hitting a lot of these points and things that I didn't even have to ask about. You just hit on them 
yourself, which is really great. 
 
RS: Oh, great. 
 
ANF: Is there anything else that I haven't touched on that you want to add or that you think is important to 
note? If not, that's fine, I just like to give everyone the opportunity. 
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